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ABSTRACT
Robert Rosen and Relational System Theory: An Overview
by
James Lennox
Advisor: Andre Aciman
Relational system theory is the science of organization and function. It is the study of
how systems are organized which is based on their functions and the relations between their
functions. The science was originally developed by Nicolas Rashevsky, and further developed
by Rashevsky’s student Robert Rosen, and continues to be developed by Rosen’s student A.
H. Louie amongst others. Due to its revolutionary character, it is often misunderstood, and
to some, controversial. We will mainly be focusing on Rosen’s contributions to this science.
The formal and conceptual setting for Rosen’s relational system theory is category theory.
Rosen was the first to apply category theory to scientific problems, outside of pure
mathematics, and the first to think about science from the point of view of category theory.
We will provide an overview of Rosen’s theory of modeling, complexity, anticipation, and
organism. We will present the foundations of this science and the philosophical motivations
behind it along with conceptual clarification and historical context. The purpose of this
dissertation is to present Rosen’s ideas to a wider audience.
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Introduction
It has been almost sixty-two years since the first publishing of C. P. Snow’s Rede
Lecture, The Two Cultures. Since then, not much seems to have changed. Perhaps things have
even gotten worse. In the lecture Snow argues that the intellectual life of modern society has
splintered into two different groups. There are the scientists; in particular the physical
scientists. And then there are the humanities; in particular, what Snow calls the “literary
intellectuals’’ and these, he says, are the most influential in our “traditional” culture. The
problem is, as he states it, “that neither the scientific system of mental development, nor the
traditional, is adequate for our potentialities, for the work we have in front of us, for the
world in which we ought to live.”1
The problem is exacerbated, Snow argues, since neither of the two cultures has the
means or desire to communicate with the another. We are each ignorant of what the other
does. We are even hostile towards one another; you may recall the science wars that began
in the 1990s. Sometimes, Snow is a rather harsh critic of those of us in the humanities:
A good many times I have been present at gatherings of people who, by the
standards of the traditional culture, are thought highly educated and who have
with considerable gusto been expressing their incredulity at the illiteracy of
the scientists. Once or twice I have been provoked and have asked the
company how many of them could describe the Second Law of
Thermodynamics. The response was cold: it was also negative. Yet I was
asking something which is the scientific equivalent of: Have you read a work
of Shakespeare? I now believe that if I had asked an even simpler question –
such as, What do you mean by mass, or acceleration, which is the scientific
equivalent of saying, Can you read? – not more than one in ten of the highly
educated would have felt that I was speaking the same language. So the great
edifice of modern physics goes up, and the majority of the cleverest people in

1

Snow, The Two Cultures, 64.
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the western world have about as much insight into it as their Neolithic
ancestors would have had.2
Snow even goes so far to call us in the humanities intellectual Luddites.
I too have come to find the problem of the two cultures unsettling. In my philosophical
studies, as a graduate student, I was forced to come to terms with the other culture, the
natural sciences. I felt I had no choice in the matter.
I entered the Comparative Literature program at the Graduate Center to study
continental philosophy and the human condition as it manifests itself in the arts and
literature. I was excited. In my first semester, I took a course titled History of Literary Theory
and Criticism III with Dr. Giancarlo Lombardi. One of the works Dr. Lombardi assigned was
Gilles Deleuze’s and Felix Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia. At
the time I found it intriguing so I decided to study it and more of the works of Deleuze. In
Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, there is a passage in which he asserts that Alfred North
Whitehead’s Process and Reality is “one of the greatest books of modern philosophy.”3 This
was quite a claim. I had never heard of it. I was in the library at the Graduate Center when I
read the passage. I immediately ran down to a bookstore in Union Square and luckily, they
had it, so I Picked up a copy, went back to the library, and began to read. After I finished, I
was not sure if I understood one lick of it. It was formidable. I would later learn that some
say it is the most difficult work in philosophy, but I found it fascinating. This was the
beginning of my intense study of the philosophy of Whitehead which lasted for some years.

2
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The more I studied Whitehead the more I realized there was a problem that I was
going to have to face in order to continue. Whitehead did not start doing philosophy proper
until he was in his sixties. By trade, he was a mathematician and a theoretical physicist. He
tells us that his entire metaphysics is based upon his understanding and interpretation of the
implications of the mathematical physics of late 19th and early 20th centuries in which he was
so well-versed. Unfortunately, I knew absolutely nothing about mathematical physics
whatsoever, but I realized I would have to learn; at least to some extent. The problem got
worse when I came across an essay by the physicist and philosopher Abner Shimony,
“Quantum Physics and the Philosophy of Whitehead”. In the essay, Shimony argues that there
are certain properties of quantum systems (or better, the lack thereof) that call into question
the very foundations of Whitehead’s metaphysics. If this were true, it would be a devastating
blow.
I began reading popular books on quantum physics. Not a good place to start. But
then, shortly thereafter, I got a stroke of luck. I met a physics student in the lobby of the
Graduate Center, Yonatan Ben, or Benben as he is called. I explained to him my problem and
he was graciously willing to help. Beben had just started reading a book, Philosophical

Consequences of Quantum Theory, Reflections on Bell’s Theorem. It was a collection of
papers that were presented at a conference which was held at the University of Notre Dame
in October of 1987. He asked if I would like to read it with him and we could meet after
reading each paper to discuss and he would take me through the physics. We started meeting
in the science lab at the Graduate Center, right around the hall from the office for the
Department of Comparative Literature. During one of our meetings, there was another
physics student, Amol Deshmukh, who heard our discussion and became very intrigued.
3

Bell’s theorem is concerned with what physicists call foundational problems. In general,
physics courses do not usually concern themselves with such problems. After the three of us
talked for some time, Amol suggested that we form a group and meet every week to continue
to study foundational problems in physics in greater detail. And we did. We started meeting
once a week, every Sunday, at three o’clock, in the science lab. We would pick papers, books,
or chapters from books beforehand and then discuss them the next week. Shortly thereafter,
another physics student, William Mayer became interested and joined the group.
At some point, I can’t quite remember exactly when, I came across a book, Quantum

Expectations, Essays in Honour of David Bohm. The physicists and I had studied a good bit
of Bohm’s work and he had become one of my favorite thinkers. I thought there might be
some good papers in the book for us and I turned out to be right; we ended up studying at
least five of the papers in the book.
I had read all of the papers in the book to see which ones would be of interest to the
physicists and there was one, that at first, I did not share. It was an essay by Robert Rosen.
Who was Robert Rosen? Never heard of him. The paper is titled “Some Epistemological
Issues in Physics and Biology”. As I read it, I couldn’t believe my eyes. It contains the most
revolutionary and original ideas I had ever come across. I could see an entirely new way of
thinking and with it, an entirely new world. It is truism that physics is the science that
concerns itself with the general study of nature. Biology, when compared to physics, is a
marginal science since it concerns itself only with a very small portion of nature, the living.
More, a lot of scientists, even a lot of biologists, would like to believe that biological
phenomena can and will be eventually understood entirely though the means of

4

contemporary physics. In the essay Rosen argues it is in fact the other way around: it is
biology that is the more general science and it is contemporary physics that is marginal.
“How could that be?” you might ask, “That makes no sense!”, you might say. There’s the rub.
“Who is this guy?”. “How many more papers did he write about this stuff?”. “Did he
write books?”. “If he wrote books that would be grand.” After finishing the paper, I
immediately did an internet search. Unfortunately, I found that Rosen passed in 1998 due to
complications with diabetes. I found that Rosen did write and edit books, and that he had
published hundreds of papers and essays. I decided to first read the last book he wrote before
he passed, Life Itself, A Comprehensive Inquiry Into the Nature, Origin, and Fabrication of

Life. It was everything I could have asked for and more. Reading it at first was brutal. It still
is. I could follow some of the arguments and I could glimpse at some of its profundity. But
the science, the math, a lot of really abstract math, a lot of category theory, I just did not know
and could not follow. Not even the physicists knew this math. I was at a loss.
Earlier on, before coming across Rosen’s work, I was walking to the science lab to talk
with the physicists. In passing, coming towards me down the hallway, was Dr Rohit Parikh. I
had the good fortune of having discussions with Dr. Parikh from time to time. Dr Parikh is a
professor of philosophy, mathematics, and computer science at the Graduate Center and
Brooklyn College. He was with a colleague of his that I did not know, Dr. Noson Yanofsky. Dr.
Parikh kindly stopped me to introduce us. Dr. Yanofsky is a professor in the Department of
Computer Science, both at the Graduate Center and Brooklyn College. In my hand was a copy
of Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, a collection of papers of the physicist
J. S. Bell who I mentioned above. The physicists and I were studying Bell’s papers. When he

5

saw the book, Dr. Yanofsky remarked “that is not an easy read.” “Yes”, I said. Dr. Yanofsky
then told me that he had recently written a book, The Outer Limits of Reason, What Science,

Mathematics, and Logic Cannot Tell Us. In it, he said, was a chapter on quantum theory and
Bell’s theorem. He asked me to have a look if I like and to email him if I had any thoughts or
questions. I did. His book became a favorite of mine and I use it often to teach my students.
Another stroke of luck: it turns out that Dr. Yanofsky is a category theorist. After
struggling so much with Life Itself, I turned to Dr. Yanofsky. I asked him, how, God willing,
could I learn category theory? “Here”, he responded, “you start here”. He showed me a copy
of Conceptual Mathematics, A first introduction to categories, by William Lawvere and
Stephen Shanuel. And so began my study of mathematics. Category theory is hard but it is
very beautiful and philosophically rich. Outside of pure mathematics, it now has applications
in physics, biology, computer science, even linguistics.
Gradually, I asked the physicists, if, from time to time, we could study some of Rosen’s
work together. It turned out that even for them, Rosen’s work was difficult to understand.
Nonetheless they were astonished. Even the way Rosen treats familiar concepts in physics is
novel and takes some getting used to. Eventually, Benben and Amol graduated and moved
on. William and I kept meeting. Together, we devoted some year and a half to the study of
Rosen’s work exclusively. We decided that even though I was a comparative literature major
it would be best, if possible, to write my dissertation on Rosen and present his ideas to a
more general audience. Then William graduated and moved on too. The meetings were over.
The physicists and I had formed the first, and I pray not the last, intellectual
community of which I was proud and honored to be a member. Snow, and both scientists and

6

my colleagues in the humanities alike may find it odd that they so willingly included me,
someone so ignorant, in their studies of some of the most important discoveries and deepest
problems in theoretical physics. All I can tell you is that I am grateful and that they taught me
more than I could ever have dreamed. It is a beautiful thing.
Rosen’s work is not well known, even in his own field of study, biology. It appears that
not one course has ever been taught on his work exclusively in any biology department in
the world. There are, however, a small number of scientists who do continue his work. But
amongst those scientists who are aware of his work, there are also those who vehemently
despise it. Part III of Rosen’s Essays on Life Itself, published posthumously, is mainly a tribute
to the great mathematician and natural philosopher René Thom. In it he writes:
The appearance of René Thom’s Stabilité Structurelle et Morphogenèse in
1972 (translated into English in 1976) was a watershed event in mathematics,
in theoretical biology, and for the philosophy of science generally. The
questions he raised in that book, both directly and by implication, were deeply
disquieting to most practicing, empirical scientists, making their dogmatic
slumbers untenable. The predictable responses took several forms: (1)
outrage and indignation; (2) violent but irrelevant counterattacks; (3)
pretense that Thom did not exist, and hence is ideas did not need be addressed
at all; and (4) a distortion of his views into a benign soporific that would
enable them to sleep again.4
I would argue that if you replace Thom’s name with Rosen’s and Stabilité Structurelle

et Morphogenèse with “Rosen’s work” you have an autobiography.
Rosen’s first two published books were textbooks, Optimality Principles in Biology
and Dynamical System Theory in Biology. He intended the latter to be the first of two
volumes. The reviews for it were harsh. In response, he vowed to never publish another

4
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textbook again. To be fair, Dynamical System Theory in Biology is full of errors, most
unfortunately in the math. Rosen is a terrible proofreader and in many of his subsequent
works there are errors abound. Nonetheless, the insights in both textbooks were either
underappreciated or ignored.
All of Rosen’s subsequent books are scientific monographs. For political reasons, and
its controversial content, it took Rosen six years to find a publisher for his second
monograph, Anticipatory Systems, Philosophical, Mathematical and Methodological

Foundations:
There were many people who, I should say, the ideas of functionality and ideas
of anticipation raised hackles because, again, it was easy for them to feel it was
a step away from science as they understood it. They felt that science was
simplifying – dealing only with simple systems. And any attempt to complexity
or any attempt to invoke a larger context – several larger contexts, in fact –
was a step away from science that they wanted, or that they were seeking.5
Rosen was once accused of trying to find answers to questions that nobody wanted
to ask. The most important question that motivates his entire life’s work is the Schrödinger

question, “What is life?”. Or more, “What distinguishes a living system from a non-living
one?”, “What are the defining characteristics of a natural system for us to perceive it as being
alive?”. And as we shall see, he gave definitive answers.
Rosen tells us that as he got better at defending himself and putting forth his point of
view fewer and fewer people would talk to him. In my studies of his work, I noticed a growing
frustration with the orthodox scientific community overtime. From the late 1950s up until
the 1980s, the presentation of his ideas is clear and congenial. From then on, while still

5
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optimistic about the direction and possibilities his ideas could take, the presentation is
sometimes cryptic, and much more critical. In the opening paragraph for the preface of Life

Itself, Rosen writes:
For whom is this book intended? I do not know. The book itself has no
pragmatic purpose for which I am aware. It is thus for anyone who wants to
claim it.6
As said above, Rosen’s work is difficult to understand. A good amount of his critics
and commentators both misunderstand and mispresent his ideas. Most do also not take the
pains to study enough of his work in the detailed manner it requires. This is even true for
some of his more congenial commentators. To give just one example, I recall one such
commentator lamenting that Rosen had not considered the relationship between his model
for a living cell and what in mathematics are known as adjoint functors. Had the
commentator read Rosen’s most comprehensive essay on the mathematics involved in the
model, “Some Relational Cell Models: The Metabolism—Repair Systems”, on page 241 they
would have seen:
the two functors
H(A, H(B, C)), H(AxB, C)
mentioned above are also naturally equivalent (the proof is somewhat tedious,
though not difficult). Indeed, the above natural equivalence, which indicates a
deep relation between the Cartesian product and sets of mappings is the
motivation for the important theory of adjoint functors, which may have
important biological applications.7
Frustrating to say the least, but I have seen much worse.

6
7
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In the future, it is my hope to make explicit, as much as possible, the philosophical
implications of Rosen’s work. His work offers vital alternative approaches and new insights
to many philosophical problems. But before anyone including myself can do this, his work
must be thoroughly understood. This is the purpose of this dissertation, to present some of
Rosen’s work in the clearest possible manner to a wider audience. Unfortunately, I could find
no effective way for presenting his work in some kind of linear order; I am not sure there is
one.
Unfortunately, there is some math. I have tried to avoid it as much as possible and
when necessary to keep it as simple as possible, perhaps to the point of over-simplification;
and all of this probably to the annoyance of the mathematicians. To them, I must apologize.

10

Chapter 1. Category Theory
1.1 An Historical Note
Rosen wanted to be a biologist even before he knew what the word meant:
Among my earliest memories are walks though the wild and overgrown vacant
lots which dotted the asphalt Brooklyn landscape into which I was born. Under
every rock was a new and thrilling universe of living things. From these
experiences was born an eternal passion, a lust, to understand why these
things, in their separate ways, were alive, while the rock was not. The rocks
were themselves mildly interesting, but in a bland, impersonal way; it was life
which was the compelling challenge to me. If I could find out what life was, I
would know what the rocks were, but as it even then seemed to me, not the
other way around.1
At an early age Rosen began reading anything he could find dealing with life and the
living. As a student at Stuyvesant High School, Rosen took courses in analytical and organic
chemistry. His studies in chemistry led him to the study of physics. And then, as he puts it,
“fatefully”, his studies in physics led him to study mathematics, the language in which physics
is expressed:
I decided that henceforth, I must become proficient enough in that
mathematical language to understand, to the root, what realities were being,
or indeed could be, expressed through it. […] Up to that point, I had only the
most perfunctory interest in the sciences of the inanimate; these were the
rocks again, and not the life. Suddenly, it now seemed a matter of urgent
necessity to master these things. To facilitate acquiring such a mastery, it
seemed the most natural thing in the world to change my major. So I blithely
shifted out of biology and into mathematics. It felt perfectly right to do so, and
I regarded it as the merest tactical device in the service of the unchanging
strategy I was groping for.2

1
2

Rosen, Anticipatory Systems, 422.
Ibid, 423
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Rosen decided to immerse himself entirely into the study of pure mathematics and
mathematical physics with the instinct that therein must lie the secret to understand life and
the living:
I quickly came to recognize that my instincts had been correct; that the
mathematical universe had much of value to offer me, which could not be
acquired any other way. I saw that mathematical thought, though nominally
garbed in syllogistic dress, was really about patterns; you had to learn to see
the patterns though the garb. That was what they called “mathematical
maturity”. I learned that it was from patterns that the insights and theorems
really sprang, and I learned to focus on the former rather than the latter.3
Rosen obtain a bachelor’s degree in mathematics from Brooklyn College and within
just a year, a master’s degree in mathematics from Columbia University. Although, he initially
entered the University of Chicago, to obtain a PhD in mathematics, he quickly changed his
major and obtained a PhD in mathematical biology under the tutelage of Nicholas Rashevsky
which we will have more to say about in Chapter 3.

It was at Columbia University that Rosen was first introduced to category theory.
Category Theory was developed by Sanders Mac Lane and Samuel Eilenberg. The theory was
first presented in their 1945 paper “General Theory of Natural Equivalences” which we will
consider in a bit more detail below. Rosen took a course on abstract algebra with Eilenberg
at Columbia University which turned out to really be a course on category theory in disguise.
Rosen continued to study category theory with Mac Lane at the University of Chicago and it
was at that time that Rosen made the revolutionary discovery that category theory
“expressed in a purely mathematical realm the patterns of relations, between objects and

3
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models, and between one model and another, which I was trying to find in the realm of the
living.”4

Rosen was the first to apply category theory to the natural sciences, outside of pure
mathematics, beginning with his second published paper in 1959, “The representation of
biological systems from the standpoint of the theory of categories”. We will consider the
content of this paper and its subsequent development in Chapter 6. More, as we shall see
over and again, he was the first to think about science, or perhaps even better, rethink
science, from the point of view of categories. Rosen recalls:
I believe I was the first to suggest that category theory had important roles to
play in the sciences. The realization that this was so actually began dawning
on me a couple of years earlier. I remember well my suggesting this, with a
great deal of diffidence, to Samuel Eilenberg, from whom I first learned
category theory. This was in 1958, when Eilenberg was in residence for a
quarter at the University of Chicago. I will never forget his two-word response:
“Oh, no.” At this point, I realized there would be no help from this quarter, and
that I was on my own.5
Many years later, in Rosen’s last book, Life Itself, he writes: “I do not believe that
anyone has yet fathomed all the things category theory can do, even after decades of work.
It can of course, be employed as a tool, for talking coherently about specific referents. It can
be studied as a thing in itself. It can be used as a kind of transducer, to move ideas and
methods from one part of mathematics to another. But each of these, important as they may
be, is only a part, and preoccupation with a part obscures the whole.”6

Ibid, 428.
Rosen, “On Models and Modeling,” 372.
6 Rosen, Life Itself, 151.
4
5
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1.2 Category Theory: A General Theory of Models
For Rosen, category theory is, first and foremost, a general theory of modeling in and
for mathematics or what Rosen calls modeling relations; category theory provides the means
by which mathematics can model itself: category theory is “among other things, the natural
habitat for discussing, not only specific modeling relations that have historically arisen in
mathematics, but also the enterprise of modeling itself. It is thus unique among formal
systems in its inherent reflexive characteristics, which as I said, approach those of a natural
language, unique to the point that many mathematicians, even today, do not consider it
mathematics at all.”7 This self-reflexive character of category theory, which is so striking,
makes it, as Robert Geroch says, “the mathematics of mathematics.”8
Informally, a category can be thought of as a kind of “mathematical universe” which
is comprised of two kinds of entities: objects and arrows both of which are left unspecified.
The objects are usually denoted, A, B, C, etc., or a, a’’, b, b’’, etc. The arrows are usually
denoted, f, g, h, etc., or by the letters of the Greek alphabet, α, β, γ, etc. Every arrow has an
object called its domain and an object called its codomain. For example, given an arrow f,
from A to B, usually written, f: A → B, the domain of the arrow f is A and the codomain of the
arrow f is B. The arrows in a category can be thought of as ways of transforming or

translating things in their domains into things in their codomains or as a general
representation of processes.

7
8
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Most importantly, arrows in a category can be composed. Given two arrows f: A → B,
and g: B → C, for which the codomain of the arrow f is the same as the domain of the arrow
g, one can compose the arrow g with the arrow f and obtain a new arrow from A to C, usually
written, g ∘ f: A → C. The symbol “∘” means after or following; so, g ∘ f means the arrow g after
or following the arrow f.

Every object in a category has an identity arrow, 1A: A → A. An identity arrow can be
thought of as a kind of “do nothing arrow”; no transformation or process has taken place.

A category satisfies two axioms. The first is the associative law for the composition of
arrows: given the three arrows f: A → B, g: B → C, and h: C → D, we have

h ∘ (g ∘ f) = (h ∘ g) ∘ f

This axiom states that composing g with f before h is the same as composing h with g
before f.

15

The second is the identity law: given an arrow f: A → B, if we compose it with the
identity arrow for A and the identity for B, we have

f ∘ 1A = f = 1B ∘ f

This axioms states that composing an arrow, f, with the identity arrows for either its
domain or codomain, does not “do anything” to f. It is analogous to multiplying any number
save zero by the number 1.

Anything that satisfies the above conditions forms a category and it turns out that a
vast amount of mathematical structures are categories. Category theory is the study of how
different categories and their mathematical structures may be compared and the ways in
which these structures may be related to one another, some of the means by which we now
turn.
The first important concept for establishing a modeling relation between categories
is called a functor.9 Category theorists say that a functor is an arrow that is structure

There are two kinds of functors, covariant and contravariant, but for our purposes, we need not bother with
the distinction.
9
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preserving between categories. Roughly, in mathematics, the term structure means the kinds
of relations defined on an object. Rosen, would prefer to say that a functor preserves

entailment relations between categories.10 Given two categories, C and D, a functor F: C → D,
from a category C to a category D, sends the objects and arrows in C to the objects and arrows
in D; it does so in such a way that it preserves domains and codomains between arrows,
identity arrows, and the composition of arrows of C in D; if arrows transform or translate
things in their domains to things in their codomains, functors do the same except now from
one entire category into another in a structure or entailment preserving way. Whenever it is
possible to establish a functor between some category C and another category D, we can say,
using Rosen’s terminology, that the category D becomes a model for the category C; this is of
the upmost importance because it means that one can learn about the properties of the
category C by studying them (to the extent to which they are preserved) in D. The origins of
the theory provide a good illustration.11
As we mentioned in Section1.1, category theory was developed by Sanders Mac Lane
and Samuel Eilenberg. They originally developed the theory for the purpose of unifying two
different areas of mathematics: geometry and algebra. More specifically, topological spaces
are geometric objects on which some notion of continuity can be defined. Generally, these
spaces are very complex objects and difficult to characterize and classify directly. However,
the structure of these spaces can be translated or transformed into algebraic structures in
which the properties of the spaces become easier to study through algebraic means. In this
way, functors establish a modeling relation between topological spaces and algebraic

10
11

We will have much more to say on entailment relations as we proceed.
For more detailed examples of the modeling relation in mathematics see Anticipatory Systems, Section 3.1
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structures for which the algebraic structures become models for the spaces. The modeling
relation makes it possible to know the structure of a topological space through the collection
of all of its algebraic models.12 The point being that in order to do this, Mac Lane and
Eilenberg needed to develop a language that was neither inherently geometric nor
inherently algebraic and abstract enough to deal with both kinds of structures. As Yanofsky
observes, this is where category theory gets its real power: by being about nothing it is about
everything.13
The second ingredient for establishing modeling relations is called a natural

transformation. A natural transformation preserves structure or entailments between
functors; If F and G are two functors from a category C to a category D, F: C → D, G: C → D, a
natural transformation α: F → G, is a rule that assigns to every object a in C an arrow
α F(a) → G(a) called the component of α at a. This assignment must further satisfy the
following naturality condition: for every arrow f: a → a’ in C the following diagram commutes
in D.

12
13

For more details, see Fundamentals of Measurement, 126 -127.
Yanofsky, Computer Science for the Working Category Theorist, 2.
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A natural transformation can be interpreted as a model of models; it allows one to
compare different models of a category C in D. It was one of the main purposes of Mac Lane’s
and Eilenberg’s paper to make explicit and rigorously define this notion of naturality.
Before leaving this section, there is a very important aspect of category theory we
must point out. We said above that a category is comprised of two entities: objects and the
arrows between them. However, in category theory, there is no absolute distinction between

objects and arrows; or in philosophical parlance, no absolute distinction between relata and
relations. For one thing, the objects of a category correspond exactly to their identity arrows.
This makes it possible to dispense altogether with the objects in the definition of a category
we gave above and instead treat them as their identity arrows; i.e., there is an “arrows only”
definition of a category.14 Additionally, it turns out that categories and functors also form a
category in which the objects are entire categories and the arrows are now functors between

them; this is the categories of categories. It also turns out the functors and the natural
transformations from a category in which the objects are now functors and the arrows are

now natural transformations between them; this is the functor category; and this is just the
beginning of a process that can be iterated indefinitely as a hierarchical structure, one

category after another, without limit, and so on forever! Thus, at each level in the hierarchy
what are arrows at one level become the objects in the next higher level; i.e., in this hierarchy,
the distinction between objects and arrows is context dependent. We believe Yanofosky
jokingly put it best:
Between objects there are morphisms. Between morphisms, there are
morphism. Between those morphisms, there are other morphisms. Between

14

Mac Lane, Categories for the Working Mathematician, 9.
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those morphisms, there are other morphisms. Between those morphisms, there
are other morphisms. Between those morphisms, there are other morphisms.
Between those morphisms, there are other morphisms. Between those
morphisms, there are other morphisms. Between those morphisms, there are
other morphisms. Between those morphisms, there are other morphisms.
Between those morphisms, there are other morphisms. Between those
morphisms, there are other morphisms. Between those morphisms, there are
other morphisms.…15
This indefinite hierarchy of levels is what gives category theory its reflexive character
and in good part, the capacity for mathematics to model itself.

There is another way in which the distinction between objects and arrows is blurred
which will become very important and is embodied in what is called a hom-set. A hom-set is
a set or collection of arrows from one object to another.16 Following Rosen, for any two
objects A and B we will usually denote their hom-set H(A, B) with f ϵ H(A, B), where ϵ
(epsilon) is the symbol that represents “member” or “element of”; i.e., the arrow f is an
element of the hom-set H(A, B). At one extreme the hom-set could just be empty (save for
the identity arrows required for all sets of the form H(A, A), H(B, B), etc.). At the other
extreme, the hom-set could be the set of all arrows from the object A to the object B; or, the
hom-set could be any number of the arrows between these two extremes. When a hom-set
contains all of the arrows from A to B we will sometimes write BA instead of H(A, B). Since
hom-sets are objects they can be the domains and codomains of other arrows. For example,
g: X → H(A, B), where the hom-set H(A, B) is now the codomain for the arrow g.

15
16

Private conversation.
Formally, H(A, B) = {f : f is an arrow f: A → B in the category C}.
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We now turn to Rosen’s extension of the modeling relation in category theory to
theoretical science.
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Chapter 2. The Modeling Relation in Science
The modeling relation is the point of departure for Rosen’s entire scientific
enterprise. We should note at the outset that in diagrammatic form, the modeling relation
looks deceptively simple. As we shall see though, it is exceedingly rich in conceptual content
and will play a key role in everything that follows.

2.1 Natural Law

There are, according to Rosen, two basic beliefs that are the minimum requirements
to do science. These two beliefs constitute what Rosen calls Natural Law. The first is the belief
that there are causal relations between the events and their qualities that we perceive in the
external world; it must be presumed by the scientist that some of the events in the external
world are not entirely whimsical, chaotic, or arbitrary, but obey definite laws or relations:
“without a belief in the causal order, there could be no science and, very probably, no
sanity.”1 The second belief is that these causal relations are, at least in part, capable of being
grasped and understood by the human mind and can be articulated and expressed in
language, and in particular, mathematics:

Since mathematics, in the broadest sense, is the study of implication
[entailment] relations in formal systems, or the art of extracting conclusions
from premises, it follows that mathematics is integrally involved in the study
of natural law.2

1
2

Rosen, Theoretical Biology and Complexity, 179.
Ibid, 180.
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2.2 Formal Systems

Both mathematics and science are predicated on dualisms. As Rosen notes, they are
impossible to avoid, since every mode of discrimination creates one.3 The fundamental
dualism in mathematics (or languages in general) is that between syntax and semantics, or
more, in mathematics and logic, between syntactic truth and semantic truth. Syntax is what
a language is in and of itself, independent of its meanings or referents. In any mathematical
system there are propositions that are true purely in terms of their form which results from
the way in which the mathematical system is “put together”. Syntactically true propositions
then, are true because of their form, independent of any referent or what is meaningfully
asserted by the propositions. Semantics is what a language is about and pertains to a
language’s meanings or its referents (or as Rosen’ puts it, semantics means “non-syntactic”).
Semantically true propositions then, depend on their referents or what is meaningfully
asserted by the propositions. In general, a mathematical system can have both. However,
following Rosen, we are going to call a formal system an object or “sublanguage” (extracted
from the mathematical world) that is specified only and entirely through its syntax.4
Formal systems are comprised of two things: axioms and rules of inference.5 Axioms
are a formal system’s “initial propositions” and are assumed to be “true” without proof; they
are like the rules of a game.6 The rules of inference provide the means for entailing new
propositions from given ones.7 Roughly, to say that some proposition P (syntactically)

Rosen, Life Itself, 140.
For Rosen the term system is a primitive; it is left undefined. Following A. H. Louie, we say that a system is “a
collection of material or immaterial things that comprises one’s object of study.” More Than Life Itself, 82.
5 Rosen sometimes uses the term production rules instead of rules of inference as in the passage below.
6 For example, recall the two axioms for category theory from Section 1.2.
7 For example, modus ponens.
3
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entails a new proposition Q means that the truth of Q must follow as a necessary
consequence of the truth of P. A syntactic entailment relation is usually denoted P ˫ Q, where
˫ is the symbol (turnstile) that represents “syntactically entails.” Thus, a formal system can
be considered as a set of propositions (theorems) all of which are derived from its axioms
and by the successive application of its axioms and its rules of inference. For now, following
Rosen, we will call the kinds of syntactical entailments available in a formal system

inferential entailments.8 We will provide a more general representation of entailments
(whether syntactic or semantic) in terms of objects and arrows, i.e., in a category theoretic
context, in subsequent chapters.9
There is another dualism inherent formal systems between its rules of inference and
the propositions they (along with the axioms) generate:
Syntax involves its own inherent dualism between proposition and production
rules. From a syntactical point of view, divorced from any external referents,
propositions in the language are generally not about anything and described
entirely in terms of conventional vehicles: letters, words, sentences, and so
forth. The production rules are themselves propositions, but they do have
referents, namely, the other propositions in the language. Their role is
essentially a dynamic one, to enable the construction of new propositions from
given ones, or the analysis of given propositions from simpler ones.10
We will have more to say about this in Chapter 4, but for now, we should note that,
historically, there has been a strong motivation for the study and treatment of languages in
terms of pure syntax. The reason is that syntax is considered to objective and hence
amenable to scientific study. Semantics on the other hand is inherently subjective, the host

Rosen sometimes uses the term implication relations, as quoted in Section 2.1.
For an intriguing overview of mathematical and formal systems see Anticipatory Systems, Section 2.2.
10 Rosen, Life Itself, 43.
8
9
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of obscurities and ambiguities. Thus, the more syntax a language has (and the less
semantics), the better a language it is presumed to be.

2.3 Natural Systems
The first dualism in science is that between the internal world of the self and the

external world of events and their qualities.11 Science requires the belief that at least some
of our percepts (by which Rosen means our basic units of awareness of sensory perceptions)
are not entirely generated by us but by events and their qualities in the external world. An
event and its qualities in the external world are what Rosen calls a natural system to
distinguish it from what we have called a formal system in Section 2.1. The qualities of
natural systems that we believe are responsible for the generation of our associated percepts
are what Rosen calls observables. Natural systems and their observables are the basis for all
scientific inquiry.
But more, in accordance with Natural Law, science is the attempt to discover relations
in and between natural systems and their observables. Rosen calls these relations in and
between natural systems causal entailments to distinguish them from what we have called

inferential entailments in and between formal systems. But as Rosen points out, there is a
problem: it does not seem as if the causal relations in natural systems are themselves

percepts. This makes it plausible to believe that one of the primary functions of the mind is
to establish and organize relations between percepts. The mind then behaves as if the

relations it establishes between percepts are themselves percepts; the mind imputes the

11

Rosen sometimes, especially in Life Itself, likes to use the term ambiance for the external world.
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relations it establishes between percepts to natural systems in the external world. These
imputations are hypothetical models for how the external world is organized. Thus, the
“perception” of causal relations is subjective in the sense that “we must admit that such
[causal] relations reflect the properties of the active mind as much as they do the percepts
which the mind organizes.”12 This observance allows Rosen to further characterize his
notion of a natural system: a natural system is a apart of the world or a set of qualities to

which definite relations can be imputed. Note that a natural system is not the same as a
material system. A material system is ontological, something presumed to exist in the
external world. A natural system is epistemological since the relations imputed to it are
intrinsically involved in its conception.

The second basic dualism of science is predicated on the first: a natural system is
something that the mind extracts from the external world (which as Rosen points out, is
analogous to the way in which the mind extracts a formal system from the world of
mathematics). This extraction creates another dualism between a natural system and its

environment. This distinction Rosen argues, is also imputed to the external world by the
mind and serves as one of the ways in which the mind organizes and manages percepts. But
before leaving this section, a forewarning for very important considerations in Section 7.1:
The partition of the ambience into system and environment, and even more,
the imputation of that partition to the ambience itself as an inherent property
thereof, is a basic though fateful step for science […] Indeed it is precisely at this
point that, as we shall see, fundamental trouble begins to creep in.13

12
13

Rosen, Anticipatory Systems, 46.
Rosen, Life Itself, 42.
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2.4 Natural Law and the Modeling Relation

Both mathematics and science, are, in their own ways, concerned with systems of
entailment, inferential and causal. Furthermore, Rosen argues that theoretical science is
concerned with the construction of modeling relations which relate these two different kinds
of entailments. A modeling relation between a formal system and its inferential entailments
and a natural system and its causal entailments can be represented by the following diagram:

[2.4.1]
The left-hand box of the diagram represents a natural system in the external world.
The arrow labeled c represents causal entailments in a natural system. The right-hand box
represents a formal system in the mathematical or internal world of the self. The arrow i
represents the inferential entailments in a formal system which are imputed to natural
systems. The two arrows ɛ and δ represent the way in which a congruence relation is
established between the external world of natural systems and their causal relations and the
internal world of formal systems and inferential entailments. The arrow ɛ represents the

encoding of qualities (observables) of a natural system into a formal system. The arrow δ
represents the decoding of the inferential structure of a formal system that symbolically
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represents the causal structure of the natural system with which it is associated. Decodings
represent interpretations, or more, predictions that can be made about the causal
entailments of a natural system derived from the encodings and the propositions (theorems)
that are generated by the inferential entailments in the formal system. The essence of the
modeling relation is captured by the arrows ɛ and δ. They establish a dictionary which allows
one to translate back and forth between natural and formal systems and causal and
inferential entailments. Thus, a modeling relation is established between a natural system
and a formal system whenever (1)

i = ɛ(c)
which represents an encoding of causal entailments into inferential entailments of a formal
system, and (2) the diagram [2.4.1] commutes:

c=δ∘i∘ɛ
Rosen calls the formal system on the left a model of the natural system on the right.
Conversely, Rosen calls any natural system on the right a realization of a formal system on
the left. In this way, the task of theoretical science is to determine what kind of formal
systems can model certain kinds of natural systems; or again, conversely, what natural
systems may realize certain kinds of formal systems as models.
All in all, we have:

28

[2.4.2]
A simple but elegant illustration of a modeling relation is what is known as the

problem of the Seven Bridges of Königsberg which was solved by the mathematician
Leonhard Euler in 1735.
The problem was that in the town of Königsberg in Prussia there was an island,

Kneiphof, with the two branches of the river Pregel, flowing around it, and seven bridges
crossing the two river branches. Euler put the problem thus:
The question is whether a person can plan a walk in such a way that he will
cross each of the bridges once but not more than once. I was told that while
some denied the possibility of doing this and others where in doubt, there
were none who maintained that it was actually possible. On the basis of the
above I formulated the following general problem for myself: Given any
configuration of the river and the branches into which it may divide, as well as
any number of bridges, to determine whether or not it is possible to cross each
bridge exactly once.14

14

Louie, More than Life Itself, 134.
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Natural System ⇆ Model
[2.4.3]

In order the solve the problem, Euler developed what would become an entirely new
branch of mathematics now known as graph theory or network topology. Roughly, a graph
consists of two things: vertices and edges where the edges represent connections between
vertices. Euler encoded the four land masses, labeled A, B, C, D into the vertices of the graph
and the seven bridges labeled a, b, c, d, e, f, g into the edges of the graph as depicted in
diagram [2.4.3]. Thus, the graph on the right-hand side of the diagram [2.4.3] is a model of
the natural system on the left-hand side. Intuitively, now the problem of deciding whether
or not it is possible to cross each bridge exactly once now becomes a formal problem (via the
encodings) of whether or not one could traverse the graph in one continuous trace of the
edges, passing along each edge exactly once. Euler proved that this was impossible for the
graph. This allowed him to predict (decode) that it is impossible to take such a walk.15

For more detailed examples of the modeling relation in the sciences, see Anticipatory Systems, Sections 3.3
and 3.4.
15
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We can now see that Rosen’s formulation of the modeling relation which represents
what he considers to be the essence of theoretical science is an extension of ideas and
concepts arising from category theory which we presented in Section 1.2. Natural systems
are treated as if they are objects and their causal entailments are represented as arrows
between the objects themselves.16 The encoding and decoding arrows are analogous to
functors or entailment preserving arrows between categories. The difference, of course,
between functors and encoding - decoding arrows is that the former are entirely formal
entities while the latter are not; and indeed, cannot be: the encoding and decoding arrows
are the means for effectively moving back and forth between two entirely different worlds:
causality in the informal external world and inferences in the formal world of mathematics
or the internal world of the self.
A most important feature of the encoding and decoding arrows is that they do not

represent entailments nor are they entailed; neither by causality in the external world, nor
formally in the internal world of the self.
Modeling, […] is the art of bringing entailment structures into congruence. It
is indeed an art, just as surely as poetry, music, and painting are.17 Indeed, the
essence of art is that, at root, it rests on the unentailed, on the intuitive leap. I
have stressed repeatedly that the encodings and decodings on which modeling
relations depend are themselves unentailed. Thus, theoretical scientists must
be more artists than craftsmen; Natural Law assures them only that their art
is not in vain, but it in itself provides not the slightest clue how to go about it.18
And

In category theory, an arrow between an object and itself is called an endomorphism.
Emphasis ours.
18 Rosen, Life Itself, 152
16
17
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The modeling relation is intimately tied up with the notion of prediction.
Natural Law, as embodied in modeling relations, thus equips us to look into
the future of things; insofar as the future is entailed by the present, and insofar
as entailment structure itself is captured in a congruent model, we can
actually, in a sense, pull the future of our natural system into the present. The

benevolence of Natural Law lies in assuring us that such miracles are open to
us, but it does not extend to telling us how to accomplish them; it us forever to
discover the keys, the encodings and decodings, by which they can be brought
to pass.19
The modeling relation then, is the art of science. Encodings and decodings “manifest
what Einstein called ‘free creations of the human mind,’ on which science depends.”20

2.5 Analogies, Alternative Models, and Metaphors

The modeling relation provides the means for the comparison of the causal
entailments between two or more natural systems. If two natural systems N1 and N2, are
realizations of the same formal system F, then, in terms of the modeling relation we have:

[2.5.1]

19
20

Ibid, 64. Emphasis ours.
Rosen, Essays on Life Itself, 159
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The diagram [2.5.1] represents the situation where the two natural systems, N1 and
N2, encode into the same formal system F. If such a relation holds between the natural
systems N1 and N2, and the formal system F, it then becomes possible to establish encoding
and decoding arrows between the natural systems, N1 and N2, themselves. This relation
between two or more natural systems encoding into the same formal system is what Rosen
calls an analogy between two or more natural systems. When an analogy can be established
between two or more natural systems it means that one can learn about one natural system
from studying the others and conversely:

[2.5.2]
Scale models that are used in engineering are a good example of analogies. One of
Rosen’s favorite is William Rowan Hamilton’s optico-mechanical analogy in physics.
Rosen points out that analogies between natural systems are of the most profound
importance. After giving the examples just mentioned Rosen writes:
Still more dramatic, perhaps, are the vistas opened by analogy for the further
elucidation of causal entailments in natural systems that are, in conventional
physical terms, of entirely different structures: organisms and “machines”,
organisms and social systems. This is another way of seeing […] that reduction
to a common set of material constituents is not the only way, or even a good
way, of comparing natural systems.21
21

Rosen, Life Itself, 63.
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The compliments of analogies are alternative models. This kind of situation arises
when the same natural system, N, has encoding arrows into, and decoding arrows out of, two
or more formal systems, F1 and F2.

[2.5.3]
While an analogy between two or more natural systems automatically guarantees
the existence of encoding and decoding arrows between them, this is not the case with
alternative models; there may or may not be any. The problem then becomes whether or not
there is any way to establish encoding or decoding arrows (functors) between the two
formalisms F1 and F2. Notice that if there are any arrows that can be established between the
formalisms F1 and F2, then from the point of view of the natural system for which they serve
as models, these arrows would be analogous to a natural transformation between functors.
Analogies and alternative models bear heavily on the problem of reductionism in
science and philosophy. As Rosen alluded above, analogies establish an entirely nonreductionist approach to the modeling of natural systems. And, from the point of view of the
modeling relation, reductionism is an entirely formal affair; it would mean that in the
34

situation depicted in diagram [2.5.3] a model F1 of some natural system N could be reduced

to or embedded into another formal system F2 through a functor; that is, F2 is “bigger” than
F1 in the sense that the former captures all of the inferential structure of the latter and more.
In the most extreme case, reductionism would require that every model of every natural
system could be reduced to one and only one model or formal system; there would have to
be a largest model; a theory of everything.22
Rosen calls a metaphor a modeling relation in which the only arrow between a
natural system and formal system is the decoding arrow δ; metaphors do not explicitly
involve the encoding of natural systems into formal ones. Rosen likens a metaphor to a
“crystal ball” or a “one-way mirror” that allows one to study natural systems and interpret
or make predictions (decodings) about them in a way in which only “half of the work” is
involved. Metaphors, like analogies “have in fact been of profound importance in the history
of science and in many areas continue to play a major role; in fact, they constitute what there
is of theory in these areas.”23For an important example, let us consider what Rosen calls the

open system metaphor.
Traditionally, physics and in particular thermodynamics, has concerned itself with
the behaviors of closed or isolated systems. A closed system is one which is exchanging
energy with its environment, but not matter. An isolated system is one which is neither
exchanging energy nor matter with its environment. Closed and isolated systems are
governed by the second law of thermodynamics which roughly states that an isolated or
closed system will proceed from orderly sates to disorderly states (eventually to a state of

22
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We will further discuss the problem of a largest model in Sections 4.3 and 4.5.
Rosen, Life Itself, 65.
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equilibrium; i.e., total disorder) and never the other way around; that is, never from
disorderly states to orderly states. An open system is one which is exchanging both energy
and matter with its environment “to which the Second Law of Thermodynamics is not
directly applicable.”24
Organisms, for example, are definitely open systems, exchanging both matter and
energy with their environment. It was the general system theorist Ludwig von Bertalanffy
who was the first to apply the open system metaphor to explain what appeared to be some
of the odd, counterintuitive properties and behaviors of organisms (from the point of view
of traditional physics in terms of closed or isolated systems).
As Rosen points out: “open systems share many interesting aspects of behavior
simply by virtue of the fact that they are open.”25One of the properties of open systems is
that they have what are called steady states or attractors. These are states that open systems
will tend towards regardless of any changes in the systems’ initial states or conditions. Unlike
closed or isolated systems, open systems have “the stubborn tendency […] to reach the same
final state despite experimental interventions such as amputations, randomizations, or
hybridizations.”26 In 1891, the embryologist Hans Driesch discovered that if the first four
cells of the embryo of a sea urchin are divided in two, both still develop into whole sea
urchins (i.e., from a more “disorderly” state to a more “orderly” state). This convinced
Driesch that no physical explanation of this kind of phenomena was possible; not even in
principle. He called this kind of behavior equifinal. This would certainly be the case in terms

Rosen, Anticipatory Systems, 231.
Rosen, Fundamentals of Measurement, 125.
26 Rosen, “Sixth Annual Ludwig von Bertalanffy Memorial Lecture,” 241.
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of the properties of closed or isolated systems. However, von Bertalanffy, without any
specific encodings of sea urchins, was able to show that equifinality is just an instantiation
of open systems tending towards their steady states; again, without any specific encodings,
the developmental processes of organisms could be explained in terms of steady states.
Since we are on the subject, we should take the time to point out two other important
aspects of open system theory. The first, is that formally, open system theory is more general
than isolated or closed system theory. As von Bertalanffy notes:
The intuitive choice of the open system as a general system model [metaphor]
was a correct one. Not only from the physical viewpoint is the “open system”
the more general case (because closed systems can always be obtained from
open ones by equating transport variable to zero); it is also the general case
mathematically because the system of simultaneous differential equations
(equations of motion) used for description in dynamical system theory is the
general form from which the description of closed systems derives by the
introduction of additional constraints (e.g., conservation of mass in a closed
chemical system).27
The second is that even though it is a more general theory, unfortunately, as Rosen observes
I would say that, today, there is no satisfactory “physics” of open systems,
primarily because people persist in thinking of closed systems as fundamental,
and of open ones simply as closed ones conically perturbed. 28 29
Metaphors, as Rosen points out, exist, on their own, in the world of mathematics.
Recall from Section 1.3 that a functor establishes a modeling relation between categories.
Consider a functor F, from the category C to D, F: C → D, where the category D is a model of
the category C. If we forget the functor F and the source category C, then the image of C in

Bertalanffy, “The History and Status of General Systems Theory,” 412.
Rosen, Anticipatory Systems, 427.
29 For a good overview of open system theory, see Anticipatory Systems, Chapter 5
27
28
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the target category D becomes a metaphor for the category C.30 More, the totality of all
models of a natural system S form a category, what Rosen calls C(S), for each natural system
S. The totality of all models for a natural system is what Rosen calls its epistemology, and
furthermore that:31
Natural Law asserts that all we can know about [a system] S is embodied in its
models, i.e., in what we have called C(S). Thus, we must build our knowledge
of S from the formal structure of C(S). Thus C(S) itself becomes a kind of
metaphor for S, for each individual S. And moreover, the totality of all these
C(S), must be a kind of metaphor for the whole external world itself.32
However, the fact that metaphors do not require specific encodings for the natural
systems they may represent is not without some controversy:
To proceed metaphorically […] is, of course, not an unreasonable thing to do.
It is also clear, however, why experimentalists find such metaphors troubling
and why they occupy an anomalous position in what passes nowadays for
philosophy of science. For by giving up encoding, we also give up verifiability
in any precise sense. Thus, experimentalists interested specifically in, say, a
developing sea urchin, derive no tangible help from a metaphor. They need
something to verify, couched in terms of some specific observation, or
experiment they can perform. That is to say, they need precisely what is
missing in the metaphor; they need encodings. Hence the indifference, if not
active hostility, manifested by empiricists to theory couched in metaphorical
terms. Metaphor is immune to such verification; insofar as science is identified
with verification, as it is currently fashionable to do, metaphor is not even
science. Nevertheless, it is clear that metaphor can embody a great deal of
truth. And as with all crystal balls, it does have the irresistible attraction of
offering something for free.33
Rosen ends the section in Life Itself devoted to metaphors with this remark:

Note that if there are two or more functorial images of C in D then a natural transformation establishes a
modeling relation between those functors.
31 Recall the distinction we made between a natural system and a material system in Section 2.3.
32 Rosen, Life Itself, 180. For more on the category of models see Life Itself, Chapter 6. We are omitting Rosen’s
presentation of analytic and synthetic models.
33 Ibid, 66.
30
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In some sense, it is precisely the unique metaphorical aspects of Category
Theory that generates qualms in many mathematicians regarding it, which run
quite parallel to those of any empiricist.”34
We now turn to relational system theory and its models.

34

Ibid.

39

Chapter 3. Relational Models
3.1 Nicolas Rashevsky: Topology and Life
Nicolas Rashevsky is perhaps the most important pioneer in the development of

mathematical biology. Rashevsky completed his PhD at the University of Kiev, in his
homeland Ukraine, before he was twenty years old. Shortly thereafter he published several
papers on the then new relativity and quantum theories. After teaching for some time in
Prague, in the late 1920s, he obtained a position at the Research Laboratories of the
Westinghouse Corporation in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. At the time, one of the main
problems he was working on was in thermodynamics. It involved trying to understand how
fluid droplets spontaneously split into smaller ones. As Rosen tells the story, Rashevsky met
a biologist from the University of Pittsburgh at a social occasion. During their discussion,
Rashevsky asked the biologist if his work on the splitting of fluid droplets might be useful for
understanding how cells divide. The biologist told Rashevsky that nobody knew how cells
divide and that nobody could know how cells divide; this was biology, not physics. Rashevsky
was horrified by the biologist’s response; he was a firm believer that there was a physical
explanation for any material process. Stubbornly, to make his point, he soon found himself a
biologist. His original approach was to apply the mathematical physics in which he had been
trained to problems in biology. In 1934, Rashevsky obtained an assistant professorship in
the Department of Physiology at the University of Chicago. In 1940 he established his own
department there, the Committee on Mathematical Biology. Throughout this time his
strategy, the application of physics to biological problems, was, as he then felt, proving to be
very successful; he did in fact make great progress in the understanding of cell division (his
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hunch from thermodynamics turned out to be correct), and, over several decades, developed
a host of other unforeseen and trail-blazing theoretical advancements in mathematical
biology.
Rosen met Rashevsky in October 1956 during his first semester as a graduate student
in the Department of Mathematics at the University of Chicago. Rosen had been aware of
Rashevsky’s work since he was a teen. He had read Rashevsky’s book, Mathematical

Biophysics: Physico-Mathematical Foundations of Biology, and the journal edited by
Rashevsky, which was the first of its kind, Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics. But Rosen
found them to be wanting:
I had looked at both, and decided that the kinds of problems therein treated
had nothing in common with the things in which I was interested; they seemed
to deal, not with the essence of what makes things alive, but rather with more
less casual, even trivial, manifestations of life. I arrived in Chicago determined
to take a track of my own, in which I would attempt to, in ways I knew not of,
with the real questions1
Nonetheless, Rosen, was still curious about Rashevsky’s department and so he made
an appointment to meet.
At their meeting, Rashevsky told Rosen that he was intrigued that a graduate student
in pure mathematics was interested in biology and that he had some new problems for which
he thought Rosen could be of use. He told Rosen that, overtime, he had become to feel very
uneasy about his work. He had begun to consider the problem of identifying those unique
characteristics that living systems must have to distinguish them from the nonliving; i.e.,
what is that makes a living system living? Up until recently, for this, he had no theory; he felt

1

Rosen, “Reminisces of Nicolas Rashevsky,” 63 – 64.
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that the traditional methods of physics simply could not do this; its methods make no
distinction between the living and the nonliving. He would have to begin anew, and so he did.
Two years earlier, Rashevsky wrote a paper, “Topology and Life: In Search of General
Mathematical Principles in Biology and Sociology.” At their meeting Rashvesky gave Rosen a
copy and discussed its content with Rosen at great length. Rashevsky tells Rosen that he has
sketched out the preliminary steps for the development of an entirely new approach to
biology and science in general; a radical departure from anything ever done before. He called
this new science relational biology.
In the paper, Rashevsky makes the astute observation that, as a science, biology is still
in a pre-Newtonian stage of development. Since the time of Archimedes, and up to the 17th
century, natural philosophers had only developed mathematical models for separate and
isolated physical phenomena. It was Newton, with his three laws of motion, who was the first
to introduce principles applicable to physical phenomena in general; Newtonian mechanics
was a grand and unifying synthesis. Analogously, the most serious shortcoming in biology,
as Rashevsky sees it, is that all of its models developed thus far, only deal with separate and
isolated biological phenomena:
It is important to know that diffusion drag forces may produce cell division. It
is important to know how pressure waves are reflected in blood vessels. It is
important to have a mathematical theory of complicated neural networks. But
nothing so far in those theories indicates that the proper functioning of
arteries and veins is essential for the normal course of the intracellular
processes; nor does anything in those theories indicate that a complex
phenomenon in the central nervous system, by eventually resulting, for
example, in the location of food, becomes very indirectly, yet intimately tied
up with some metabolic processes of other cells in the organism. Nothing in
those theories gives any inkling of a possible connection between a faulty
response of a neural net, which leads to the accidental cutting of a finger, and
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the cell divisions, which result from a stimulation of the process of healing.

And yet this integrated activity of the organism is probably the most essential
manifestation of life.
So far as the theories mentioned above are concerned, we may just as well
treat, in fact do treat, the effects of diffusion drag forces as a peculiar diffusion
problem in a rather specialized physical system, and we do treat the problems
of circulation as special hydrodynamical problems. The fundamental

manifestation of life mentioned above drop out from all our theories of
mathematical biology.2
Moreover, Rashevsky forcefully argues that the principles introduced by Newton are
inadequate to account for the most important properties of organisms:
A direct application of the physical principles, used in the mathematical
models of biological phenomena, for the purpose of building a theory of life as
an aggregate of individual cells is not likely to be fruitful. We must look for a
principle which connects the different physical phenomena involved and
expresses the biological unity of organism and organic world as a whole.3
All of Rashevsky’s previous work, and mathematical biology in general, concerns
itself with what Rashevsky calls the structural-metric aspects of biological phenomena. By

structural, Rashevsky means the material properties of an organism that are studied using
physics and chemistry; by metric, Rashevsky means that these are the properties that can be
represented quantitatively.4 As Rashevsky notes above, he in no way denies the importance
of the structural-metric approach. Nonetheless, Rashevsky argues that the fundamental
flaws of this approach are as follows: insofar as quantitative analysis is concerned, he notes
that “when we observe the phenomena of biological integration we notice, however, not
quantities, varying continuously or discontinuously, but rather certain relations”; and that

Rashevsky, “Topology and Life,” 319 – 320. Emphasis ours.
Ibid, 321. Emphasis ours.
4 Note this is not the same meaning the term structure has in mathematics (the kinds of relations defined on a
mathematical object) which we discussed in Chapter 1.
2
3
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“the unity of the organism and the unity of life is expressed by just that kind of relations”. 5
By relations, Rashevsky means functional relations; i.e., what it is that organisms do and how
all of these doings are related to one another. Additionally, the presumption underlying the
structuralist-metric approach, if not explicitly then tacitly, is that the physicochemical

structure of organisms dictates their functions; i.e., that the functional properties of
organisms can only be known through a comprehensive knowledge of their structure. But as
Rosen pointedly puts it:
The first step in any structural study of a biological system, whether the study
is experimental or theoretical, is to forget about, or even destroy, the higherlevel functional organization, leaving behind a purely physiochemical system,
which is then studied entirely by physicochemical (that is, nonbiological)
means. For instance, the molecular biologist studies “fractions” obtained by
cells by a variety of physical processes […] In the process of abstraction or
simplification, whether it be theoretical or experimental, there is a loss of
information. And it is quite obvious from the means whereby such fractions are
produced, that the information lost concerns the higher-level organizational
and functional properties of the system from which the fraction was taken. In
other words, the first step in conducting any structural study of a biological
system is to abstract away the organizational properties of the system, leaving
behind a purely structural residue to be studied entirely in structural (that is,
physicochemical) terms.6
Alternatively, Rashevsky’s relational approach is based on the presumptions that (a)
functional relations are organizational properties of a system and not structural ones; and
(b), that function dictates structure; in the structural approach one keeps the matter and

throws away the organization; in the relational approach one keeps the organization and
throws away matter; that is to say relational models abstract away the structure of systems

5

Rashevsky, “Topology and Life,” 322. There appears to be a typo here. Rashevsky probably meant to say “just

these kinds of relations.”
6 Rosen, Foundations of Mathematical Biology , Volume II, 219.
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(both the physics and the chemistry) and leave behind only the functional organization of
these systems.
Rashevsky discovered that one could mathematically model the organizational and
functional relations of organisms by representing them as topological spaces; or more
specifically, as one-dimensional directed graphs.7 The functional relations of an organism
are represented as (directional) relations between edges and vertices in a space. The entire
graph represents the organization as a whole. In topology, an arrow between topological
spaces represents a continuous transformation from one space into another. Rashevksy
posited that there must be one or a few of what he called primordial organisms and their
corresponding models that he called primordial spaces. These primordial spaces would have
to represent the minimal kinds of organizations and functional relations an organism must
have. All of the more sophisticated kinds of these “same” organizations and functional
relations could be transformed onto their corresponding primordial ones. The relation
between the sophisticated and primordial spaces is what Rashvesky called The Principle of

Biotopological Mapping and the development of this principle is the central aim of his paper:
“The topological spaces or complexes by which different organisms are represented are all
obtained from one or at most a few primordial spaces or complexes by the same

transformation.”8
For example, the first relational model Rashevsky presents in his paper is a
representation of the digestive function of a single-cell organism (protozoan):9

7 Unlike graphs (Section 2.3), in a directed graph, each edge has a specified direction from one vertex to another

(like an arrow between objects in a category).
8 Rashevsky, “Topology and Life,” 325
9 Ibid, 326.
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[3.1.1]
We will skip the technical details of this directed graph; as you can see, even for a
single-cell organism, the organizational and functional properties of digestion is a rather
complicated affair. The point we wish to make is that as a primordial graph, The Principle of
Biotopological Mapping mandates that every other digestive process of more sophisticated
organisms can be mapped onto this primordial one.10 It thus, expresses the biological unity
of organism and organic world as a whole, which is precisely what Rashevsky sought out to
do. It is a remarkable thing.11
Upon hearing these ideas Rosen recalls “I remember myself thinking that this was
more like it; my own embryonic view about the nature of biological organization proceeded

Such a mapping is what is called an epimorphism.
Rosen gives an alternative and very nice presentation of the Principle of Biotopological Mapping in
Anticipatory Systems, Section 3.5.
10
11
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along similar directions, and I waxed enthusiastic.”12 Rashevsky concluded their meeting by
offering Rosen a full fellowship and his own office. Shortly thereafter, Rosen accepted.
3.2 Function and Organization as Global Properties
Rosen’s approach to relational biology (or more generally, relational system theory)
is different than that of Rashevsky’s but very much in the same spirit. Following Rashevsky,
for Rosen, relational biology is the science of organization and function. And, these
organizational and functional relations must be studied independently of the structural
properties of natural systems. The reason for this is that many functional and organizational
properties are shared by large classes of structurally diverse natural systems; relational
models classify natural systems based on their sharing of some common element of
organizational and functional similarity. However, unlike Rashevsky, Rosen’s point of
departure is from the more general point of view of category theory: “category theory is the
proper study of relational models and is precisely equivalent to this study.”13
To begin with, let us consider the structure-function dualism from the last section in a bit
more detail, but from Rosen’s point of view. There is, for example, the category of groups
(and each group forms a category). A group is a set G, together with a binary operation
GxG → G on its elements, written (a, b) ↦ ab, that satisfies the following three axioms:14
(i)

The binary operation is associative.

(ii)

There is an identity element u ϵ G with ua = a = au for all a ϵ G.

Rosen, “Reminisces of Nicolas Rashevsky,” 65.
Rosen, Fundamentals of Measurement, 127.
14 “↦” is the arrow symbol used when one is only considering the elements of an object. An arrow (a, b) ↦ ab
is called an element chasing diagram. We will see many more of these in what follows.
12
13
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(iii)

For this element u, there is to each element a ϵ G an element a’ ϵ G, which is the
inverse of a, with aa’ = u = a’a.

In order to determine whether any mathematical structure (in the mathematical sense)
is a group means that one must show that the mathematical structure in question satisfies
the above group axioms. It turns out there is no way to do this at the level of a mathematical
structure’s elements. Additionally, there is no way, at the level of their elements, to
determine whether or not two or more mathematical structures share the common property
of being a group; the only way to compare two or more mathematical structures is to
establish a structure or entailment preserving mapping between them; in the case of groups,
these are what are called group homomorphisms; Another way of saying this is that being a
group is a global property:
Any mathematical structure, regardless of the nature of its elements, that
satisfies these axioms is therefore a group. We determine that a mathematical
structure is a group, then, not by studying the nature of its elements, but by
determining the global axioms which define groups in general are satisfied.
Thus, the most diverse kinds of mathematical objects, composed of the most
diverse kinds of elements, can be groups. [And] despite the diversity of the
kinds of things which can be groups, all groups can be simultaneously studied
in terms of their global properties they share in common, and which are
specified by the group axioms.15
For example, the integers with addition form a group; the elements of this
group are the integers. The elements of a symmetry group could be geometric objects,
images, or patterns.

15

Rosen, Foundations of Mathematical Biology, Volume III, 369.
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And as we pointed out in Section 1.2 category theory is the general systematic
study of classes of mathematical structures and the structure or entailment
preserving maps between them.
In an analogous way, functional and organizational properties of natural systems are
global properties; it is impossible to determine whether natural systems, at the level of their
constituent particles or molecules (“elements”) share some common functional or
organizational property. For example, many material systems of the most diverse kinds,
without a molecule in common, share the property of being alive (like so many different
mathematical structures with different elements mentioned above, sharing the common
property of being a group). Also, it is impossible to compare and thus classify two or more
material systems at the level of their constituent particles or molecules (“elements”) to
determine whether or not they share some common functional or organizational property
(again, just like groups). In order to compare two or more natural systems to determine
whether or not they share some common functional and organizational property would
mean one would have to either establish an analogy between them based on their sharing
the same relational model or a decoding from a common metaphor.
For Rosen, the merits of this relational approach being based on its strong analogies
to mathematical reasoning (and in particular, category theory) are obvious:
We may pass to new levels of understanding when we exhibit basic properties
of organisms as a consequence of overall system-theoretic functional
properties, freed in large part from the relatively nonspecific physical
structures which carry this organization. Thereby we gain enormously in
insight and economy of thought, in a way which has all the advantages of
axiomatization within mathematics itself. For instance, it is obviously
uneconomical to prove a general group-theoretic theorem individually for
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many different kinds of specific groups, using in each case the detailed
properties of the group elements, when the theorem depends only on the
group axioms and is independent of whether the group elements are matrices
or numbers or differential operators. Relational biology does this for biology.16
3.3 Organization: A Thing in Itself
The organization of a natural system is to be considered as a relation between a
natural system as a whole and the parts of which it is comprised. A part of an organization is
what Rosen’s calls a component.17 A component then is the basic unit of organization and
every component has at least one corresponding function. Following A. H. Louie, we will,
instead, use the term, functional component
Rosen’s approach in defining a functional component comes from stability theory.
The theory provides the means for the comparison of system behaviors (formal or natural);
more specifically between the behavior of a system unperturbed and change in system
behavior that is a result of some kind of perturbation on the system. Any unperturbed
heterogeneous system comprised of its various functional components and left unperturbed
will have its own autonomous behaviors. If it is possible to remove a functional component
of such a system (through a perturbation), this will result in the creation of a “new” system
whose behaviors can be compared with the behaviors of the original system. The
discrepancy or difference observed between the two systems defines a component; the
discrepancy or difference between the two systems behaviors defines a function. Thus, from
a relational point of view, the analysis of a system involves its resolution into its constituent

16
17

Rosen, Foundations of Mathematical Biology, Volume II, 249.
This usage is different than a component of a natural transformation, Section 1.2.
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functional components; conversely, the understanding of the organization of a system as a
whole involves the synthetic interrelations between its functional components.
A functional component then, is a particle of function in the sense that it plays the
same role as a basic analytic unit in relational analysis that a particle or a molecule plays in
structural analysis. However, it cannot be stressed enough that there is a very important and
fundamental difference between this relational analytic unit and a structural analytic unit.
In structural analysis, a structural unit does not and cannot acquire new properties by being
a part of a larger system; it is the same thing whether it is considered in isolation or as a part
of a larger system to which it may belong; its identity is always context independent. A
functional component, on the other hand, is dependent upon the larger system for which it
is a part; if a functional component is isolated from the larger system to which it belongs, it
will lose its function; the function of a component is always context dependent;18
Additionally, as a larger system changes, so too can its components and their corresponding
functions, so a functional component can acquire new properties in its relationship to the
larger system for which it is a part. A functional component must possess two properties:
enough “identity” that it can be considered a thing in itself, but it also must have the capacity
to acquire new properties that are dependent upon the larger system to which it belongs. In
part, this is in accordance with the fact that the kinds of natural systems we are considering
are in general, open systems; i.e., natural systems that are exchanging both matter and
energy with their environments which can affect system behaviors in many possibly
different ways.

18

Recall a similar context dependency in terms of objects and arrows in category theory in Section 1.2.
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The organization of a natural system and its relation to one of its functional
components can be represented by the following diagram:

[3.3.1]
In the diagram [3.3.1], the arrow 1 represents the way in which a functional
component is affected by the behavior of the organization of the natural system to which it
belongs. The arrow 2 represents the way in which the behavior of organization of the natural
system is affected by its functional component. The arrow 3 represents the effect that the
environment of the natural system has on its functional component. The arrow 4 represents
the effect the functional component has on the environment of the natural system to which
it belongs. In short, the arrows 1 and 3 represent inputs to the functional component from
the natural system and the environment to which it belongs. The arrows 2 and 4 represent
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the outputs from the functional component to the natural system and the environment to
which it belongs.
3.4 Aristotle’s Four Categories of Causation
We want to show (in terms of the modeling relation) what the formal images or
inferential entailments are (in category theory) for natural systems in terms of organizations
and their functional components. In order to do this, we need to show in what way relational
models make explicit that there are different kinds of entailments than those presumed by
the conventional structural-metric (and reductionist) approaches in terms of the possible
models for natural systems. Most astonishingly, the only way that Rosen could find to make
these different kinds of entailments that relational models admit explicit “came from a most
unexpected quarter, from the old Aristotelean doctrine of the categories of causation.”19 Let
us see in what way.
To begin with:
To Aristotle, all science is animated by a single question: Why? Science must
answer this question “Why?”; it must say, “Because.” In so doing, depending on
the context, science becomes the vehicle for both explanation and prediction.
Aristotle’s basic contribution was to recognize that there are different and
inequivalent, but equally valid, ways of saying “because.” If we have singled
out some event or thing in the external world and ask why it is what it is, then
what we have singled out is the effect of its causes, and these causes are
embodied in the different ways that Aristotle distinguished, in which we can
answer the question we have asked.20
Rosen is very much aware that his adoption of the Aristotelian causal categories,
would on the face of it, seem peculiar to say the least: “Aristotle’s explicit discussion of the

19
20

Rosen, Theoretical Biology and Complexity, 187.
Ibid.
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categories of causation is, by modern standards, superficial, and incomplete, and, oddly, is
couched in terms of material artifacts.”21
But what Rosen sees as most important is that “the whole thrust of the old Aristotelian
analysis of causation is to make it manifest that no one mode of causal entailment suffices to
understand anything.”22
Moreover, as Louie duly notes, we should be careful to distinguish Aristotle’s notion
of a causality from our modern conceptions of the term:
Aristotle’s original Greek term αίτιov (aition) was translated into the Latin
causa, a word which might have been appropriate initially, but which had
unfortunately diverged into our contemporary “cause” as “that which
produces an effect.” The possible semantic equivocation may be avoided if one
understands that the original idea had more to do with “grounds or forms of
explanation”, so a more appropriate Latin rendering, in hindsight, would
probably have been explanatio.23
Aristotle presents his four categories of causation in in Book III of his Physics:
Material cause:
In one sense, then, (1) that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists,
is called its ‘cause’, e.g., the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the
genera of which the bronze and the silver are species.
Formal cause:
In another sense (2) the form or the archetype, i.e., the statement of the
essence, and its genera, are called ‘causes’ (e.g., the octave of the relation of
2:1, and generally number), and the parts in the definition.
Efficient cause:

Ibid.
Rosen, Life Itself, 132.
23Louie, More than Life Itself, 107.
21
22
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Again (3) the primary source of the change or coming to rest; e.g., the man
who gave advice is a cause, the father is the cause of the child, and generally
what makes of what is made and what causes change of what is changed.
Final cause:
Again (4) in the sense of end or “that for the sake of which” a thing is done, e.g.,
health is the cause of walking about. (“Why is he walking about?” we say “To
be healthy,” and, having said that, we think we have assigned the cause.) The
same is true also of all the intermediate steps which are brought about through
the action of something else as a means to an end.24
Before proceeding further (1): We would say that Rosen’s interpretation of arrows
and their entailments are analogs of Aristotle’s four causal categories and so are not to be
taken literally in terms of Aristotle’s original conception. (2) The main category that Rosen
uses to build relational models in terms of Aristotelian causality, representing organizational
and functional entailments in natural systems, is the category of sets, whose objects are sets
and whose arrows are arbitrary mappings between sets, so, from now on, will use both the
terms arrows and mappings interchangeably. And (3), most importantly, in order to formally
represent these analogs of Aristotle’s causal categories faithfully, it became necessary for
Rosen to modify the traditional notation for arrows in order to make the four causal
categories explicit.25
Consider an arbitrary mapping f: A → B. We will now represent this mapping as

Aristotle, Physics, 34 – 35.
Even though Rosen deals with Aristotelian causal categories throughout Life Itself, Rosen does not present
the modified notion we are using until Chapter 9, Section D.
24
25
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[3.4.1]
Following Louie, we are going to call [3.4.1] a relational diagram. We will be
concerned with the entailments between the elements of sets and not the sets themselves.
In order to do this, will represent element chasing diagrams in relational form. A relational
diagram for the element chasing diagram f: a ↦ b (or f: a ↦ f(a), since b = f(a)), where a is
an element of A and b is an element of B is then

[3.4.2]
An interpretation of an arrow in terms of Aristotle’s four causal categories is as
follows:26
If we treat b as an effect, and, following Aristotle, ask “Why?” about it; i.e., “Why b?”,
We get the following four different answers, just like Aristotle said we would.

26 Note that by “interpretation” we mean that we are now introducing
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semantics into our formal considerations.

The element a represents the material cause of the element b.
The ordered pair of the solid-headed arrow and the hollow-headed arrow in sequence
represents the formal cause of b; i.e., together, the solid-headed arrow represents the

processor and the hollow-headed arrow represents the flow from a to b; form is then process
– flow

[3.4.2]
The efficient cause of b is represented by the solid arrow alone; the processor f which
induces the flow from a to b:

[3.4.3]
In passing, we should now be able to see that the traditional notation for an arrow,
f: A → B, neither makes the distinction between processor and flow (i.e., represents formal
cause) nor does it make explicit the difference between efficient and formal cause. As a
matter of fact, we might argue that relational diagrams are not so much a modification of the
traditional notation, as we put it earlier, but rather that the traditional notation, in terms of
entailment relations, is an abbreviation of a relational diagram.
Final cause is a tricky affair which we will discuss in greater detail in the next section.
For now, we will say two things: First, it is the function of a functional component to produce
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the effect b, represented by the mapping f; and second, the final cause associated with the
effect b can be thought of as that which is entailed.

[3.4.4]
All in all, the four categories of causation can be represented by the following diagram

[3.4.5]
Later on, there will be some considerations regarding entailment relations for which
the material cause is irrelevant. When this is the case, we use the turnstile “˫” to represent
formal cause:27
f˫b
Generally:

27 In the relational context “˫” does not mean

syntactical entailment; it means formal entailment but it still reads

“efficient cause entails final cause”.
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[3.4.6]
We are now in a position to present relational models of natural systems proper.
3. 5 Entailments in Relational Models
As far as we know, Rosen is the only one to make explicit how category theory is
richer in its entailment structure than other formal systems. He distinguishes three different
kinds of entailments in category theory, what he calls: inner entailments, outer entailments,
and functional entailments.
Inner entailments are the kinds of entailments that are available in a given category.
And they allow for the encodings or representations (metaphors) of functional components.
The formal image of a functional component is, again, a mapping, f: a ↦ b, of the relational
form of diagram [3.4.2]

The element a represents an input to a functional component (material cause). The
mapping f, the solid-headed arrow, represents the function of a functional component
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(efficient cause). b represents the output of a functional component (and the associated final
cause for the effect b). The hollow-headed arrow represents the flow from a to b induced by
the mapping f (the solid-head and hollow-headed arrow are the formal cause of a functional
component).28
Outer entailments are determined by the global inference rules of category theory
itself. Outer entailments allow (in a limited sense) for the entailment of mappings from other
mappings (composition) and the construction of more complicated objects and mappings
from given ones (products, sums, exponentials, etc.). The outer entailments are what allow
for the encodings or representations (metaphors) of entire organizations. For example, one
kind of minimal representation of an organization is one with just two components, say, two
mappings, g: X → A, and f: A → B, and their element chasing arrows f: a ↦ b and g: x ↦ a. Their
composition in relational form is

[3.5.1]
Which gives the new mapping f ∘ g: x ↦ b

28 For

now, since the formal cause is the “same” in the diagrams we are studying, we will omit its consideration.
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[3.5.2]
`

Looking at diagram [3.5.1] we see that the material cause a of b is now entailed; the

material cause of a is x and the efficient cause of a is the mapping g. This kind of composition
of functional components is what Louie calls sequential composition; sequential chains of
composition are one of the means by which material causes of functional components can be
entailed within organizations:

[3.5.2]
The other means by which material causes of functional components can be entailed
are what Louie calls sequential cycles; these kinds of organization are possible when the first
and last mappings in a sequential chain are themselves linked by sequential composition:

61

[3.5.3]
A sequential cycle is what Louie calls a closed path of material causation; every
material cause in this kind of organization is entailed by another material cause.
Summing up thus far, inner entailments allow for the entailments of the outputs of
functional components. Outer entailments allow for the entailment of two or more functional
components which comprise organizations (along with the construction of more
complicated objects and mappings). The outer entailments, sequential chains and cycles,
allow for the entailment of material causes.
We should now pause to point out something. Thus far the only kinds of entailments
at our disposal have been material entailments; only the inputs and outputs in relational
diagrams are entailed. There is, at present, no way to entail a functional component’s
function, a mapping, its efficient cause. That is, if we ask “Why f?”, in diagram [3.4.2] above
we get no answer, save its function, to produce b. Now let us consider what it would mean to
be able to entail a mapping in a relational diagram. In terms of the modeling relation, it would
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represent the means by which an organization has the capacity to entail or generate its own

functional components (internal to the system). The fact that this can be done, and how it is
done is most important.
Recall from section 1.2, we demonstrated some of the ways in which there is no
absolute distinction between objects and arrows in category theory. In particular, we
introduced the notion of a hom-set which is a set of arrows between objects. And, that since
hom-sets are objects, they can serve as domains or codomains of other arrows. Consider the
mapping g: X → H(A, B), with f ϵ H(A, B) from Section 1.2. As a relational diagram this is

[3.5.4]
As we can see, in the diagram [3.5.4] the mapping f is now entailed; that is, hom-sets
provide the means for the entailment of mappings. If we now ask “Why f?” We get “because
of its material cause x” and “because of its efficient cause g.” That is, the entailment of
mappings is the formal means by which it is possible to represent an organization that has
the capacity to entail or generate its own functional components. The entailment of
mappings or efficient causes are what Rosen calls functional entailments. While both
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functional entailments and material entailments are inner entailments, functional
entailments are different in kind than material entailments; material entailments do not
entail functional components, while functional entailments do. Another way of saying this is
that in sequential composition, the first mapping produces an output that becomes an input,
something to be operated on or processed. But in functional composition, since the final
cause associated with g is the efficient cause f, the mapping g represents an efficient cause of
an efficient cause; thus, the processor g generates a processor itself, f. Regarding functional
entailments, Rosen argues: “It is precisely here that the real power of relational ideas become
manifest” and is the most radical departure from the structuralist-metric approach which
has dominated modern science.29
Now actually, for the mapping g: X → H(A, B) and it corresponding relational diagram
[3.5.4] there two hom-sets involved: g ϵ H(X, H(A, B)) and f ϵ H(A, B). Notice that the homset for g, H(X, H(A, B)), contains the hom-set H(A, B) which in turn contains the mapping f.
We can interpret this situation by treating the mapping g as occupying a higher level in the
organization than the mapping f. This kind of composition, involving functional entailments,
is what Louie calls hierarchical composition. Again, hierarchical composition is different in

kind (a different mode) than sequential composition which only involves material
entailments. However, similar to sequential chains, one can also construct hierarchical

chains of hierarchical entailments:

29

Rosen, Life Itself, 135.
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[3.5.5]
As we shall see in Chapter 4, Section 5, it is also possible to construct hierarchical
cycles which are of the greatest significance.
3.6 Entailments in Relational Models Continued: Functional Entailment and Final Cause
Since the notion of final cause in terms of functional entailment is so important, we
should consider the way in which Rosen develops it in some detail.30
As Rosen and Louie note (more below), both the notions of function (as in the
function of the heart is to pump blood or function of the lungs is for gaseous exchange) and
final cause have faced serious criticisms throughout the history of biology; or more, function

The most comprehensive treatment Rosen gives on functional entailment and final cause is in Life Itself,
Sections 3E, 5I, and 5K.
30
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is considered to be unscientific insofar as it has often been associated with final cause,
purpose, telos, which are definitely considered to be unscientific; any explanation of
biological processes involving final cause, it is presumed, violates scientific objectivity. This
is perhaps best expressed by Jacques Monod in his Chance and Necessity:
The cornerstone of the scientific method is the postulate that nature is
objective. In other words, the systematic denial that “true” knowledge can be
gotten at by interpreting phenomena in terms of final causes […] there is no
way to be rid of it […] without departing from the domain of science itself.31
The only respectable way in which talk of function is currently permitted in biology
is from the point of view of evolutionary theory: “nowadays it is considered again acceptable
to talk of function, because natural selection and the adaptive processes it generates, can, it
is supposed, be invoked to exorcise any finalistic demons”.32
Now, in the last two sections we have shown the formal means by which Rosen
introduces a completely legitimate notion of function, and most importantly that functions
can be entailed (functional entailment) within the organizations (hierarchical composition)
for which they are functional components. It is also important to note that function and
functional entailment as Rosen develops it, in no way depends on the theory of evolution.
Moreover, as we will show below, final cause, as Rosen develops it, is intimately tied to both
function and functional entailment.
But before we proceed, we should point out why, Rosen argues, formally, final cause
has always been difficult to develop.

31
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Monod, Chance and Necessity, 21.
Rosen, Life Itself, 116.
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Traditionally, the only kinds of formal systems that have considered to be appropriate
to serve as models for natural systems fall under the rubric of dynamical system theory. As
Rosen argues, these kinds of models can all be traced back to the work and ideas of Newton:
Our basic ideas on this subject [modeling relations] go back, in one way or
another, essentially unchanged, to the mechanics of Newton’s Principia.
Despite enormous technical variations in mathematical language (e.g., from
classical to relativistic or quantum; from continuous to discrete time; from
continuous state to discrete state; from deterministic to stochastic; from
autonomous to forced; from finite-dimensional to infinite dimensional; etc.),
the basic epistemological presupposition remains the same, untouched and all
but unnoticed.33
And most importantly
The central concept of Newtonian mechanics, from which all others flow as
corollaries or collaterals, is the concept of a state, and with it, the effective
introduction of recursion as the basic underpinning of science itself.34
The fundamental idea underlying Newtonian mechanics and all subsequent
developments in dynamical system theory that Rosen mentioned above is twofold: the first
is the concept of the state of a natural system. A state specifies what a natural system is like
at an instant and is given by an appropriate set of state variables. In Newtonian mechanics,
position and velocity of particles (formally, mass points) are examples of state variables. The
second are the equations of motion (dynamical laws). The equations of motion determine
how a natural system changes over time; i.e., in terms of its states and state transitions. Again,
for example in Newtonian mechanics this is his second law of motion. The equations of
motion represent a force that is acting on a natural system. Forces come from a natural
system’s environment. We should note in passing that the dualism between a natural system

33
34

Rosen, Theoretical Biology and Complexity, 181.
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and its environment that we mentioned in Section 2.3 establishes a corollary dualism
between the states of a natural system and the equations of motion that govern its state
transitions. As Rosen alluded to above, the only kind of entailment in traditional dynamic
system theory is recursion.35
Intuitively, a recursive process is on that begins with some initial value (initial state
of a natural system) and iteratively repeats itself by taking the previous value or output of a
mathematical function (an equation of motion) as the next input for the same mathematical
function.36 In terms of entailment relations what this means is that the entailment of “what
will happen next” is entirely determined by “what is happening now.” I.e., the next state of a
natural system is entirely determined by its present state.37
One of Rosen’s many key insights is that “the Aristotelean analysis can be applied to

any entailment structure”38
Thus, for traditional dynamical system theory, relationally, the initial states can be
interpreted as material cause; the equations of motion are the efficient cause; and the
trajectories of systems as they change over time is formal cause.
There cannot, however be a final cause in traditional dynamical system theory. The
reason is that is that in terms of causality it is “forbidden to allow present change of state to

depend on future states” and that the admittance of final cause “would appear tantamount

For a detailed analysis, see Life Itself, Chapter 4.
Recall Section 2.5.
37 So to not upset our friends the physicists, the last two statements are only true when the force(s) acting on
the natural system are constant and the natural system is a closed system (Section 2.5).
38 Rosen, Life Itself, 48.
35
36
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to a denial of causality in the natural world.”39 The only meaning final cause can have in
traditional dynamical system theory is that future states of the system (that are presumed
to not have even happened yet) would somehow have to be acting back on its present or past
states. But again, since the present state entirely determines the next state, this cannot
happen:40
It is this fact more than any other that has led to the profound belief that
finality is incompatible with science. Indeed, any attempt to impose a category
of final causation onto the Newtonian encodings destroys it completely.
Insofar as finality involves the effects of future inputs, or future state, upon
present change of state, the idea of anticipation has been expunged from
serious science without further thought.41
And
The rejection of finality in science is usually cast in this temporal context, in
the form of the unspoken ‘Zeroth Commandment’ permeating all of theoretical
science: ‘Thou shalt not allow the future to affect the present.”42
There is an analogous situation in the proof process in formalisms. Recall from
Section 1.2 that a formal system is comprised of a set of axioms (initial propositions) and
rules of inference. In terms of Aristotle’s categories of causation, the axioms (initial
propositions) can be interpreted as material cause; the rules of inference as efficient cause;
and the algorithm or rules for the successive application of the axioms and rules of inference
for generating the proofs for true (or false) propositions as formal cause.

Rosen, Anticipatory Systems, 9.
This is not “entirely true”. For example, for any natural system that obeys an optimality principle, such as
Fermat’s principle in optics or Hamilton’s principle in mechanics, the actual path described by the physical
process is as much determined by its terminal state as by its initial one. But as Rosen notes, these and other
examples are never taken seriously insofar as they imply some notion of finality (see Rosen, Theoretical Biology
and Complexity, 189). For more examples of “hidden teleology in physics”, See Louie, More Than Life Itself, 248
– 250.
41 Rosen, Theoretical Biology and Complexity, 189.
42 Rosen, Life Itself, 49.
39
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For example, if there is some proposition P that has been proven to be true in a
formalism and we ask “Why P?”, then:
[Material cause] Obviously, the truth of P in a formal system depends on that
system’s axioms. For, by definition, P is entailed from precisely those axioms;
this is exactly what makes P true. So the axioms, which entail P, also play a role
in entailing “the truth of P.”
[Efficient cause] A different role within the system is played by the production
rules [rules of inference], the machinery that actually does the entailing.
Different production rules, with the same axioms, might not entail P.
Therefore, “the truth of P” is also partially entailed by the rules of inference
that govern the system.
[Formal cause] The actual entailment of P by the axioms, which constitutes the
proof of the theorem P, involves more than just the inferential rules
themselves. It is an explicit list of these rules, to be applied to the axioms
themselves. The second rule is applied to the lemma arising therefrom. The
third rule is applied to the results and so on. The last rule on the list produces
P itself. Such a list of production rules, each in an imperative mood, constitutes
an algorithm or program. The exhibition of such an algorithm or list is another
way of entailing “the truth of P” in our system.43 44
We see a problem with temporal sequence in the production of proofs akin to that of
traditional dynamical systems:
Indeed, the formal analog of “time” is embodied in the idea of sequence, the
order of application of production rules or inferential operations in proofs and
algorithms. This flow of “formal time” is irreversible, just as real time is […] for
exactly the same reasons. In it, the axioms are always earlier than any of their
consequents; a proposition P is later than another Q if it is implied by it, if there
is a proof of P with Q as hypothesis.”45

Ibid, 47.
We will have a bit more to say about algorithms in Chapter 4.
45 Rosen, Life Itself, 49.
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Like a future state in a traditional dynamical system, the proposition P would
somehow have to be acting back on the axioms or the propositions that preceded the
proposition P in its proof, again, violating temporal sequence.
The three “traditional” causal categories (formal, material, and efficient
causation) always respect the flow of “formal time”, in the sense that “cause”
Q always precedes effect P. Final causation gives the appearance, at any rate,
of violating this flow, in the sense that the effect P seems to be acting back on
the causal processes that generated it; it appears that the “future” is actively
affecting the “past”.46
But here is where Rosen gets to the heart of the matter and says a most important thing:
I say “appears” because this (traditional) interpretation of finality confuses P
with its final cause; it is not the effect P, but the final cause of P, that must
operate on the process by which P is generated. The temporal anomaly
remains, however; final cause clearly cannot fit within the same temporal
sequence in which the other causal categories harmoniously operate.47
And shortly just before that

:

Formally, to say that something is a final cause of P is to require P itself to entail
something; in every other case, to say that something is the cause of P means
only that it entails P. Final cause thus requires something of its effect P; in all
other cases, nothing is required of P beyond the passive fact of its entailment.
Moreover, in addition to requiring its effect P to entail something, a final cause
of P must entail the entailment of P itself. It is this particular reflexive character
of final causation, visible here in purely formal terms, that is primarily
responsible for its anomalous position.48
The question then becomes if there are formalisms rich enough to admit a meaningful
category of final causation. And indeed, there are, in particular, category theory. To see how,

Ibid.
Ibid.
48 Ibid.
46
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let us begin to consider the content of the above passages more generally in terms our
element chasing mapping f: a ↦ b, and its relational diagram [3.4.2]

The first thing to point out is that in the relational theory of entailments that we have
presented thus far, in terms of the modeling relation, there need be no notion of states, no
state transitions, not even a notion of temporal sequence. Instead, what we have are
functional components and their organizations for which they are parts.
Now since the relational diagram [3.4.2] represents a functional component we can
say that it always has a final cause; that is, to produce its output b. And again, this is partly
possible because the entailment relations in relational diagrams need not involve states, and
state transitions. Additionally, in organizations, the composition of functional components
establishes various kinds of relations between final causes and the other categories of
causation. For example, in all of the organizations in Section 3.5, the final causes (the outputs
of functional components), are either relayed as material causes in sequential chains and
sequential cycles, or relayed as functional causes in hierarchical chains.
However, with regard to the kind of relations that final cause can have with the other
causal categories, Rosen has much more in mind.49 To begin to see this, let us take the last

This will become more apparent in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 when we consider the different kinds of relations
between final cause and the other causal categories in complex systems. This is extremely important.
49
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three passages from Rosen and put them in relational form. In this context, what Rosen is
saying is that the effect b is not to be confused with the final cause of b and the final cause
would have to operate on the processes that generated b, i.e., its own causes. Moreover, for
b to have a final cause, b must not only be entailed by its causes (material, efficient, and
formal), b must also entail something; and that something must be the entailment of b itself;
the final cause of b is the effect b entailing its own entailment. Let us now proceed to
demonstrate how Rosen does just that.
Recall our example for functional entailment from Section 3.5, the mapping
g: X → H(A, B) and its relational diagram [3.5.4]

What we are going to do is simply make the domain X of the mapping g equal to the
set B in the hom-set H(A, B), X = B. This is gives us a new mapping we are going to call ɸ
which is ɸ: B → H(A, B) in which the mapping f is now functionally entailed by the mapping
ɸ instead of the mapping g:
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[3.6.1]
Since the domain of the mapping ɸ is B which is also the codomain of the mapping
f: A → B, which is an element in the hom-set H(A, B), we can compose the mapping f with the
mapping ɸ which gives ɸ ∘ f: A → B → H(A, B):

[3.6.2]
which can also be represented as
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[3.6.3]50
Let us look closely at the relationship between the efficient cause f and its effect, the
element b in the diagrams [3.6.1] and [3.6.2]. The element b is now the material cause
entailing its own efficient cause f which entails b as its final cause. We can see that final cause
is doing precisely what Rosen said it must: the final cause of b as a material cause is operating
on the process that generated it (in particular its efficient cause f). The final cause of b is not
only entailed (by its own material, efficient, and formal causes) but is also involved in the

entailment of itself (by entailing its own efficient cause). If we keep in mind that the mapping
f, efficient cause, represents the function of the functional component f: A → B, then what this
means is that the final cause of this functional component is entailing its own function; the
final cause of the effect b entails its function f.
Also, if we look at the diagrams [3.6.1], [3.6.2], and [3.6.3], we see that b and f are
rather busy. b is both the material cause of f and is the associated final cause of f; f is both the
efficient cause of b and the associated final cause of ɸ. This is another way of representing
the fact that in organizations of this kind, the functional components in terms of the relations
they have in their overall organization are context dependent (Recall Section 3.3) but now
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These last three diagrams, especially, [3.6.3] will become very important to us in Chapter 6.
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made explicitly in terms of entailments; in one context b is material cause, in another an
effect and its associated final cause; f in one context is efficient cause, in another an effect
and its associated final cause.
We can begin to see what Rosen means when he says that functional entailment is
where the real power of relational ideas become manifest. It not only provides the means for
the entailment of functions within an organization but also, as claimed above, provides the
means for formally developing a scientifically legitimate form of final cause. And again, we
cannot stress the fact enough, that final cause, in terms of functional entailments does not
involve states or state transitions, only mappings and the relations between them. It is
interesting to note both the reflexive character of category theory that we discussed in
Section 1.2 and the reflexive character of final cause which it can formally represent. It is a
remarkable thing.
There is another peculiarity (aside from its reflexive character) between final cause
and the three other causal categories. In terms of entailment, material, efficient, and formal
causes are necessary relations in the way in which we discussed entailments in Section 2.2;
the element b is a necessary consequence of its material, efficient, and formal causes; it is in
this sense, that these three causal categories are unique modes of entailment. Rosen points
out that the situation is rather different with final cause. To show how, consider two different
mappings f: A → B and g: C → B, noting that both the mappings f and g have the same
codomain B. Now consider some element a in A and c in C such that f(c) = g(c) = b and also
that f ≠ g and a ≠ c. Even though the material and efficient causes of the two mappings are
different, both the mappings (f and g) have the same final cause, the element b. What this
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means is that final cause is not unique like the other three causal categories; instead of being
a necessary relation like the other three categories of causation, final cause is bound up with
the notion of possibility. This in turn means that: “(1) the same function can be manifested
in many different ways, and also, conversely (2) many different functions are incipient in a
relational unit.”51 Final cause accounts for how many different kinds of natural systems in
terms of their organization perform the same functions and how different functions may be
carried out by natural systems with the same kinds of organizations. We feel it is apt to end
this section with a quote from Louie:
The misguided need to exclude finality in the name of “preserving objectivity”
has often been carried to ludicrous lengths in biology. Some would even go so
far as to entirely do away with the concept of “function”, a very pillar of
biology, on the grounds that it is finalistic and therefore not “objective”.
Statements such as “the function of the heart is to pump blood” and the
“function of the lungs is for gaseous exchange” would hence become heresy.
Carried still further, many consider illegitimate for science to seek to
understand anything about a system in terms of (its relations and interactions
with) a larger system for which it is a part. The reductionist idea is that one
must only seek answers of larger wholes from “objective”, contextindependent constituent parts; but never the reverse. And worse: any method
that is not based on the “scientific method” of physiochemical, mechanistic
dogma (i.e., “their” way) cannot possibly be “objective”.
The characterization of “scientific knowledge” (as opposed to other kinds of
knowledge) with the adjective “objective” is usually meant to indicate that
scientific knowledge pertains to its object alone, devoid of any information
about the specificities of its obtainment. Stated otherwise, this is the
description that neither the observer nor the observation process plays a
causal role in entailing what is observed. Final causation, i.e., teleology, has
long been regarded as the quintessence of subjectivity, and therefore
incompatible with objective science itself. But this is simply an equivocation.52
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Chapter 4. Simple Systems and Complex Systems
4.1 Impredicativity and Self-Reference
In Section 2.2 we said that the fundamental dualism in mathematics or languages in
general is that between syntax and semantics. Recall that syntax is what pertains to language
in and of itself, independent of any its meaning or referents. While semantics is what a
language is about in terms of its meanings or referents.
We also mentioned that historically, there has been a strong motivation to the study
and treatment of languages in terms of their syntax alone. We said that the reason for this is
that the syntax of a language is considered to be objective and hence amenable to scientific
study. While semantics, on the other hand, is considered to be inherently subjective, and
hence, unscientific, just like function and final cause from Section 3.6. We are now in a
position to discuss some of the reasoning behind these similarities in more detail. In
particular, we are concerned with a very important kind of semantics, namely:

impredicativity or self-reference. Let us begin with some history.
In the 19th and early 20th centuries there were two discoveries that struck at the heart
of the foundations of mathematics. The first was the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries.
The discovery of these geometries arose out of concern with Euclid’s Parallel Postulate.
Roughly, the Parallel Postulate states that given any line and any point p not on the line in
the plane, there exist exactly one line L parallel to the first line and passing through the given
point p. For the Ancient Greeks, postulates or axioms, were presumed to be self-evident
truths. However, the Parallel Postulate did not appear to be as self-evident as the other
axioms of Euclid’s axiomatic system: the Parallel Postulate depends what happens to the
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lines in far off or even infinite space; how can one ever be sure the two lines do not ever
meet? It was presumed by some that the Parallel Postulate was not an axiom at all and could
be derived as a theorem or proposition from the other axioms. This presumption turned out
to be wrong. The Parallel Postulate was proven to be independent of the other axioms and
one could develop different geometries by replacing it with different axioms.1 It was realized
that these different geometries could be characterized by their constant curvature. Euclidean
geometry has zero curvature. The two first newly discovered geometries are called

hyperbolic geometry and elliptic geometry. Hyperbolic geometry has negative curvature
while elliptic geometry has positive curvature. One of the major concerns with their
discovery was whether or not these new geometries were consistent, i.e., non-contradictory
(more below), and along with them axiomatic systems in general.
The second, and more important for us, was the discovery of “paradoxes” in Georg
Cantor’s set theory of which we have been using a variant (the category of sets and
mappings) for the development of relational models.
In the latter half of the 19th century Cantor developed his theory of infinite or
transfinite sets. In doing so Cantor discovered the astonishing fact that there is a neverending hierarchy of different sizes of infinite sets. Cantor also discovered that this infinite
hierarchy of sets leads to contradictions. It is interesting to note that Cantor, unlike the rest
of the mathematical community, considered his discovery of these contradictions as positive

In a bit more detail, both the parallel postulate and its negation were shown to be independent of the other
axioms. The negation of the parallel postulate is what really opened the door for the discovery of new
geometries.
1
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results and complementary to the advancement of his work.2 However, there was another
contradiction in Cantor’s set theory, discovered by Bertrand Russell in 1902, that, at the time,
was considered too unsettling and certainly not anything one would consider a positive
result.
The fundamental primitive concept in Cantor’s set theory is the membership
relation.3 Russell discovered a problem with the axiom of comprehension or axiom of

specification. A predicate or property is what is said or asserted about an object. The axiom
states that if P is some predicate or property for any objects, then there is a set whose
elements are exactly those objects which have the predicate or property P. For example, if P
is the predicate or property of a natural number being greater than 1 and less than 5, then
the elements of the set satisfying that predicate or property are {2, 3, 4}.
In Cantor’s set theory, it was presumed that there can be sets that are members or
elements of other sets. More, that sets can be members of themselves. For example, the set
of all ideas contains itself, since a set is an idea. There are also sets that do not contain
themselves; the set of all books does not contain itself since a set is not a book. In Russell’s
paradox, we are asked to consider the set of all sets that do not contain themselves. Call this
set R, for Russell’s set. Now ask whether or not the set R contains itself. If R does contain
itself then R does not contain itself since it is the set of all sets that do not contain themselves.
On the other hand, if R does not contain itself then R does contain itself, since, again, it is the

Dauben, Georg Cantor, 242 – 243.
This is not so in the category of sets and mappings we have been using; in the category of sets, an element is
not a primitive notion and is defined as an arrow from a set with one element to any other non-empty set in
the category of sets, 1: {x} → X.
2
3

80

set of all sets that do not contain themselves. Thus, the set R does not contain itself and the

set R does contain itself; a contradiction.
The earlier contradictions that were discovered by Cantor involve the ordering
relations and the sizes of infinite sets. The significance of Russell’s paradox is that it only
involves the membership relation regardless of whether sets are infinite or finite.
Russell’s paradox appeared to have rendered Cantor’s set theory inconsistent insofar
as it is based on the axiom of comprehension or specification. A mathematical system is

consistent when its axioms cannot prove a contradiction. A mathematical system is
inconsistent when it can prove a contradiction. An inconsistent mathematical system is
useless: it can prove anything.
The situation got worse when mathematicians began to realize that the implications
of this contradiction were not just confined to Cantor’s set theory. Russell’s discovery (even
more so than the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry) called into question the consistency
of older branches of mathematics since they all involve, in one way or another, the notion of
a collection or a set: Russell’s paradox “strikes at the very notion of classes of objects, a notion
used throughout mathematics.”4 The appearance of Russell’s paradox “constituted a crisis in
the development of a theoretical basis for mathematical knowledge.”5
Russell and others quickly realized that all of the known paradoxes in set theory
involved impredicativity or self-reference. Roughly, a self-referential statement is a
statement that refers to itself. Natural languages can generate all kinds of self-referential
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statements: “Jonny is the tallest man on his team.”, “This sentence has five words.”, which is
true, and “This sentence has four words.”, which is false. These kinds of self-referential
statements are harmless. However, this is not always the case. The discovery of the first kind
of troublesome self-referential statement dates back to well over two millennia: the liar

paradox of Epimenides. There are many versions of the liar paradox but for simplicity’s sake
consider the following instance: “This sentence is false.” Now ask whether or not the
sentence is true or false. If the sentence is true it is saying of itself that it is false and so it
cannot be true. If the sentence is false then it is saying of itself that it is true and so it cannot
be false. The sentence is both true and false; a contradiction.
In mathematics, an impredicative definition is one that involves self-reference:
When a set M and a particular object m are so defined that on the one hand m
is a member of M, and on the other hand the definition of m depends on M, we
say that the procedure (or the definition of m) is impredicative. Similarly,
when a property P is possessed by an object m whose definition depends on P
(here M is the set of the objects which possess the property P). An
impredicative definition is circular, at least on its face, as what is defined
participates in its own definition.6
Thus, “we see that the distinguishing feature of impredicativity is the self–referencing,
cyclic restraint”:7

m⇆M
Russell called this cyclic restraint a vicious circle:
An analysis of the paradoxes to be avoided shows that they all result from a
kind of vicious circle. The vicious circles in question arise from supposing that
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a collection of objects may contain members which can only be defined by

means of the collection as a whole.8
It seemed then to Russell and others that the necessary solution to the paradoxes
would require the elimination of all impredicative definitions in mathematics. But as Stephen
Cole Kleene rightly points out, there is one very big problem:
It might appear that we have a sufficient solution and adequate insight into the
paradoxes, except for one circumstance: parts of mathematics we want to
retain, particularly analysis, also contain impredicative definitions.”9
It turns out that impredicative definitions are not only ubiquitous in mathematics,
they are generally unavoidable. For example, the definition of a least upper bound. Consider
the set S of all real numbers between 2 and 6. The set, say, S1 of all upper bounds for S
contains the elements 6, 6.5, 7, 8, etc. The least upper bound of S 1 is 6. The definition of a
least upper bound is impredicative: it defines a particular element (in our example, 6) of the
set of upper bounds which is also a member of the set being defined. As Kleene notes, much
of analysis depends on the use of least upper bounds as well as solutions to any kind of
optimization problem. To eliminate the use of least upper bounds and other self-referentially
defined objects would be a great loss to mathematics indeed.
Various attempts were made by mathematicians in the early part of the 20th century
to resolve the paradoxes and secure a firm foundation for all of mathematics. For our
purposes, the most important was David Hilbert’s program. Hilbert’s goal was to “establish

8
9

Russell, Whitehead, Principia Mathematica, 37. Emphasis ours.
Kleene, Metamathematics, 42. Emphasis ours.
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once and for all the certitude of mathematics.”10 For Hilbert and his followers, the
consistency of all of mathematics is to be obtained through a process called formalization:11
As the first step, the propositions of the theory should be arranged
deductively, some of them, from which the others are logically deducible,
being specified by the axioms.
This step will not be finished until all the properties of the undefined terms or
technical terms of the theory which matter for the deduction of theorems are
expressed by the axioms. Then it should be possible to perform the deductions
treating the technical terms as words in themselves without meaning. For to
say that they have meanings necessary to the deduction of the theorems, other
than what they derive from the axioms which govern them, amounts to saying
that not all of their properties which matter for the deductions have been
expressed by axioms. When the meanings of the technical terms are thus left
out of account, we have arrived at the standpoint of formal axiomatics. […]
Since we have abstracted entirely from the content or matter, leaving only the
form, we say that the original theory has been formalized. In its structure, the
theory is no longer a system of meaningful propositions, but one of sentences
as sequences of words, which in turn are sequences of letters.12
The essential idea behind formalization is the elimination of all semantic aspects of a
mathematical system; it was presumed by Hilbert and his followers that the semantics of a
mathematical system can be replaced with, or reduced, to pure syntax and without any loss

of truth. This is important for two reasons. The first, as Kleene notes, is that if the truth of
any mathematical proposition depends on something other than the axioms, and the
application of rules of inference, i.e., semantics, then its truth would in turn depend on
something subjective, and again, unscientific. The second is that if all referents (semantics)
are eliminated from a mathematical system, then a fortiori all self-referents are eliminated
as well; thus, by fiat, formalization eliminates the cause of the contradictions:

Kline, Mathematics, The Loss of Certainty, 246.
Recall our characterization of a formal system in Section 2.2.
12 Kleene, Metamathematics, 59 - 60.
10
11
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Meta-mathematics must study the formal system as a system of symbols, etc.
which are considered wholly objectively. This means simply that those
symbols, etc. are themselves the ultimate objects, and are not being used to
refer to something other than themselves.
Thus, just like function and final cause, we can see, as we said at the outset, the
removal of any meaning (subjectivity) from a mathematical system, making it entirely
syntactic is what is presumed to make the system objective. Note that to say that these
ultimate syntactic objects are not to be used to refer to anything means that they must be

context independent in the same sense that a particle or structural analytic unit is context
independent.13 For the formalist then, mathematics is nothing more than the methods for
generating patterns of meaningless (syntactical) symbols through the application of a
system’s axioms and its rules of inference.
In summary, formalization presumes that (a) any mathematical system can be
formalized; (b) a formalization is a purely syntactic object; all the semantics in a
formalization have been removed; and (c) a formalization is equivalent to the original
mathematical system in the sense that there is no loss of information or truth after the
process of formalization is complete.
We will continue with these historical considerations in Section 4.4.
4.2 Simulations
Rosen argues that Hilbert’s program is canonical for science in the 20 th century and
we would hold that his argument is generally still true to this day:
If I had to characterize 20th century science in a single sentence, I would call it
the Age of Syntactics. I can even be more precise than this: It is the Age of String
13

Recall Section 3.3.
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Processing, Word Processing, Data Processing. In every field I know of in
which the concepts are at all meaningful, the goal has been to express all truth,
all meaning, all sense, by means of syntax alone.14
Now string processing, word processing, data processing are what machines do; more
specifically Turing machines or what nowadays people call computers. As Rosen points out,
at root, Turing machines are just a reformulation of Hilbert’s ideas discussed in the last
section. Like formalizations, Turing machines are purely syntactic objects; they involve only
the manipulation of meaningless symbols by fixed external rules; that is, any formalization,
can be replaced or replicated by a Turing machine:
Any mathematical structure. Any mathematical system, whether it can be an
explicit model of something in the material world or not, may possess the
property of being formalizable. There are many ways of describing this
property, but they all amount to being able to describe the entire system as
software to a mathematical machine (a Turing machine), in such a way that
the machine can simulate the system. Everything about a formalizable system
can be expressed as pure syntax; every inferential process in such a system
can be thought of as rote symbol manipulation or word processing.15
In a sense, Turing machines make formalizations even more objective and hence
scientific, since they manipulate pure syntax entirely “on their own”; i.e., a machine can do

it.16
As noted in the passage above, for Rosen, the defining characteristic of Turing
machines is that they are simulators: “Simulations are what [Turing] machines do and a
system (formal or material) is a [Turing] machine if it simulates, or can simulate, something

Casti, Karlqvist. Real Brains, Artificial Minds, 1.
Rosen, Essays on Life Itself, 324.
16 It is interesting to note that Turing developed his machines (1936) to resolve the Entscheidungsproblem,
one of several problems Hilbert posed to the mathematical community some years earlier.
14
15
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else.”17 Again, bearing in mind that “simulability means that all external referents, and hence
all semantics, have been internalized, in the form of equivalent syntactic rules.”18
Before we proceed, we should note that the term model is ubiquitous throughout the
scientific and philosophical literature. To our knowledge, no one uses the term in the context
of entailment relations between systems. More, for many scientists and philosophers the
terms model and simulation are synonymous. However, in terms of the modeling relation
(entailments), Rosen demonstrates that they are quite different, the reasons for which we
will now show.
Although the terms have slightly different meanings, the term simulation is nearly
synonymous with the terms computable or algorithmically definable .19 Following Louie, we
are going to say that a mapping is simulable if it is definable by an algorithm.20 An algorithm
has the following attributes:21
(i)

it terminates after a finite number of steps;

(ii)

each step is unambiguously defined;

(iii)

it has zero or more input data;

(iv)

it has one or more output data; and

(v)

it must be effective, which means there must be a Turing-machine equivalent; i.e.,
the process must be evaluable by a mathematical (Turing) machine.

More, if a mapping is simulable, then:

Rosen, Life Itself, 185.
Rosen, Essays on Life Itself, 268.
19 Louie, More than Life Itself, 203.
20 Recall Section 3.6.
21 There is some dispute of the definition of an algorithm in the scientific community.
17
18
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(a) its corresponding Turing machine halts after a finite number of steps;
(b) its corresponding algorithmic processes is of finite length; and
(c) its corresponding program, which may be considered as a word built out of the

alphabets of its Turing machine, is of finite length.
Thus, an algorithm
is a computational procedure that requires in its application a rigid stepwise
mechanical execution of explicitly stated rules. It is presented as a
prescription, consisting of a finite number of instructions. It may be applied to
any number (including one) of members of a set of possible inputs, where each
input is a finite sequence of symbolic expressions. Once the inputs have been
specified, the instructions dictate a succession of discrete, simple operations,
requiring no recourse to chance and ingenuity. The first operation is applied
to the input and transforms it into a new finite sequence of symbol
expressions. This outcome is in turn subjected to a second operation, dictated
by the instructions of the algorithm and so on. After a fine number of steps, the
instructions dictate that the process must be discontinued, and some outputs
be read off, in some prescribed fashion, from the outcome of the last step.22
Note that the key word is finite.
In order for us to show the difference between a modeling relation and a simulation
let us recall how the modeling relation works from Section 2.4 with a slight modification of
notation:

22

Louie, More than Life Itself, 203 -204.
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[4.2.1]
And the diagram commutes:
φ=β∘ψ∘α
Now, let S1 be a system (natural or formal,) and let S2 be a Turing machine or
a simulator of S1. Let a mapping f: X → Y represent an entailment relation in the system
S1. Just like a modeling relation, in order for a simulator to simulate another system,
an encoding relation α must be established between the two systems. Let a mapping
g: α(X) → α(Y) for an encoding represent the simulation of S1 by S2. This gives the
following commutative diagram:

[4.2.2]
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If we follow the arrows, we see that α following f is the same as g following α, so
α ∘ f(x) = g ∘ α(x) for all x ϵ X. Thus, when the diagram commutes, we say that S2 is a

simulation of S1.
However, in order for S2 to be a model (as opposed to a simulation) of S1, the
mapping from α(X) to α(Y) must also encode the mapping f as an efficient cause of a
natural or formal system S1 which gives: α(f): α(X) → α(Y) and α ∘ f(x) = α(f) ∘ α(x):

[4.2.4]
As we can see, the crucial difference between a simulation and a model is that a
simulation converts (or to put it even worse, confuses) efficient cause, the mapping f of the
system being simulated, into material cause or input for the mapping g. Also note that a
simulation of the mapping f by the simulator g is now causally contributing to the effect of
its output α(Y); i.e., if we ask “Why α(Y)?” then g (and not f) is the efficient cause. Even more,
note that the original distinction between processer–flow (between efficient and formal
cause) is lost; everything is all “flow” in the simulation. Thus, unlike simulations, models
must satisfy a more stringent condition in that they must preserve the entailment relations
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between it and the system being modeled; In other words, unlike a simulation, a model is in
a strong sense functorial.23
4.3 Relational Models for Simple Systems and Machines
We want to consider the kinds of relational models of systems that can be formalized
or simulated. It is important to point out that in this section, we are not concerned with
examples of natural systems to which these models apply, only the kinds of entailments that
are available in these models. The kinds of systems that can be formalized or simulated are
what Rosen calls simple systems or mechanisms and a subclass of these kinds of systems
that Rosen calls machines.
Rosen’s definition for a simple system or a mechanism is as follows:
A system is simple if all of its models are simulable.24

A natural system N is a mechanism if and only if all of its models are
simulable.25
As we can see, the definition of a simple system and a mechanism are
synonymous; in what follows, we will use the term simple system as it pairs better
with complex system with which we want to compare in Section 4.5.
In Chapter 8 of Life Itself, Rosen proves that all of the models of a simple system must
be simulable. We will skip the technical details since it would require an in-depth excursion
in to lattice theory.26 The important result is that if a natural system N is a simple system,

Recall Section 1.2.
Rosen, Essays on Life Itself, 293.
25 Rosen, Life Itself, 203
26 For an alternative presentation of the proof, see Louie, More Than Life Itself.
23
24
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then the category of all of its models, C(N) must have the following properties:27 (1) a unique
largest model nmax; every other model ni in the category C(N) is included in the largest model
nmax, i.e., ni ≤ nmax. Thus, the largest model nmax tells us everything we can know about the
simple system N. (2) there exist a finite collection of disjoint minimal models n min; that is,
none of these minimal models are included in one another; and (3) the largest model nmax is
equivalent to the sum of all of the disjoint minimal models nmin in the category C(N). Roughly,
the proof demonstrates that one obtains a reductio ad absurdum when one assumes that the
properties (1), (2), and (3) do not hold for the category of all models C(N), a simple system.
Note again from Section 4.2 that the key word is finite. In terms of our discussion of
alternative models in Section 2.5 this means that for simple systems, reductionism holds; in
the category of all models for a simple system, the models “smaller” than the largest model
can all be reduced to the largest one.
This is dependent upon the fact that the only kinds of entailments available in the
models for simple systems are material entailments (sequential or cyclic), finite chains of
functional entailments, or cycles of entailments with only one solid-headed arrow. Let us
review:
All the models for single functional component are simulable and hence, are
simple systems (diagram [3.4.2]):

27

Recall Section 2.5.
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All of the models for sequential composition of a finite number of functional
components (sequential chains) are simulable and hence, are simple systems (diagram
[3.5.1]):

All of the models for system containing a finite number of closed paths of material
causation are simulable and hence, are simple systems (diagram [3.5.3]):
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All of the models for a system containing a finite number of hierarchical chains are
simulable and hence, are simple systems (diagram [3.5.4]):

All of the models for a finite system containing a cycle or closed path with exactly one
efficient cause are simulable and hence, are simple systems (diagram [3.6.3]):

And lastly, for a more complicated example of a relational model of a simple system,
consider the entailment network:
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[4.3.1]
Notice that model, diagram [4.3.1] contains a finite number of sequential chains, a
finite number of hierarchical chains, and one closed path of material cause.
As we can see, all of the relational models for natural systems that we have presented
thus far are models for natural systems that are simple. Now let us consider another kind of
relational model that can represent a class of natural systems, which as we noted above,
Rosen calls machines. Rosen defines a machine as follows:

A natural system is a machine if and only if it is a mechanism, such that at
least one of its models is already a mathematical machine.28
And by mathematical machine, Rosen means Turing machine which we introduced in
Section 4.2.29 Recall that for Rosen, the defining characteristic of Turing machines is that they
are simulators. Additionally, the most important property of a relational model of
mathematical machines is that they require an absolute distinction between their hardware
28
29

Rosen, Life Itself, 203.
From now on we will just use mathematical machine so to conform to Rosen’s definition.
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and their software. Intuitively, the hardware of any mathematical machine is a processor of
its software. Since the two parts are absolutely distinct, the hardware and software are
represented as two disjoint summands for which a mathematical machine is their sum:
MATHEMATICAL MACHINE = HARDWARE + SOFTWARE
The software of a mathematical machine can be decomposed further into three more
disjoint summands: inputs, software flow (or everything else that goes on in between inputs
and outputs), and outputs:
SOFTWARE = INPUTS + SOFTWARE FLOW + OUPUTS
All in all, a mathematical machine can be represented as a sum comprised of these
four disjoint summands.
The reason for the absolute distinction between hardware and software of a
relational model of a mathematical machine is that, if it is to serve as a model for a natural
system, then there must be two disjoint parts of the natural system, one that can be encoded
as hardware, and the other that can be encoded as software. That is, since, formally, the
hardware and software are distinct disjoint summands, in order preserve the entailment
relations, the encodings of a natural system must preserve this distinction.
A relational model of a mathematical machine is just a representation of a functional
component, Diagram [3.4.2]:30

30

This is just a representation of the simulator, g: X → Y, diagram [4.2.2] in relational form.
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The solid-headed arrow represents hardware (efficient cause); the elements a in the
set A represent the inputs (material cause); the hollow-headed arrow represents software
flow; the solid-head and hollow-headed arrow, again, represent formal cause; and the
elements b in the set B represent outputs (effect associated with final cause).
We should note two important things in passing. The first is that, as we can see, a
mathematical machine can be represented as a single functional component comprised of its
four distinct, disjoint parts. But recall from Section 3.3 we said that a functional component
is a particle of function or the basic analytic unit of relational systems meaning that it cannot
be analyzed any further. What we must keep in mind in our representation of a functional
component, as a mathematical machine, is that its parts, neither hardware or software
separately, are functional units themselves; for a mathematical machine to have function
requires both hardware and software together since function in the context of a
mathematical machine means that the hardware must be able to act effectively on the
software; it is only as a whole, that a mathematical machine is a functional component.
The second is that, as Yanofsky has pointed out, mathematical machines do not

strictly form a category. While associativity of composition is well-defined and mathematical
machines do have identity arrows, the problem is that the identity law fails for mathematical
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machines:31 “The composition of any Turing machine with such an identity Turing machine

produces the correct function, but it is not the same Turing machine as the original Turing
machine.”32 Roughly, a program f (input) for a mathematical machine is a sequence of syntax
(words or letters) or a sequence of rules. The identity program is also a sequence of syntax
(words or letters) or a sequence of rules. If the program f has some rule “do this, do that, do
the other”, it is not the same as the program f composed with the identity rule: “do this, do
that, do the other, send everything back to itself.” We mention this only to say that this fact,
does not however, in any harmful way affect our representation of mathematical machines
categorically in terms of sets, elements of sets and the mappings between them.
Mathematical machines can be sequentially composed and generate sequential
chains (diagram [3.5.1]):

Mathematical machines can also be composed to generate sequential cycles. This
means that relational models represented by diagrams [3.5.1], [3.5.3], [3.5.4], not only
represent mechanisms, they also represent its subclass, machines. As we shall now see, the
difference between a mechanism and a machine is that mechanisms admit (finite) functional
entailments while machines do not. Machines only admit material entailments.

31
32

Recall Section 1.2.
Private conversation.
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The reason that machines cannot be functionally entailed by one another is because
of the absolute distinction between hardware and software that, as we said, must be
maintained in the encodings from a natural system into a relational model of a mathematical
machine. I.e., since mathematical machines are comprised of disjoint summands, each causal
category that corresponds to each disjoint summand is also disjoint and independent of each
other; they are not interchangeable.33 Any blurring of the causal categories of mathematical
machines would make it impossible to decode the hardware-software distinction that the
relational model must maintain: “The distinction between hardware and software, then, is a
completely legitimate one, but it must be maintained consistently when decoded back to a
natural system.”34 Another way of saying this is that if mathematical machine admitted
functional entailments, then this would mean that a mathematical machine can entail
hardware and this is something that mathematical machines cannot do; mathematical
machines cannot entail efficient causes.35
In summary, the difference between a simple system and a machine is that a simple
system can be simulated by a mathematical machine. A machine, however, has at least one
model that is itself a mathematical machine. Another way of saying this is that in all of the
models for a simple system (that is not a machine) the distinction between hardware and
software can be blurred. If a simple system is a machine, then at least one of its models, a

Note that although that formal cause is hardware + software flow, neither hardware nor software flow are
interchangeable.
34 Rosen, Life Itself, 234.
35 Recall, though, from Section 4.2 that a mathematical machine can simulate another mathematical machine’s
hardware, but again, in terms of decoding, this confuses efficient with material cause.
33
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mathematical machine, must maintain the distinction between hardware and software; or, a
machine is a special kind of mechanism that does not admit finite functional entailments.
Before leaving this section, there is one important thing we should discuss. As we
mentioned above, Rosen proves that a simple system must have a largest model. And this
largest model can tell us everything we can know about the simple system. But we should
point out that this is an entirely formal result. What the proof shows is that having a largest
model is what is known as an existence property of simple systems. Again, trying to avoid an
excursion into lattice theory, to prove that a simple system must have a largest model means
that in the category of all of its models, which indeed does form a lattice, there must exist a

top or maximal element in the lattice. This top element is the largest model. It is not
uncommon for mathematicians to prove the existence of an object, in Rosen’s case, a largest
model, without constructing it, or knowing how to construct it, or even knowing what it is.
Even in cases where one knows what the top element is one still may not be able to access it.
What this means is that one may not be able to construct, know, or access what the largest
model is for a simple system. As we shall see in Section 5.2, when it comes to a natural system
as opposed to formal ones, it may be impossible to construct, know or access its largest
model.
For example, consider what is known as Pierre-Simon Laplace’s Intellect or Demon:
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and
the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all
forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature
is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to
analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest
bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect
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nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present
before its eyes.36
In Newtonian mechanics, the system’s differential equations, one equation per
particle, in a six-dimensional Euclidean space would be, in Rosen’s terms, Laplace’s largest
model, rendering the universe simple. But it is a model, and in practice, it is impossible to
construct, know, or access. And this is the case for simple systems in general.
More, as we shall show in Section 4.5, one fundamental difference between simple
and complex systems is that complex systems do not and cannot have a largest model; i.e., in
the category of all models for a complex system a top element does not and cannot exist.
4.4 Impredicativity and Self-Reference Continued
Bearing all this in mind, let us now return to our discussion of impredicativities and
self-reference from Section 4.1.
In 1931, Kurt Gödel published a paper titled “On Formally Undecidable Propositions
of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems.” In it, are perhaps two of the most important
results ever discovered in mathematical logic. Roughly, what Gödel’s results demonstrate is
that any attempt of a formalization of number theory (or similar systems) in Hilbert’s sense
is impossible. I.e., Gödel proved that “for any proposed axiom system for number theory
there will always be further truths about the number system that do not follow as theorems
in that axiom system.”37

36
37

Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, 4.
Lawvere, Rosebrugh, Sets for Mathematics, 130.
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A formal system is complete when every theorem generated by its axioms can be
either proven or disproven by the axioms. A formal system is incomplete when the axioms
can generate one or more theorems that are neither provable nor disprovable by the axioms.
In his first theorem Gödel demonstrated that any consistent formal system S within which a

certain amount of elementary arithmetic can be carried out is incomplete with regard to
statements in elementary arithmetic: there are statements which can neither be proved, nor
disproved in S. In the original paper, Gödel provided only a sketch for his second theorem
(and can be considered as a corollary of the first theorem) which demonstrates that for any

consistent formal system S within which a certain amount of elementary arithmetic can be
carried out, the consistency of S cannot be proved in S itself. 38
Let us briefly give a very rough overview of some of the salient features of Gödel’s
first incompleteness theorem. The construction of Gödel’s proof for the first theorem
involves the conversion of mathematical statements and proofs about numbers and their
predicates or properties into logical symbolic form. This process is called symbolization. The
logical symbols, statements, and proofs are then converted into unique numbers which then
represent them. This process is called arithmetization. These two processes, symbolization
and arithmetization, create a self-referential cyclical loop that allows number theory to talk
about itself; i.e., to talk about its predicates or properties and most importantly, its proofs.
SYMBOLIZATION ⇆ ARITHMETIZATOIN39

38
39

Franzen, Gödel’s Theorem, 16, 34.
Recall the cyclical loop m ⇆ M from Section 4.1.
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Thus, the proof of the first theorem depends on self-reference in an essential way; As
Emile Post put it: “Symbolic logic may said to be Mathematics become self-conscious.”40
Now, there are sets of numbers that may (or may not) have certain predicates or
properties. For example, being even, being prime, being greater than or equal to the number
10, etc.41 Such predicates can be treated as mappings. These mappings F accept numbers n
as inputs whose values or outputs F(n) are either true or false depending on whether or not
a given number n has the predicate or property in question. For every logical predicate F that
takes on a number n, we can construct a fixed-point which allows us to turn predicates into
self-referential propositions. That is, we can construct a logical proposition S, such that S ≡
F(“S”) which says that S has the property F that corresponds to the number “S”. 42 The
proposition S is called a fixed-point because the input for the predicate function “S” is
equivalent to the output S; this means that the proposition S is self-referential: put differently
S says “I have the property F.” The process that takes us from a mapping F(x) to S is called a

fixed-point machine.
Let “Prov” be a predicate which means “there is a proof for…”. We can let Prov(x, y),
be a two-placed predicate that is true when “y is the number of a proof of a proposition
whose number is x.” More formally, this is
F(x) = (ꓯy) Not-Prov(y, x)

Yanofsky, The Outer Limits of Reason, 321.
Recall the axiom of comprehension or specification from Section 4.1.
42 The symbol “≡” means that S is defined equivalently to F(“S”).
40
41
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The symbol “ꓯ” means “all” and “Not-prov” means “there is no proof for...”, which
gives, on the righthand side of the equation, “for all proofs y, there is no proof for x.”; or a bit
more precise, the above proposition says F(x) is true if and only if no proof exists for the
proposition whose number is x. Using the fixed-point machine, Gödel showed it is possible
to construct the proposition G (called a Gödel sentence), such that:
G ≡ F(“G”) = (ꓯy) Not-Prov(y, “G”)
Which, roughly, says there is no number y that corresponds to a proof for the
proposition G, or better, yet rougher, it is the self-referential proposition
“I am unprovable.”
Now assume that the proposition is provable. G says of itself that it is not provable so
to prove it would mean we have proved a false proposition. This would mean the axioms of
number theory are inconsistent. Now assume that the axioms of number theory are
consistent. G says of itself that it is not provable which means that it must be true; i.e., this
means that the proposition G is true but cannot be proved by the axioms of number theory.
More particularly, if the axioms of number theory are consistent, then the Gödel sentence G
is unprovable but true.43 Thus, number theory is incomplete. Additionally, Gödel’s first
incompleteness theorem allows for the generation of a countably infinite number of
additional Gödel sentences. In summary, what Gödel proved is that the set of all true
propositions in number theory is greater than the set of all provably true propositions in
number theory. It is a remarkable thing. As Rosen puts it:

43

These are Peano’s axioms for number theory.
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For any system of axioms rich enough to be mathematically interesting there
must always exist propositions we can recognize as true, but which we cannot
effectively generate from the axioms by means of available production rules;
this is the content of Gödel’s theorem. […] Gödel’s theorem asserts that the
quality of being a theorem is one which can be recognized directly, but for
which no specific linkage can be effectively constructed between this quality
and our axioms.44
Now, what does it mean to say that a Gödel’s sentence can only be recognized as true
qualitatively? In part, it means that the truth of a Gödel sentence is inherently semantic. What
Rosen points out, is that when we say that the set of all true propositions in number theory
is greater than the set of all provably true propositions in number theory, what is really
meant is that the set of all semantic, non-formalizable truths in number theory is greater
than the set of all syntactic, formalizable truths in number theory; and moreover, what this
means is that semantics cannot be reduced to syntax without loss of truth. Thus, while it is
true that formalization is indeed a part of mathematics, it is not all of mathematics;
formalization, the reduction of semantics to syntax cannot be a universal strategy for the
study of mathematics. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem asserts that formalizations or purely
syntactical systems, are, to use Rosen’s term, too “impoverished” to model number theory in
its entirety; there are qualities or semantic properties of number theory that are inaccessible
and cannot be captured by formalizations: “It would require, at best, an infinite number of
distinct formalizations to capture all the qualities, and hence, all the entailments of number
theory, in terms of syntax alone.”45 It is in this sense that Hilbert’s program of formalization
fails. And of course, if number theory is not formalizable, then a fortiori, it is not simulable
by a mathematical machine. Thus, as a mathematical system, number theory is not a simple

44
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Rosen, Anticipatory Systems, 166.
Rosen, Life Itself, 9.

105

system; in the sense that it is “nonsimulable, nonalgorithmic, nonsyntactic.”46 Nonetheless,
even though number theory is not formalizable, it is still a branch of mathematics. Its
unformalizability, and nonsimalibility, though, means that it is not a closed, finite system of
material or functional entailments.
4.5 Relational Models for Complex Systems
We now want to consider the kinds of relational models that cannot be formalized or
simulated. Again, it is important to point out that in this section, we are not concerned with
examples of natural systems to which these models apply, only the kinds of entailments that
are available in these models that are not available in simple systems. These kinds of systems
are what Rosen calls complex systems and in the next two chapters we will consider two
important subclasses of complex systems, anticipatory systems and (M, R) – Systems.

A natural system is a complex system, if and only if it is not a simple system. This
means that a natural system that is complex is different in kind than a natural system that is
simple. The reason for this is that the kinds of entailment a natural system admits that is
complex is different in kind than the kinds of entailment a natural system admits that is
simple. The fundamental difference between a complex and simple system is that a complex

system is impredicative while a simple system is predicative:47
The issue is rather the comparison of impredicative contexts with predicative
ones, and with each other. I would rather, then, call a system complex if it has
inherent impredicative loops in it.48

Rosen, “On Models and Modeling,” 370.
Recall that from Section 4.3 that the only kinds of entailments available for simple systems are material
entailments (sequential or cyclic), finite chains of functional entailments, or cycles of entailments with only one
solid-headed arrow. All of these kinds of entailments are predicative.
48 Rosen, Essays on Life Itself, 44.
46
47
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[…] the barrier between simple and complex is not porous; it cannot be
crossed at all in the direction from simple to complex; even the opposite
direction is difficult. There are certainly no purely syntactic operations that
will take us across the barrier at all. That is, no given number of finite number
of repetitions of a single rote operation will take us across the barrier in either
direction; it can produce neither simplicity from complexity nor the reverse.49
50

In terms of entailments, this means that a natural system is complex if it contains a

closed path of efficient causation; a closed path of efficient causation is a hierarchical cycle
in the natural system that contains two or more solid-headed arrows; i.e., two or more

efficient causes entailing one another.
A complex system is one in which there must exist closed loops of entailment.
Such loops cannot exist in a machine or a simple system; this is indeed
precisely why machines are so feeble (i.e., there is not “enough” entailment in
a simple system to close such a loop). In mathematics, loops of this kind are
manifested by impredicatives, or self-references—indeed, by the inability to
internalize every referent.51
For an example of a complex system, consider this relational model of an entailment
network for a complex natural system:52

Ibid, 293.
Note again the word finite again from Section 4.2.
51 Rosen, Essays on Life Itself, 281.
52 Compare this with the diagram [4.3.1] of an entailment network for a simple system.
49
50
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[4.5.1]
In the near-center of the diagram is hierarchical cycle, i.e., a closed path of efficient
causation with three functional components entailing one another.
To begin to understand the impredicative nature of complex systems in terms of
closed paths of efficient causation let us consider, an example, a situation known as deadlock.
Roughly, the most commonly known example of deadlock is in the old question

Which came first, the chicken or the egg?
As another example, you may find hard to believe, it would appear that the following
law was passed by the Kansas legislature in the early part of the 20th century:
When two trains approach each other at a crossing, both shall come to a full
stop and neither shall start up again until the other has gone.53
Deadlock is also a problem in computer science:

53

Botkin, Treasury of Railroad Folklore, 381.
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Deadlock refers to a specific condition when two or more processes are each
waiting for another to release a resource, or more than two processes are
waiting for resources in a circular chain.54
Louie, showed that deadlock can be generalized and represented formally in a
relational context.
Consider two mappings, g: A → B and f: X → Y. We can use these mappings to form a
minimum two-mapping hierarchical cycle by letting B = H(X, Y) and Y = H(A, B). This now
gives the mappings g: A → H(X, Y) and f: X → H(A, B), with g ϵ H(A, B) and f ϵ H(X, Y). As a
relational diagram this is:

[4.5.2]
For now, we are omitting a representation of the mappings f and g from the diagram.
This is because the mappings f and g are not fixed, but variable: This means that a mapping
f, as a value in the codomain of the hom-set H(X, Y), for the mapping g: A → H(X, Y), is
dependent upon and determined by some argument a in the set A. Likewise, a mapping g, as
a value in the codomain of the hom-set H(A, B), is dependent upon and determined by the
value of some argument x in the set X. Since f = b = g(a) and g = y = f(x), we will denote the
mapping f as fb and the mapping g as gy.

54

Louie, More Than Life Itself, 209.
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If we supply an element a in A to the system to entail a mapping f in the hom-set
H(X, Y), this gives55

[4.5.3]
There is a problem: since the mapping g: A → B is variable it cannot yet operate on
the element a to generate b = g(a), i.e., fb. In order for the mapping g to operate on the
element a, the mapping f: X → Y would have also to operate on an element x in X to generate
y = f(x), i.e., gy.

[5.5.4]

55

gy and fb are hollowed out to denote the fact that they are both variable, i.e., argument dependent.
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There is another problem: since the mapping f: X → Y is also variable it cannot yet
operate on x to produce y = f(x), i.e., gy. In order for the mapping f to operate on the element
x, the mapping g: A → B would also have to operate on the element a in A to generate
b = g(a), i.e., fb.
All in all, we have:
gy: a ↦ fb, fb: x ↦ gy
In terms of entailments, the closed path of efficient cause is
gy ˫ fb and fb ˫ gy
Which is just the hierarchical cyclic loop
gy ⇆ fb56
Now, the key is that if the process is to begin at all, both the elements a in A and x in
X have to supplied simultaneously; more, if the process is to be reiterated, the two inputs a
in A and x in X have to be resupplied, again, and again, simultaneously. And this is the
quintessence of deadlock.
Thus, in our example, there is a closed path of efficient causation involving two
efficient causes. This means that gy and fb are functionally dependent on each other in a
hierarchical cycle. It is the relationship between the two final causes and the other causal
categories, in particular, the two efficient causes, that render the system impredicative, i.e.,
complex; the final cause for the efficient cause gy is fb, and the final cause for the efficient

Recall the cyclical loop m ⇆ M from Section 4.1 and SYMBOLIZATION ⇆ ARITHMETIZATOIN from Section
4.4.
56
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cause fb is gy. In other words, complex systems admit a category of final cause in a special
way that is not available in a simple system.57 Recall that in simple systems, final causes are
either relayed as material causes in sequential chains and sequential cycles, or relayed as
functional causes in hierarchical chains, or in the case of the relational diagram [3.6.3], the
more interesting situation, with a cycle with just one efficient cause. More, any attempt to
simulate a hierarchical cycle would involve having to deal with efficient causes
simultaneously. There is no externally imposed way (outside of the hierarchical cycle) to do
this without breaking the hierarchical cycle apart, i.e., rendering it predicative which then
eliminates the internally related and functionally dependent entailments that makes the
system complex; complex systems then are nonsimulable. As such, what this also means is
that, unlike simple systems, in the category of all models for a complex natural system, there
can be no largest model. To further illustrate the passages cited above at the beginning of
this section, when Rosen says that the barrier between the simple and the complex cannot
be crossed, and that the complex cannot be reduced to the simple, means, as corollaries, that
impredicatives cannot be reduced to predictatives, nor can semantics be reduced to syntax
or context independency, any more than say, the infinite can be reduced to the finite:
It should be noted that there are many deep parallels between the dichotomy
we have drawn between simple (predicative) and complex (impredicative),
and the dichotomy between the finite and the infinite. Just as “infinite” is not
just “big finite”, impredicatives are not just big (complicated) predicatives. In
both cases, there is no threshold to cross, in terms of how many repetitions of
a rote operation such as “add one” are required to carry one from one realm
to the other, nor yet back again.58

This further illustrates what we meant in Section 3.6 when we said that with regard to the kinds of
relations that final cause can have with the other causal categories, that Rosen has much more in mind.
58 Rosen, Essays on Life Itself, 44.
57
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In closing this section, a word more on objectivity. As we have seen, function, final
cause, semantics, especially context dependency, traditionally, have all been deemed
subjective and hence unscientific. However, it is important to point out that the partitioning
of the world into an objective part and a subjective part is something we do, subjectively;
there is no objective criteria whatsoever for the distinction between the objective and the
subjective, since again, the distinction is subjectively posited by us. One way of reconsidering
all of what we have said with regard to both objectivity and the self-referential paradoxes
presented thus far, is, as Rosen makes clear, quite worth our consideration (along with the
passage from Louie in Section 3.6):
Most, if not all, the known paradoxes arise from an attempt to divide a universe
into two parts on the basis of satisfying some property or not (e.g., a property
like objectivity). Trouble arises whenever this property can be turned back on
itself, in particular, when we try to put some consequent of the property back
into one or the other class defined by the property.59
In other words, when we try to partition the world in to an objective part and a
subjective part and ask to which part the criteria we are using to make the demarcation
belongs, we thereby generate an impredicativity. Vicious circle indeed.
4.6 Addendum: The Lawvere-Cantor Theorem: “Solution” to the Paradoxes
There is, unfortunately, a little-known paper, published by William Lawvere in 1968,
“Diagonal Arguments and Cartesian Closed Categories.” In it is a most astonishing result.
Lawver shows that Cantor’s theorem for the different sizes of infinite sets, Russell’s paradox,
Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, and Alfred Tarski’s undefinability theorem, are all just
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Ibid, 90.
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instances of a more general theorem in category theory.60 In 2003, Yanofsky published his
(also unfortunately little-known) paper “A Universal Approach to Self-Referential
Paradoxes, Incompleteness and Fixed-Points” that extends Lawvere’s results. Yanofsky
shows that Grelling’s paradox, Turing’s halting problem, Richard’s paradox, Parikh
sentences, etc., are also instances of Lawvere’s general theorem.
Intuitively, to understand how Lawvere’s general proof works let us consider an
example. Recall Russell’s paradox from Section 4.1. There is an analogous version of Russell’s
paradox called the barber paradox. Imagine a village, consisting of a finite set of villagers.
The village has only one barber and the following village ordinance: every villager that does

not cut their own hair gets their hair cut by the barber; and every villager that does cut their
own hair does not get their hair cut by the barber. Now ask the question: Who cuts the
barber’s hair? If the barber does not cut his own hair, then the barber does cut his own hair
since villagers that do not cut their own hair get their hair cut by the barber. On the other
hand, if the barber does cut his own hair, then he does not cut his own hair since villagers
that cut their own hair do not get their hair cut by the barber; a contradiction: the barber
cuts his own hair and does not cut his own hair.
More formally, consider the mapping f with two arguments:
f: VillxVill → 2

60

Roughly, Tarski’s theorem shows that the truth of arithmetical statements cannot be defined in arithmetic.
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Vill is the set of villagers and 2 is the set with two elements, 2 = {0, 1}, where 0 means
“no” and 1 means “yes”. This mapping allows us to describe who cuts whose hair in the
village. For two villagers v and v’ in the set Vill we have
f(v, v’) = 1 if the hair of v is cut by v’ and f(v, v’) = 0 if the hair of v is not cut by v’
We can now express the village ordinance as saying that for all villagers v in Vill
f(v, v) = 1 if and only if f(v, barber) = 0
This says that the villager v cuts their own hair if and only if the villager v does not get
their hair cut by the barber.
This is true for all villagers v including the barber. The contradiction, that barber cuts
and does not cut his own hair, can be expressed as
f(barber, barber) = 1 if and only if f(barber, barber) = 0
Now let’s look at the barber paradox in the context of Lawvere’s theorem. The general
theorem states that
(In any category with products), if Y is an object such that there exist an object
T with enough points to parameterize all the arrows T → Y by means of some
single map f: TxT → Y, then Y as the “fixed point property”: every endomap α:
Y → Y of Y has at least one point y: 1 → Y for which α(y) = y61

61

The instances of Tarski and Gödel us the converse of this theorem.
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In the above theorem, let T = Vill, again, the set of all villagers, and let Y = 2, again,
the set with two elements {0, 1}. We are going to let the mapping α: Y → Y now be
NOT: 2→ 2. The mapping NOT is the negation map that takes 0 to 1 and 1 to 0, i.e.,
NOT(0) = 1, and NOT(1) = 0.
The mapping f: TxT → Y is now our mapping f: VillxVill → 2. There is also the diagonal
mapping mapping, Δ: Vill → VillxVill. The diagonal mapping is the core of self-reference; it is
defined as
Δ(v) = (v, v)
The diagonal mapping can be composed with the mapping f, which gives
f ∘ Δ: Vill → VillxVill → 2
The composition of the diagonal mapping with the mapping f restricts the mapping f
in such a way so that now the only question is whether or not each villager v cuts their own
hair or not; i.e., f ∘ Δ (v,v) = 1 if and only if the villager v cuts their own hair and
f ∘ Δ (v,v) = 0 if and only if the villager v does not cut their own hair. In other words, we get:
“Do I cut my own hair or not?”; i.e., self-reference. All in all, Lawvere’s theorem, in our
example, gives us the following diagram:

[4.5.1]
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The mapping g is defined
g = NOT ∘ f ∘ Δ
For any villager v
g(v) = NOT(f(Δ(v)) = NOT(f(v, v))
What this says is that g(v) = 1 if and only if f(v, v) = 0 if and only if v does not cut
their own hair. The negation mapping NOT will flip the value of the mapping f so that if
f(v,v) = 0, then, NOT ∘ f(v, v) = 1. This makes the mapping g represent the subset of villagers

that do not cut their own hair.
Since the mapping f is supposed to determine which villagers cut their own hair and
which villagers do not, we can ask, “Is there some villager, v0 such that g( ) = f( ,v0)?”. This
is a reasonable question since the mapping g describes the set of all villagers who do not cut
their own hair which also means that these villagers should get their hair cut by the barber.
And of course, f( , barber) can describe all of the villagers that do get their hair cut by the
barber. So if we let v0 = barber, then we are asking if g( ) is the same as f( , barber) since they
should characterize the same subset of villagers.
The answer is yes for most of the villagers
g(v) = f(v, barber)
but this is not true when v = barber. If it were true for the barber this would give
g(barber) = f(barber, barber)
But the definition of g is
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g(barber) = NOT(f(barber, barber)
All in all this would give
g(barber) = f(barber, barber) = NOT(f(barber, barber))
which is a contradiction since the value of the mapping NOT is the negation of the value of
the mapping f
f(barber, barber) ≠ NOT(f(barber, barber))
This means that the diagram [4.5.1] cannot commute. In order for the diagram to
commute the mapping NOT would have to have the fixed point property NOT(1) = 1 which
is impossible, a contradiction. And there you have it.
According to Yanofsky, in order to generate the contradictions two things are
required: (1) objects that negate themselves, and (2), a single object that describes the
objects that negate themselves. In our example the object that negates itself is the subset of
all villagers who do not cut their own hair. The single object that describes the objects that
negate themselves is the barber who cuts the hair of the subset of all villagers who do not
cut their own hair.
What Lawvere’s theorem shows is that the so-called paradoxes are not really
paradoxes at all! Each of the so-called paradoxes are simply instances of general algebraic
properties of what are called Cartesian closed categories. Roughly, a Cartesian closed
category is a category that admits products (recall that the codomain of the diagonal
mapping is a product and generates self-reference); give me products, and I’ll give you
“paradoxes.” As Lawvere puts it:
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In “Diagonal arguments and Cartesian closed categories” we demystified the
incompleteness theorem of Gödel and the truth-definition theory of Tarski by
showing that both are consequences of some very simple algebra in the
Cartesian-closed setting. It was always hard for many to comprehend how
Cantor’s mathematical theorem could be re-christened as a “paradox” by
Russell and how Gödel’s theorem could be so often declared to be the most
significant result of the 20th century. There was always the suspicion among
scientists that such extra-mathematical publicity movements concealed an
agenda for re-establishing belief as a substitute for science. Now, one hundred
years after Gödel’s birth, the organized attempts to harness his great
mathematical work to such an agenda have become explicit.62
Before leaving this chapter, one last historical note. The following passage is from
Rosen’s essay "Old Trends and New Trends in General Systems Research”. Lamenting on the
reception of category by many a mathematician, Rosen writes:
It is interesting to note that category theory has elicited exactly the same
response within the community of pure mathematicians that system-theoretic
approaches have generated in the community of experimental or empirical
scientists. Initially, category theory was dismissed out of hand by many
mathematicians as at best a cumbersome language for stating well-known
facts about algebraic topology. Later, when it became clear that category
theory could answer important open questions in a variety of areas, it was
conceded to be of some limited usefulness for specific applications, but still no
significance as an independent branch of mathematics. This attitude is still
prevalent; indeed, just a few years ago, I served on the Executive Committee
of the Department of Mathematics as the State University of New York, Buffalo,
when that department was in the process of hiring an eminent category
theorist. A substantial group of senior faculty tried to block this appointment
on the grounds that category theory was not real mathematics. They were
dissuaded only with the difficulty from writing to other departments to collect
opinions on whether category theory was mathematics or not.63
Although Rosen does not mention him by name, the eminent category theorist turns
out to be nonother than William Lawvere. Rosen fought to get him a job.
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Lawvere, “Diagonal Arguments and Cartesian Closed Categories,” 2.
Rosen, “Old Trends and New Trends in General Systems Research,” 179 – 180.
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Chapter 5. Anticipatory Systems
5.1 An Historical Note
In 1972, Rosen accepted an invitation for a Visiting Fellow at the Center for the Study
of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara, California. The Center was founded and at the
time run by Robert M. Hutchins. There were no natural scientists among the Center’s staff or
its Fellows. The members were mostly political scientists, economists, philosophers,
historians, anthropologists, urban planners, journalists, etc. So it might seem odd that Rosen
was invited. Rosen’s invitation was extended by another fellow, John Wilkinson, who was a
structuralist in the tradition of the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss. It seems as if
Wilkinson saw possible and productive parallels that could be developed between the
structuralist ideas of Strauss and the relational ideas of Rashevsky and Rosen.
Reciprocally, Rosen initially accepted the invitation because he saw the Center as a
congenial and opportune setting for the further extension of the relational approach towards
biological systems to that of social systems. Rosen had learned from Rashevsky that the
establishment analogies or homologies between biological systems and social systems
would make it possible to learn more about social systems through the study of biological
systems and conversely. The significance of Rosen’s approach is two-fold: on the one hand,
in the study of biological systems the biologist is almost always an external observer; the
causal relations that are the means for the generation, maintenance, and adaptation of
biological systems are not directly observable. This is even more so the case in highly
developed biological systems comprised of billions of cells and all of which are involved in
the integral and functional activities of the system as a whole. As external observers, though,
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it is possible to identify global patterns of these integral and functional activities that from
the point of view of the functional units engaged in such activities would be impossible to
discern. On the other hand, we are all both the constituents and participants in the
generation, maintenance, and adaptation of the social systems to which we belong. As such,
we can discern certain aspects of our social systems interactively in ways that would be
impossible for an external observer. The combination of both these “global” and “local”
points of views could offer key insights into the nature of biological and social systems that
on their own are unavailable.
As Rosen recalls, the spirit and modus operandi of the Center was what Hutchins’
called the dialogue or the continuation of the great conversation. The dialogue is the
instrument through which an intellectual community both creates and sustains itself for its
purpose which, for Hutchins, is nonother than the discovery and elucidation of both the
means and ends for the whole of human society:
The great conversation began with the Greeks, the Hebrews, the Hindus, and
the Chinese, and has continued to the present day. It is a conversation that
deals – perhaps more extensively than it deals with anything else – with
morals and religion. The questions of purpose of human society are the
recuring themes of the great conversation.
[…]
Its members [of the intellectual community] talk about what ought to be done.
They come to the conference table as citizens, and their talk is about the
common good…It does not take positions about what ought to be done. It
asserts only the issues it is discussing deserve the attention of citizens. The
Center tries to think about the things it believes its fellow citizens ought to be
thinking about.
[…]
The common good of every community belongs to every member of it. The
community makes him better because he belongs to it. In political terms the
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common good is usually defined as peace, order, freedom, and justice. These
are indispensable to any person, and no person could obtain any one of them
in the absence of the community. An intellectual community is one in which
everybody does better intellectual work because he belongs to a community
of intellectual workers. As I have already intimated, an intellectual community
cannot be formed of people who cannot or will not think, who will not think
about anything in which the other members of the community are interested.
Work that does not require intellectual effort and workers that will not engage
in common intellectual effort have no place [in the intellectual community].1
Almost every working day, the center would hold a meeting to discuss a precirculated paper written by a member or Fellow or visiting guest, and Rosen, of course,
would, as part of this intellectual community and its dialogue, have to contribute.
At first, Rosen, again, a natural scientist, was unsure as to whether he could make any
significant contributions to the concerns of the other members and Fellows of the Center.
Early on however, Rosen was able to see a common thread running through all of the
discussions he attended. No matter the area of interest or context:

they were all alike in their fundamental concern with the making of policy, the
associated notions of forecasting the future and planning for it. What was
sought, in each of these diverse areas, was in effect a technology for decision
making. But underlying any technology there must be a substratum of basic
principles; a science, a theory. What was the theory underlying a technology
of policy generation?2
This, Rosen felt, was a problem for which he could make a contribution. Afterall, the
basic stuff of theoretical science is the forecasting of the future, i.e., predictions, which in turn
require the construction of models for the systems of concern. And for the social sciences
especially, the purpose of predictive models is to employ them for the regulation and control
of social systems. Thus, the underlying science for a technology of management and control,

1
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Rosen, Anticipatory Systems, 1 – 2.
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like the natural sciences, involves models. In fact, these initial considerations are what
eventually led to Rosen’s development of the modeling relation and the general theory of
modeling we introduced in Chapter 2.
In accordance with Rosen’s initial interest (the establishment of analogies or
homologies between biological and social systems), he began to look for biological examples
of behavioral control through the employment of predictive models. To his astonishment, he
found them everywhere. In fact, one of Rosen’s revolutionary discoveries is that the
employment of such predictive models for behavioral control is a necessary condition for
life. Let us give some of Rosen’s favorite examples.
An overwhelming part of our own daily behavior is based on the tacit employment of
(informal) predictive models. If you are walking in the woods and suddenly see a bear in the
path in front of you, you immediately vacate the premises. But you do not leave just because
you see the bear. You leave because you can also foresee the undesirable consequences of
any direct interaction with the bear if you do not. You are employing a model which preempts
the change in your present behavior based on the prediction your model provides about the
future. Your change in behavior is not just reactive, but what Rosen calls anticipatory.
Most importantly, though, anticipatory behavior does not in general involve
consciousness, prescience or psychic phenomena. There are various kinds of tropisms
exhibited in more primitive organisms; some are phototropic; they act as if they seek
darkness. Darkness in itself has no physiological significance; there is no metabolic reason
why these organisms should seek it or avoid it. But darkness can be correlated with

dampness or moisture and the hinderance of sighted predators both of which are valuable
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for these organisms. This relationship between darkness and its correlative positive features
is based on a model through which the organism predicts that by moving towards darkness
it thereby gains an advantage for its survival. Again, there is no conscious decision, or any
choice in the matter; their models are “wired-in” as Rosen would say.
Also, consider deciduous trees. They undergo an elaborate series of adaptive internal
changes in preparation for the winter cold. It might be presumed that the signal for triggering
these changes is the ambient temperature in their environment. But as we all know, the
weather is difficult to predict; there could be a spell of premature cold in August or an
unusually warm fall. These fluctuations in temperature could trigger changes in the trees
which are unadaptive and thus, detrimental to their survival. It turns out that the signal for
the changes is not the ambient temperature but the length of day which is physiologically
neutral but can be correlated with a change in temperature. Deciduous trees possess a model
that predicts the oncoming decrease in temperature on the basis of the shortening of the day;
irrespective of whatever the ambient temperature may be. This is, as Rosen notes, a clever
thing to do.
Rosen found that examples of anticipatory or modeled-based behaviors in organisms
could be multiplied without end, including the most complicated hormonal regulatory
processes in physiology. Despite this, there was no theory of anticipatory behavior. The
reasons for this, as Rosen argues, are the same in our discussion of function and final cause
in Section 3.6. Anticipatory behavior would have to involve some form of final cause and
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along with it the presumed associated notions of purpose or telos, which again, would render
such explanations of these behaviors unscientific.3
Even though Rosen was well aware of the reasons that anticipatory behavior is
forbidden in traditional science, it was at this point that he began to see a serious problem
with its lack of consideration, even in his own work.
It might be expected that such behavior would be well understood and that
there would be an extensive body of theory and practical experience which
could be immediately applied to the problems of forecasting and policy making
which dominated the center’s interests. But in fact, nothing could be further
from the truth. The surprise was not primarily that there was no such body of
theory and experience, but rather no systematic efforts had been made in these
directions; and, moreover, almost no one recognized that such an effort was
urgently required. In retrospect, the most surprising thing to me was that I
myself had not previously recognized such a need, despite my overt concerns
with modeling as a fundamental scientific activity, and despite my
preoccupation with biological behavior extending over many years. Indeed, I
might have never recognized this need, had it not been for the fortuitous chains
of circumstances I have described above, which led me to think seriously about
the apparently remote problems of policy making in a democratic society. Such
are the powers of the compartmentalization of the human mind.4
These considerations would culminate in Rosen’s largest scientific monograph

Anticipatory Systems, Philosophical, Mathematical and Methodological Foundations. Given
its historical significance, we will now examine the contents of his first paper on the subject
in some detail.

This is before Rosen had developed his theory of final cause in Aristotelean terms we presented in Chapter 3
which seems to have been developed some time before the publication of Theoretical Biology and Complexity
in 1985 and only presented in detail in Life Itself.
4 Klir, Facets of Systems Science, 628 – 629.
3
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5.2 Planning, Management, Policies, and Strategies: Four Fuzzy Concepts
Rosen presented his first paper on anticipatory systems for the Center’s dialogue on
Tuesday, May 16th, 1972. The paper is titled “Planning, Management, Policies, and Strategies:
Four Fuzzy Concepts”. Its introductory paragraph is ominous:
It is fair to say that the mood of those concerned with the problems of
contemporary society is apocalyptic. It is widely felt that our social structure
is in the midst of crises, certainly serious, and perhaps ultimate. It is further
widely felt that the social crises we perceive have arisen primarily because of
the anarchic, laissez-faire attitude taken in the past towards science,
technology, economics and politics. The viewpoint of most of those who have
written on these subjects revolves around the theme that if we allow these
anarchies to continue we are lost; indeed, one way to make a name nowadays
is to prove, preferably with computer models, that an extrapolation of present
practices will lead to imminent cataclysm.5
Does this still not ring true today?
The alternative to anarchy, Rosen argues, is management, which involves the
systematic implementation of specific plans, policies, and strategies. There is a problem
though, there are many different and even contradictory views on what management and
planning means. This makes the various alternative approaches to management and
planning themselves anarchic.
Rosen then gives his audience at the Center an overview of the reasons that
anticipatory behavior is forbidden in traditional dynamical system theory which we
discussed in Section 3.6 and mentioned in Section 5.1.6 But he is now in a position to

5
6

Rosen, “Planning, Management, Policies, and Strategies,” 245.
Rosen also gives a brief overview of control theory.
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forcefully argue that the omission of anticipatory behavior is a devastating impediment to
the advancement of not only the biological and human sciences, but also physics:
As a result of this implicit restriction, all of our dynamical theories, in biology
and human sciences as well as in physics are based on the dynamics of
nonanticipatory systems. Consequently we have not the faintest idea of how
anticipatory systems behave formally. This is a most amazing fact, when we
consider that once we reach a certain level of complexity, say in biological
systems, many types of frankly anticipatory behaviors are encountered.7 All
sensory mechanisms are anticipatory in effect: the present behavior of an
organism is modified as a function of a future state implied, in some sense by
present sensory data. […] These kinds of behavior we like to call “intelligent”
are anticipatory in this sense. Biological examples could be multiplied
endlessly. Yet because our only modes of system description implicitly exclude
anticipatory behavior, all of our attempts to model such behavior has been in
terms of non-anticipatory models. And indeed, it is true that given any
particular system behavior, we can always model an anticipatory system with
a non-anticipatory model. But we require a different model for each new
behavior, and the models we obtain thereby are unrelated and contradictory,
leading to endless acrimony (the interested reader may consult, for example,
the literature on intelligence, both natural and artificial). Thus it can be argued
that the very basis we have used for the understanding of biological behaviors
is inadequate in principle, and we can open thereby a door to a potentially
most fruitful area of research.8
If the goal of management and planning is to change the present state or behavior of
a system based on the anticipated future states or behaviors of a system then the
development of a science of management and planning must be based on a science of
anticipation. Such a science cannot proceed on traditional (non-anticipatory) system theory.
Rosen then begins to introduce the basis for a science of anticipatory systems.

7
8

Note that Rosen’s use of the term complexity at this point is not the one he finally settles on (Section 4.5).
Rosen, “Planning, Management, Policies, and Strategies,” 247.
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Let a given system S be called an object system.9 S could be an individual organism,
an ecosystem, a social system, or an economic system. In order to simplify things, Rosen
assumes that S is a non-anticipatory system.
Let another system M be a model of the object system S. In order for the model M of S
to be anticipatory, what is required is that if the trajectories (state-transitions) of S are
parametrized by “real time”, then the trajectories of M must be parameterized by a time
variable which goes faster than “real time”; that is, if both S and M start out at some initial
time, t = 0, i.e., both in equivalent states, and if “real time” runs for a fixed interval t, then M
will have proceeded further along its trajectory than S. It is this condition that allows for M
to predict the future behavior of S; M gives us information about the future states or
behaviors of S.
Now let S and M be conjoined is such a way that allows them to interact. Again, in
order to simplify the model, Rosen restricts the interactions so that only M can affect S and
not conversely.10 Let M be equipped with a set of effectors E. The effectors E allow for M to
interact and operate on S and its environment. The purpose of the effectors E is to change
the dynamics of S based on the predictions of the future states or behaviors made by M.11
This can be represented by the following diagram:

The term object system is synonymous with natural system.
We will consider the situation when S can effect M below.
11 Note that this how science traditionally works; however, it is what follows that is the novel part of Rosen’s
theory.
9

10
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[5.2.1]
The input arrows, Input → S, Input → M, represent environmental inputs for both the
object system S and the model M. The arrow M → E represents inputs from the model M to
the effectors E. The arrow E → S represents the employment of the effectors E that can alter
the states or behaviors of the system S. The arrow S → Output represents the affects the
overall anticipatory system has on its environment. We will discuss the dotted arrow from
the effectors E to the model M below.
If we think of the system as a whole, i.e., the object system S, the model M, and the
effectors E (represented by the doted-lined box) we now have an adaptive anticipatory
system; the system as a whole can change its present state or behavior based on the
employment of its effectors which in turn are based on the predictions its model makes about
itself or its interactions with its environment.
To give a simple example of how an anticipatory system works, imagine a state space
(the set of all possible states) for S. We can partition this state space into two regions that
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correspond to “desirable” and “undesirable” states of S. So long as the predictions that M
makes “see” the future states of S in the “desirable” region of the state space, no action is
taken by M through the effectors E to alter the present states of S. However, if the predictions
M makes “see” S moving in to the undesirable region of the state space, M activates the
effectors E in such a way to alter the dynamics of S now so as to keep S from moving into the
undesirable region of state space in the future.
In terms of system control, we are now in a position to make explicit a fundamental
difference between non-anticipatory systems (or what Rosen calls reactive systems) and
anticipatory systems. Non-anticipatory behavior is reactive or feedback oriented, while
anticipatory behavior is feedforward. Feedback control is error-actuated; the stimulus for
corrective action taken by effectors is a discrepancy between a system’s present state and
the state that a system “should be in”; a deviation into an undesirable state has already taken
place. This is the essence of homeostasis. As we said, anticipatory control is feedforward;
the desirable state is preset in accordance with the model which encodes inputs from a
system or its environment and generates the model’s corresponding predictions or outputs.
Anticipatory control is implemented before a system departs from a desirable state;
anticipatory control is preventive as opposed to reactive.12
We can now consider what we have presented thus far in relation to management and
planning. In the context of anticipation, Rosen outlines what he considers to be the six
essential ingredients for a science of management and planning:

Note that feedforward is not positive feedback; feedback whether positive or negative uses information
from the past and not predictions about the future.
12
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(A) The choice of the model M. This is essentially a technical problem which we will
consider a bit more below.
(B) The choice of the effectors E. This choice will involve the ways in which it is possible
to modify the dynamics or behaviors of S through the information obtained from its
model M. Thus, the choice of effectors bears heavily on, and is generally determined
by the choice of M.
(C) The design of effector system E. This too is essentially a technical problem which is
determined by the dynamics or behaviors of S and its response to the implementation
of controls.
(D)The programming of the effector system E. Programming E involves the conversion
of the information obtained by M into specified means by which the behaviors of S
can be modified.
(E) The identification of “desirable” and “undesirable” regions. This choice is rather
arbitrary in the sense that it is independent of the chosen model M. It is what Rosen
calls a constraint on the management and planning process that is added from the
“outside”. Note though, that the choice of desirable or undesirable regions will bear
heavily on how to go about programming the effectors E.
(F) Updating the states of M. The dotted arrow from the effectors E to M represents the
means by which the model M can be updated or revised based on the extent to which
the effectors E are successful or not in controlling the system S. What is important to
point out is that a model is useless if it cannot be updated or revised based on some
means for the evaluation of its predictive success or lack thereof.
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A most important problem is that, of course, management and planning can go wrong.
Rosen gives these three reasons, none mutually exclusive for why this is so: bad models, bad
effectors, or what he calls side-effects.
Bad models could be the result of technical matters such as not specifying the appropriate
state variables or the equations of motion which determines how the system changes over
time.13 Additionally, it is possible to establish an incorrect correspondence between the
states of S and M; the result will be predictions for the future state of S that are incorrect. A
more serious problem arises when one attempts to model anticipatory behavior using nonanticipatory models. There are no technical refinements that can be made for a nonanticipatory model that will be able to capture a system’s anticipatory behavior.
Bad effectors are the result of faulty design or incorrect implementation. This creates
three problems: (a) If the wrong state variables of S are chosen then the effectors E will be
unable to correctly modify the behavior of S in the intended manner. (b) Bad effectors will
not be capable of making changes in S even if the state variables of S were chosen correctly.
(c) Bad programming could result in changes in the behavior of S that were not intended.
Side-effects, however, are the most serious problem: they call into question the
possibility of any kind of effective management and planning in an absolute sense. The
reason is that, even if it we assumed there could be a perfect model M for S and the effectors
E are perfectly designed and programmed, side effects are unavoidable; they are inherent in
the functional properties of system behaviors and especially in their interactions with other
systems as such. Let us understand why.

13

Recall Section 3.6.
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Recall from Section 3.6 that the same natural system can be involved simultaneously in
many different functional activities and that the same functional activity can be carried out
or realized by different kinds of a natural systems. In general, a system carrying out some
functional activity generally only uses a few of its degrees of freedom in doing so.14 More
technically, the state variables of a system S are strongly “linked” or related to one another
through the equations of motions that govern how S changes over time. That many of the
state variables may not be involved in one of its functional activities means that they are
allowed to freely interact with other systems. With regard to a given functional activity of S,
these other interactions could be non-functional or dysfunctional so they can inhibit or
eliminate that functionally activity.
In terms of the modeling relation, since our model M is only concerned with a particular
functional activity, M will be “simpler” than the object system S since M will neglect all of the
non-functional degrees of freedom in S and their interactions with other systems.
This is extremely important as it bears heavily on our presentation of the modeling
relation in Chapter 2. In terms of functional activities and interactions any model of a natural
system will, Rosen argues, be incomplete since such models are always what Rosen calls an

abstraction. As an abstraction, a model for a natural system always involves a loss or neglect
of the system’s properties, functional activities, and interactions with other natural systems.
The limited and abstracted aspects of a system that do correspond to its model is what Rosen

In physics, degrees of freedom has a precise meaning. Roughly, what we mean is all of the things a system
can do including the ways in which it can interact with other systems.
14
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calls a subsystem. Thus, a model does not correspond to a natural system but only a
subsystem of a natural system.
Before we proceed, there are a few things we should point out. First, further
considerations on the limitations of the modeling relation would require an in-depth
excursion into Rosen’s theory of measurement and observables which is a dissertation in its
own right. The interested reader should consult Fundamentals of Measurement and

Anticipatory Systems. Second, it is not till much later that Rosen develops his theory of
simple systems which, recall, must in principle, all have a largest model. Also, recall that even
so, a largest model may not be constructable, accessible, or knowable. Lastly, what Rosen has
in mind here are the functional activities of systems which he would later define as complex
which involve impredicativities and have no largest models: biological systems, social
systems, economic systems, ecosystems, etc.
Returning to our discussion, in summary, there will be many degrees of freedom of
the system S that are not captured by its model M since they have been abstracted away;
these neglected degrees of freedom can interact with other systems in such a way that can
inhibit or eliminate the functional activity of the subsystem of S (for which M is a model).
Additionally, the effectors E whose activities are based on the model M will only be designed
to control the subsystem of the system S, i.e., a subset of the degrees of freedom of S and the
system S as a whole.
Now, the effectors E are a system in their own right. As such, it too will have degrees of
freedom that are not involved in its own functional activity (controlling a subsystem of S).
Since these degrees are strongly linked to those involved in its functional activity, they are
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also capable of interacting with other systems in a non-functional or dysfunctional way.
Thus, both S and E have non-functional or dysfunctional degrees of freedom, neither of which
are captured by the model M. These considerations lead Rosen to the following two
conclusions:15
(a) The effectors E will in general have effects on the object system S other than those
which were intended;
(b) The intended or planned modes of interaction between S and E will be modified by
these effects.
The combination of (a) and (b) is what Rosen means by side effects. And we can now see
what is meant when we stated above that side effects are unavoidable since they are inherent
in the functional activities of systems and their interactions. Since the non-functional and
dysfunctional degrees of freedom are not modeled by M, they are unpredictable. And again,
this is true no matter how well the processes of management and planning are implemented.
In medicine almost every therapeutic or diagnostic agent generates side-effects. For
example, in the late 1950s, thalidomide was introduced to European and other markets as a
non-addictive sleeping therapeutic. It then began to be used as a therapeutic for alleviating
morning sickness. This in turn resulted in the most unintended and horrible birth defects. In
ecology, consider the disaster caused by the introduction of rabbits from Europe to Australia
for the purpose of giving gentlemen farmers something to hunt on the weekends. In
technology and engineering, consider the Ohio turnpike. It was originally built without
curves to prevent accidents based on the fact that curves are where large numbers of

15

Rosen later recalls that his first attempt at coming to terms with the problem of side effects was clumsy.
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accidents take place. Yet, their elimination ended up causing “highway hypnosis” which in
turn also causes accidents. It is interesting, Rosen notes, to consider the predictions made by
Norbert Wiener in his Cybernetics on the disastrous side-effects from using computers to
implement policy decisions.16 He draws analogies from legends or folktales about magic like
Goethe’s “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice”, the tale of the fisherman and the genie from Arabian
Nights, and the fable of the monkey’s paw by W. W. Jacobs. And just how many of our
attempts to implement solutions for our social, political, and economic problems only serve
to make the problems they were intended resolve even worse?
As we stated above, the arrow from E to M in diagram [5.2.1] represents information for
M provided by E about the behavior of S. Since this information provides the means through
which we can update and improve both M and E to act on S, these updates are paramount for
the elimination of side-effects.
An improvement in system control through the elimination of side-effects will require a
new model M’. This in turn will require a new set of effectors E’ which must take into account
the effect that M and E have on S. The new model M’ will have to be a model of (S + M + E).
This new situation will look like diagram [5.2.1] except we have to replace M with M’, E with
E’, and S with the entire anticipatory system, (S + M + E). The problem is that the new object
system S’ and effectors E’ will have also have non-functional and dysfunctional degrees of
freedom for the very same reasons we stated above for our original S and E; these of course
will generate new side effects or exacerbate existing ones which will require us to update
our model M’ with a new model M’’ and so on. Thus, we see an incipient infinite regress. It

16

Wiener, Cybernetics, 176 – 178.
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appears then, that the elimination of side effects might be impossible. This should make clear
what we meant when we said above that side-effects call into question the possibility of any
kind of effective management and planning in an absolute sense.
Rosen conjectures that it might be possible to eliminate the infinite regresses. However,
not every way of implementing management and planning processes can avoid them. If we
find it to be impossible, then:
If we have in fact embarked on a path for which the infinite regresses cannot
be avoided, then we are in serious trouble. Avoiding the infinite regress means
that developmental processes will stop, and that a stable steady-state
condition can be reached. Once embarked on a path for which the infinite
regresses cannot be avoided, no stable steady-state condition is possible. I do
not know which is the case in our present circumstances, but it should at least
be possible to find out.17
And in the paper, that is pretty much where Rosen leaves it.
In Anticipatory Systems, Rosen gives an overview of the Center’s response. Hutchins
had attended this dialogue and made a few direct comments and that one of Rosen’s
conclusions was the most outrageous thing he’d ever heard. Rosen took this as a high
compliment.
5.2 Anticipatory Systems are Complex Systems
Let us now give Rosen’s definition proper of an anticipatory system:
An anticipatory system is a natural system that contains an internal
predicative model of itself and of its environment, which allows it to change
state at an instant in accord with the model’s predictions pertaining to a later
instant.18

17
18

Rosen, “Planning, Management, Policies, and Strategies,” 252.
Louie, More Than Life Itself, 240.
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In order to see that anticipatory systems are complex means that we need to
understand them from a relational point of view; i.e., in terms of their functional components,
and the entailment relations between them that make up their overall organization. To do
this, first, let us consider our anticipatory system from Section 5.2 using a modified version
of diagram [5.2.1]

[5.3.1]
Louie has shown that we can represent the object system S, model M, and effectors E
of an anticipatory system as efficient causes. And, since M is a model for S, there must be an
encoding arrow from S to M, ɛ: S → M. Putting this all together, we can make the entailment
relations between efficient causes explicit in an anticipatory system which is represented as
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[5.3.2]

As we said, in Section 4.5, anticipatory systems form a subclass of complex systems
and we can now see why. An anticipatory system contains a hierarchical cycle with a closed
path between its three efficient causes, S, M, and E
S ˫ M, E ˫ S, M ˫ E
which gives the impredicative loop:
S˫M˫E˫S
The difference between an anticipatory system and a complex system is that a
complex system, in general, need not have an internal predictive model, including the
subloop
①: M ˫ E, and ③: E ˫ M
nor is its impredicative loop required to have entailment relations of the form
②: E ˫ S, and ③: E ˫ M
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where a set of effectors E entails both the object system and its model. Thus, an anticipatory
system must be complex; a complex system may be anticipatory.
Before leaving this section there are two important things to note. The first is that the
hierarchical cycle that is the anticipatory system is not the system that is anticipatory; the
hierarchical cycle is a subsystem that makes the system to which it belongs anticipatory (an
organism, a social system, etc.), and, of course, this holds for complex systems in general; a
complex system contains a hierarchical cycle as a subsystem (recall diagram [4.5.1]). The
second is that recall from Section 5.1 that in organisms, anticipatory behavior does not
involve consciousness, prescience or psychic phenomena; anticipation does not involve any
“seeing” of the immediate or distant future. The theory proports only that there must be
information provided to the organism by its model about itself and its environment. And it
is this information that makes it possible for an organism’s model to act causally on its
present behavior which is based on relations that are projected onto, and applicable to its
future. We also stress that Rosen’s theory of anticipatory systems is a qualitative theory, i.e.,
that the predictions that the models make do not provide any (quantitative) “certainty”
about the future, not even probabilistically:
[Anticipatory system theory] is not a quantitative theory of single systems for
which the lore of large number of systems, hence statistical reasoning, would
ever enter the picture. In other words, this theory has nothing to do with
stochastics. Anticipation is rather, an assertion based on a model that runs in
a faster time scale. The future still has not yet happened: the organism has a
model of the future but not definitive knowledge of future itself. Indeed, the
predictive models may sometimes be wrong, the future may unfold very
differently from the model’s predictions, and the consequences of the
mismatch may be detrimental to the anticipator.19

19

Poli, Handbook of Anticipation, 21.
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We now turn to a subclass of anticipatory systems, (M, R) – systems, which in turn,
are also a subclass of complex systems.
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Chapter 6. (M, R) – Systems
6.1 (M, R) – Networks
(M, R) – Systems are a class of relational cell models that Rosen presented in his first
two scientific papers in 1958: “A Relational Theory of Biological Systems” and “The
Representation of Biological Systems from the Standpoint of the Theory of Categories”, the
second paper, mentioned in Section 1.1; and, as we said, in it, was the first application of
category theory in the natural sciences, the construction of a class of relational models of
cells, which we will now present.1
By “cell”, Rosen simply means “autonomous life form”. As relational models, (M, R) –
Systems are a characterization of the fundamental organizational properties common to all
cells, regardless of their specific physicochemical structures. The fundamental
organizational feature in these models are what Rosen calls metabolism (M), repair (R), and

replication.
Rosen’s models are based on the distinction between a cell’s cytoplasm and nucleus,
but strictly in functional terms. The cytoplasm is the seat of a cell’s metabolic activity,
involving enzymes that process materials taken from a cell’s environment and converting
these materials into new forms. The nucleus is the seat of a cell’s genomic activity that
involves utilizing these processed materials to repair or reconstitute the very metabolic
activities responsible for their production.

1

This presentation is not the same as Rosen’s original presentation.
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Metabolic processes can be represented by a mapping f: A → B, and its relational
diagram [3.4.2]

In this functional component, material cause are the elements a in A that represent
inputs from a cell’s environment. Efficient cause, the mapping f, represents the enzyme or

catalyst that converts the material inputs from A into metabolic outputs b in B. The function
or final cause of the component is to facilitate this conversion. The enzymes in a cell can
become degraded or cease to function properly for a variety of reasons. In order for a cell to
continue its life it must have an additional catalyst, a gene, that can repair degraded or
dysfunctional enzymes. That is, a cell must possess another functional component, a
mapping ɸ: B → H(A, B), that utilizes the metabolic outputs from B to repair the enzyme f,
ɸ: b ↦ f:

[6.1.1]
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In this functional component, material cause are the metabolic outputs from B.
Efficient cause, the mapping ɸ, represents the gene that repairs the enzyme, functionally
entailing the mapping f, ɸ ˫ f. And the function or final cause of this component is to facilitate
this conversion. Composing these two components, metabolism and repair, and their
corresponding hierarchical form of entailment represents the “simplest” relational model of
an (M, R) – network.2
ɸ ∘ f: A → B → H(A, B)
This is the same relational system we presented in Section 3.6, best represented by
the diagram [3.6.3]

Generally, an (M, R) – network represents an entailment network of a finite collection
of metabolism and repair components.
There is a serious problem though. The catalyst, the mapping ɸ, can also become
degraded or cease to function properly. The process through which a repair component
needs repairing is what Rosen calls replication.3 Now, the mapping ɸ belongs to the hom-set

Although we showed that this relational system is a simple system in Section 4.3, we are not using “simple”
in the same sense, i.e., in terms of the difference between simple and complex.
3 Rosen’s usage of the terms repair and replication are not the same as their usage in molecular biology. For
further details, see More Than Life Itself, Section 11.14.
2
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H(B, H(A, B)). In order to replicate ɸ, there must be some functional component, some
additional catalyst β, that functionally entails ɸ:
β: Y → H(B, H(A, B))
and Y is just some arbitrary set of inputs:

[6.1.2]
To make things less arbitrary, we could let Y = H(A, B) which gives
β: H(A, B) → H(B, H(A, B))
And as a relational diagram is

[6.1.3]
It may appear that this situation is much better since now, β is using the metabolic
component f to functionally entail ɸ. But the problem is that the catalyst β can become
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degraded or dysfunctional too so it would also need repairing. We could reiterate a similar
procedure, like the one that we used to functionally entail ɸ with β; that is, we could add
another component, another catalyst ψ to functionally entail the replication component β.
But now, just as before, the component ψ will eventually need to be repaired and so on. Thus,
we see an ensuing infinite regress, and so far, Rosen’s attempt to construct a relational model
for a living cell, as an (M, R) – network, appears more than useless. Rosen’s crucial discovery
was that “under stringent but not prohibitively strong conditions, such replication
essentially comes for free”4; formally, we already have at our disposal the necessary
ingredients to entail the replication component within our (M, R) – network
ɸ ∘ f: A → B → H(A, B). It turns out that there is more than one way for which this can be
done. However, following Rosen we will devote the next section to a presentation the
simplest way possible.5
6.2 (M, R) – Systems
In order to construct an (M, R) – system, a network that avoids the infinite regress,
let us, following Rosen, begin with two arbitrary sets, X and Y. Recall from section 1.2 that
for the hom-set of all mappings from A to B we sometimes write BA, so for the set of all of the
mappings from X to Y, we write YX. In the category of sets, there is a mapping
e: YX x X → Y
whose domain is the product of the hom-set YX and the set X. This is called an evaluation

mapping because when the mapping e is applied to a mapping f: X → Y in YX and an element

Rosen, Essays on Life Itself, 262.
For some examples of other ways to construct the mapping β, from the (M, R) – network, see More Than Life
Itself, Chapter 12.
4
5
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x in X, the mapping e takes the value f(x) of that mapping f on that argument x; i.e., the

evaluation of the mapping f and the element x, e(f, x), is the same as the value f(x). What is
important for us is that when given a mapping f: X → Y, we usually tend to think of the
mapping f as fixed while the arguments x in X vary. However, there is a “symmetry” between
mappings and arguments which allows their roles to be interchangeable; we can just as well
keep x in X fixed and let the mappings f in YX vary. When considering x as a mapping, we will
write x̂ . The symmetry between f(x) and x̂ (f) means they will take on the same values in Y:
f: x ↦ y = x̂ : f ↦ y
f(x) = x̂ (f)
When x in X is fixed, the original evaluation mapping with two arguments e(f, x) is
now an evaluation mapping with just one argument, the mappings f in YX, or x̂ (f):
x̂ : YX → Y
There is an important point we must make now because this has unfortunately caused
some confusion for others in the past. Instead of writing x̂ : YX → Y, Rosen writes his
evaluation mapping in his usual way, x̂ : H(X, Y) → Y. But, H(X, Y) is not YX. This is because
H(X, Y) is a proper subset or part of all the mappings in YX, i.e.,
H(X, Y) ⊂ YX6
This was not made formally explicit in Rosen’s second paper, and only made explicit
in “Some Relational Cell Models: The Metabolism-Repair Systems”, and partially explicit in

6

The symbol “⊂” means proper subset or part.
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in his essay in Theoretical Biology and Complexity, which were not published until 1972 and
1985, respectively, quite some years later.
To help understand why Rosen’s hom-sets must be proper subsets, consider an
example of a metabolic process, represented by the mapping f: a ↦ b. where f is an element
of H(A, B), which is in turn, is a proper subset of BA. In our example, if A and B are a set of
biochemicals, then f, the enzyme, is the process that transforms an element a in A into an
element of b in B, as we said above. But biochemical reactions are very specific; not all
mappings f: a ↦ b are feasible; so, neither are all the mappings in BA. For example, there is
no biochemical reaction that would turn an amino acid into alcohol. f then, must represent
those biochemical reactions that are feasible. For similar reasons this will be the case for the
other catalysts ɸ and β. In other words, one always has to remember than an (M, R) – system

is a model of a living cell; and as such, its mappings and what they do must correspond to
what living cells do.
This brings us to another important point. In the category of sets, a proper subset, or
a part, is defined in terms of a mapping. A part-mapping, or an injective mapping, or more
generally, a monomorphism, has the uniqueness property: for a mapping f: X → Y, given any
element y of Y there is at most one element x of X for which f(x) = y. In other words, if
f: X → Y is an injective mapping, then for all elements x, x’ of X, if f(x) = f(x’) then x = x’. It is
this uniqueness property that allows us to say precisely what a subset or part is, in our case
that X is a part of Y. An injective mapping or monomorphism, always has a one-sided inverse:
if f: X → Y is injective, then there is a mapping
r: Y → X
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such that
r ∘ f = 1x
I.e., r ∘ f is equal to the identity on X (Section 1.2).
Now assume that the evaluation mapping x̂ : H(X, Y) → Y is injective. Then as a
monomorphism, it has a one-sided inverse
x̂ -1: Y → H(X, Y)
such that
x̂ -1 ∘ x̂ (f) = f
for all the mappings f in H(X, Y), i.e., we get the identity 1H(X, Y).
Also, since x̂ : H(X, Y) → Y is injective, then the uniqueness property says
x̂ (f) = x̂ (f’) implies f = f’
And since f(x) = x̂ (f), then
f(x) = f’(x) implies f = f’
Note that this last implication says that if the two mappings f and f’ agree at x, then,
being equal, they must agree everywhere.
Now let us return to our (M, R) – network, ɸ ∘ f: A → B → H(A, B), and the problem of
infinite regress.
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For the evaluation mapping x̂ : H(X, Y) → Y, Rosen lets X = B and Y = H(A, B). Now
instead of fixing an element x in X to give an evaluation mapping x̂ , we can fix an element b
in B to give a and evaluation mapping b̂ :
b̂ : H(B, H(A, B)) → H(A, B)
b̂ : ɸ ↦ f
Note again that in our original (M, R) – network

ɸ is an element of H(B, H(A, B)) and since ɸ(b) = b̂ (ɸ), and ɸ(b) = f, we also have
ɸ: b ↦f
b̂ (ɸ) = f
Now, just as before, as we did with our mapping x̂ , we assume that the mapping b̂ is injective.
The uniqueness property of injectivity tells us that
b̂ (ɸ) = b̂ (ɸ’) implies ɸ = ɸ’
And again, since ɸ(b) = b̂ (ɸ), then
ɸ(b) = ɸ’(b) implies ɸ = ɸ’
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So again, this last implication says that since the two mappings ɸ and ɸ’ agree at b,
then, being equal, they must agree everywhere. In terms of our (M, R) – network, this means
that the genetic component ɸ is uniquely determined by its one value ɸ(b) which is a unique
enzyme f in H(A, B).7
And, since the mapping b̂ is monomorphism, it also has an inverse:
b̂ -1: H(A, B) → H(B, H(A, B))
The mapping b̂ -1, the inverse that b̂ possesses, is precisely the kind of replication map
needed; it avoids the infinite regress since b̂ -1 takes an f and produces a ɸ
b̂ -1: f ↦ ɸ
b̂ -1(f) = ɸ
So, we have both b̂ -1(f) = ɸ and b̂ (ɸ) = f. It is the invertibility of the mapping b̂ that
is one of the stringent but not prohibitively strong conditions for which replication comes
for free, already inherent in our original (M, R) – network. Noting that the mapping b̂ -1 is the
same as our mapping β from Section 6. 1, i.e., β = b̂ -1, the complete (M, R) – system is now:
β ∘ ɸ ∘ f: A → B → H(A, B) → H(B, H(A, B))
Thus, Rosen demonstrated that
there is no need for an infinite regress. Under the appropriate conditions,
metabolism and repair already entail replication. And this follows from the
organization alone, independent of any details of how the organization is
realized. To my knowledge, this result still remains the only one in which
replication is entailed by something—where it does not have to posited

7

This is an abstract expression of what is known in cell theory as the one-gene-one-enzyme hypothesis.
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independently. And this is the main reason I have remained interested in
them.8
Before leaving this section, recall that in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 that we said there is
more than one way to eliminate the infinite regress and also, we would demonstrate the
simplest way possible. The important thing to grasp is the fact that it is formally possible to
entail ɸ within the system and not the existence of an inverse evaluation map since it is just
one way to do so. It is this fact, that replication can be formally entailed within the system,
representing the necessary self-sufficiency of a living cell must have, that makes Rosen’s
result one of a kind.
6.3 Closure: Entailment Relations in (M, R) – systems
In Section 10.C, in Life Itself, Rosen takes one more important step in his construction
of an (M, R) – system. Also, Section 10.C is the only place where Rosen represents the (M, R)
– system as a relational diagram. Only implicitly though, in the diagram, does one realize,
upon closer inspection, that Rosen has replaced the inverse evaluation map b̂ -1 with an
element b in the set B; i.e.,
b̂ -1: f ↦ ɸ
is replaced with
b: f ↦ ɸ
Since Rosen never makes this replacement of b̂ -1 with b explicit, his readers are not
given the justification for why this can be done. More, instead of providing the details of the
construction of an (M, R) – system that we have presented thus far, he tells his readers: “I

8

Rosen, Essays on Life Itself, 263.
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have since repeated this formal argument many times in previous work and need not repeat
it here”.9 Unfortunately, however, as we alluded above, in none of his earlier presentations
does Rosen ever take this last step, replacing b̂ -1 with b. Fortunately, Louie provides the
mathematical reasoning for this in Chapter 11 of More Than Life Itself, in particular, Section
11.24. Following Louie’s explanation, we will show why we can replace b̂ -1 with b. Let us first
construct a simpler example and then relate it to the construction of an (M, R) – system.
Let us consider an evaluation mapping for the sets B, X, and the hom-set H(B, X)
e: H(B, X) x B → X
with H(B, X) as the collection of mappings f: B → X, i.e.,
f: b ↦ f(b)
Just as before, let us fix b and let f vary, recalling that f(b) = b̂ (f). This gives us a mapping
b̂ : H(B, X) → X
and
b̂ : f ↦ f(b)
What is important to note is that each element of b in B, uniquely determines an
evaluation map b̂ in H(H(B, X), X); i.e., there is a unique correspondence between b and b̂
b ↦ b̂

9

Rosen, Life Itself, 251.
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And again, just as before, in Section 6.2, let us assume that the mapping b̂ is injective
and a monomorphism which means it has an inverse b̂ -1
b̂ -1: X → H(B, X)
But also recall from Section 2.6, injective mappings are unique which means there is
a unique correspondence between b̂ and its inverse b̂ -1
b̂ ↦ b̂ -1
Thus, there is a unique correspondence between b and b̂ , and a unique
correspondence between b̂ and b̂ -1, which means there is a unique correspondence between
b, b̂ and b̂ -1
b ↦ b̂ ↦ b̂ -1
Furthermore, this unique correspondence is one-to-one, i.e., b, b̂ and b̂ -1 are all

isomorphic to one another. Roughly, what this means is that they are all three “the same”;
whenever two or more things are isomorphic to one another they can be replaced by each
and every other thing for which they are isomorphic. Thus, even though b is not equal to b̂ -1,
b ≠ b̂ -1, since b, b̂ , and b̂ -1 are isomorphic, we can replace or substitute b̂ -1 with b.
b̂ -1 ↦ b
Returning to an (M, R) – System, recall that we have
bϵB
and the evaluation mapping
b̂ : H(B, H(A, B)) → H(A, B)
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and its inverse evaluation mapping
b̂ -1: H(A, B) → H(B, H(A, B))
Again, in this situation, b uniquely determines b̂ and since b̂ has an inverse, b̂ uniquely
determines b̂ -1
b ↦ b̂ ↦ b̂ -1
so, b uniquely determines b̂ -1
b ↦ b̂ -1

and since they are isomorphic, we can replace b̂ -1 with b, i.e.,
b̂ -1: f ↦ ɸ
with
b: f ↦ ɸ
After making this substitution, an (M, R) – System is now comprised of the following
three functional components:
Metabolism: f: a ↦ b, diagram [3.4.2]

155

The enzyme f takes environmental input a and produces metabolic output b.
Repair: ɸ: b ↦ f, diagram [6.1.1]

The gene ɸ takes a metabolic output b and produces an enzyme f.
Replication: b: f ↦ ɸ

[6.3.1]
The metabolic output b takes the enzyme f and produces a gene ɸ.
Composition of these three functional components gives the overall organization of a
living cell:
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[6.3.2]
We are now in a position to give Rosen’s definition of life, a living cell or more
generally, an organism:

A material system is an organism if, and only if, it is closed to efficient
causation.10
Recall that in Section 4.5 we defined a complex system as one that contains a closed

path of efficient causation; and that a closed path of efficient causation is a hierarchical cycle
in a natural system that contains two or more solid-headed arrows; i.e., two or more efficient

causes entailing one another. Also recall in Section 5.2 we defined an anticipatory system as
a complex system that contains an internal predicative model of itself and of its environment,
which allows it to change state at an instant in accord with the model’s predictions pertaining
to a later instant.
Organisms form a strict subclass of anticipatory complex systems. That is to say
complex systems, including anticipatory systems, will have some of their efficient causes
unentailed; again, they are only required to have two or more efficient causes entailed within
the system in order for them to be complex. On the other hand, in order for a material system
10

Rosen, Life Itself, 245.
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to be an organism, it must have all of its efficient causes entailed within the system; thus,

closure to efficient causation is not the same as a closed path of efficient causation. In other
words, the defining characteristic of an organism is that, in terms of efficient causation, it is

maximally entailed.
Let us look more closely at the entailment relations in an (M, R) – System. In terms of
efficient cause, we see that f ˫ b, ɸ ˫ f, and that b ˫ ɸ. But note further that in each context, in
each functional component, f, b, and ɸ, are all, interchangeably, playing the role of efficient
cause in such a way that every efficient cause, f, ɸ, and b, entails and is entailed by each and
every other. This is precisely what closed to efficient cause means:

[6.3.3]
Let us also look more closely at the relation between material cause, efficient cause,
and final cause in an (M, R) – system. We can rewrite diagram [6.3.2] as
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[6.3.4]
Which makes it easier to see that:
In the metabolic component f: a ↦ b:
f is efficient cause
a is material cause
b is final cause
In the repair component ɸ: b ↦ f:
ɸ is efficient cause
b is material cause of f which is also the final cause of f
f is the final cause of ɸ
In the replication component: b: f ↦ ɸ:
b is the efficient cause
f is the material cause of ɸ which is also the final cause of ɸ
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ɸ is the final cause
In an (M, R) – System, f plays the role of material, efficient, and final cause. b plays the
role of material, efficient, and final cause. ɸ plays the role of efficient and final cause.
Recall out discussion in Section 3.3. We said that a functional component is a particle
of function in relational system theory, and as such, it plays the same role that a basic unit
plays in structural analysis. We pointed out, however, that the fundamental difference
between an analytic unit and a functional one is that the former does not, cannot, change its
identity, it is context independent; while the latter’s identity is dependent upon the larger
system for which it is a part, it is context dependent; and additionally, that as a system
changes, its components and their corresponding functions can change as well. This is
precisely what is going on in an (M, R) – system.
On top of this, also recall in our discussion in Section 4.4, that syntactical objects must
also be context independent in the sense that they cannot refer to anything, while, of course
semantics is inherently context dependent.
Consider the last two mappings of an (M, R) – system, β and ɸ:
β ∘ ɸ: H(A, B) → H(B, H(A, B))
Notice that these last two components also form an (M, R) – network. Biologically, in
this (M, R) – network, ɸ is now playing the role of the metabolic component and β is now
playing the role of repair. As Rosen points out:
From this we see the curious fact that there is nothing intrinsic about the
biological qualities of metabolism, repair and replication; our perception of
them depends on the total system in which they are embedded. In fact, we can
imagine [them] extended indefinitely on both sides [see below], with any
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successive triplet of mappings being an (M, R) – system, and in which any map
could be either a metabolic component, a repair component or a replication
map depending on which triplet was selected as primary. This too is a most
remarkable result, of an entirely relational character.11
Thus, the functions of metabolism, repair, and replication, are entirely context
dependent and their dependence upon our perception and the total system in which they are
embedded makes (M, R) - systems inherently semantic in such a way that their properties

cannot be captured by pure syntax.
Now let us look a bit more closely at what the hierarchical cycles of functional
entailment are like in a system closed to efficient causation. An (M, R) – System consists of
three integrated closed loops of functional entailments:
f˫b˫ɸ˫f
ɸ˫f˫b˫ɸ
b˫ɸ˫f˫b

which are really

…f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f…

…ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ…

11

Rosen, Anticipatory Systems, 199.
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…b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b ˫ ɸ ˫ f ˫ b…

Note that these three integrated loops of hierarchical functional entailments of
efficient cause are infinite. One might pause and ask how is it exactly that a finite living
organism could be “infinite”, in terms of entailments or anything else in nature for that
matter. The answer is that an (M, R) – system is a relational model, pure organization; this
model has nothing to do with states, state transitions, or even time. And this organization, is
not only semantic, in its ultimate complexity, it is impredicative, and thus non-simulable,
such that being closed to efficient causation means that in order to have any of the functional
components, an organism must have all of them, given all at once; i.e., in Russell’s words, an
(M, R) – system “can only be defined by means of the collection as a whole”;12 the existence
of the functional component f requires the existence functional component ɸ; the existence
of the functional component ɸ requires the existence of the functional component b, which
in turn requires the existence of the functional component f, and so on. In other words, an
(M, R) – system, an organism, is an infinite hierarchical cycle of impredicative loops of

mutually functionally entailed efficient causes! Another way to say an organism is maximally
entailed, is to say that an organism is maximally impredicative, and this along with its
infinitude. Vicious circle indeed.

12

Recall from Section 4.2 on simulations and the condition of finitude.
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Chapter 7. The Realization Problem
7.1 The Problem
Relational system theory is a branch of theoretical science. And as we have seen, it
deals with classes of systems that share common organizations and functions that can be
manifest in material systems of the upmost diversity. However, traditional biology is an
inherently empirical science. Recalling Section 3.1, Rashevsky points out that biologists are
typically interested in studying the structural-metrical properties of organisms. While Rosen
argues that the generality of relational theory provides new insights and economy of
thought1, he also recognizes that it raises a serious problem: in what way can relational
system theory be integrated with the knowledge that biologists have and continue to obtain,
which, again, is of an entirely structural-metric nature? Another way of posing the problem
is after throwing away the matter and keeping the organization, how does one “get” the
matter back? Insofar as relational models cannot be identified with the specific features of
individual organisms means that in an important sense, relational system theory is
incomplete. This, of course, brings us back to our problem between structure and function
in Section 3.1:
As always, when one attempts to do theory, one confronts a banal but
unavoidable question: Is it testable, and if so, how? We have been brought up
to believe that a theory that is not testable (i.e., falsifiable) is worthless. And
indeed, it is also considered part of the theorist’s job to make theory testable in
this sense, in effect to construct some kind of experimental protocol for this
purpose, even if only in principle.2

It was this exigency that first forced me into epistemology, for I was convinced
that a relational description of an organism is as valid, as physical, a
1
2

Recall Section 3.2.
Recall Rosen’s similar criticisms of verification and metaphors in Section 2.5.
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description as any conventional physicochemical one. But, like the wave
functions of quantum mechanics, it is a description pertaining to a class of
physically diverse (though functionally equivalent) systems; and as long as
experimental test exclusively means verifying some kind of specific
physicochemical operation on individual systems in such a class, there was in
principle no way that the relational descriptions could in fact be tested in the
conventional sense. For as we have noted, it is precisely such physiochemical
particulars that are abstracted away in the process of generating the relational
model.3
Recall from Section 2.4 that one can say that a formal system is a model of a natural
system, or conversely, that a natural system is a realization of a model. The problem Rosen
faces is to demonstrate in what ways a specific natural system is a realization of an (M, R) –
system or a relational model in general. This is what Rosen calls the realization problem. It
is a most difficult problem since every form of empirical verifiability in science is based only
in terms of the structural characteristics that natural systems may or may not possess. One
way to solve this problem, as Rosen sees it, is to find a way to build or fabricate an (M, R) –
system:
The most obvious way of making contact with the conventional universe of
physicochemical descriptions and hence of generating predictions testable by
conventional physicochemical experimental techniques (which, as we have
noted, is what testable means) is through the process of realization […] For
such a realization must, on the one hand, have the relational features of an (M,
R) – system and, on the other hand, be a conventional description of a specific
physicochemical system and thus be amenable to traditional notions of
testability.4
For a time, Rosen was quite optimistic that this would be easy to do. He made
his first attempts to realize an (M, R) – system in the mid-1960s, and throughout the
early 1970s. His initial strategy is as follows:

3
4

Rosen, Theoretical Biology and Complexity,175. Emphasis ours.
Ibid, 176.

164

It seemed to me that a first step would be to transform mathematically
the (M, R) – systems to a form in which the various sets and mappings
of the (M, R) – system could be interpreted in terms of the states of
some system and a set of dynamical laws could be superimposed
thereon. This was at least the conventional language in which physical
systems were universally described; hence realizing this kind of
mathematical object would be much easier than realizing an (M, R) –
system directly.5
Rosen’s first attempts to resolve the realization problem was to translate the
properties of an (M, R) – system into the formal language of discrete dynamical systems. In
doing so, Rosen presumed this would make it easier to empirically verify their functionality
in structuralist terms:
At first, this looked extremely promising. Biologically there were a host
of network realizations available (e.g., operon networks).
Mathematically, there were a number of possibilities for passing from
discrete to continuous time, i.e., to true dynamical and control systems,
and hence “hardware” realizations, which would comprise “cells” of
perhaps utterly novel kinds.6
But it turns out that this approach was much more difficult than Rosen had
hoped and for the most unsettling of reasons:
But the really fundamental problems remained refractory to this whole
approach. In a nutshell, the reason lay in the mathematical dichotomy
between a set (object) and a mapping in the (M, R) – system. In a
network realization, a “state” of the network is a pattern of activation
in the elements that constitute that network, while the “next-state
mapping” [recursion] is embodied in the wiring diagram of the
network. But intuitively, in the (M, R) – system, both the metabolic
map(s) f and the nuclear or repair maps ɸ should themselves be
embodied in (or realized) physical structures. When we realize ɸ(f(a)),
for example, this is abstractly a mapping (f: A → B) in the (M, R) –
system; it is a pattern of excitation (i.e., a single state) in the network;
but it should be a material structure in the kind of realization we are
actually seeking. Even more, the map ɸ itself in the (M, R) – system is a
5
6

Ibid, 177.
Ibid.
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wiring diagram in a network of realization, a pattern of specificities in
an operon network, but, in fact, it should be realized as a material
structure, from which all of these mapping properties should follow.
These considerations led to a fundamental rethinking of the whole idea
of how to go about realizing any kind of abstract relational description
of a material system, and thence to the whole problem of trying to
invert the process by which any kind of mathematical description, or
model, of a material system is obtained in the first place. In particular
the very fact that the same mathematical formalism (e.g., a network)
could be interpreted in so many disparate physical ways ultimately led
me to suspect that something crucial might be missing from the
mathematics itself. In other words, I began to entertain the possibility
that our conventional mathematical description of physical reality,
which have essentially gone unquestioned for three centuries, might
themselves be fundamentally deficient, that it was this deficiency that
was responsible for the problems posed by any attempt to realize
physically an abstract functional organization.7
Although Rosen is concerned with (M, R) – systems, to simplify things, let us pause
and think about the problem, for now, in terms of our presentation of an (M, R) – network.
Consider, again, the simplest (M, R) – network, diagram [3.6.3]

If one is attempting to interpret the (M, R) – network as a discrete dynamical system,
then the (M, R) – network must have states and dynamical laws or controls that govern its
state transitions.8 In the functional component f: a ↦ b, we can interpret the elements a in

Ibid,178.
Some readers may find discrete dynamical system bad terminology. We have our reasons, noting that Rosen
uses the terms finite state machine or automaton.
7
8
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the set A as a set of input states, the mapping f as the dynamical law or control that governs
the state transition from a to b, where the elements b in the set B represent output states.
The elements of the sets A and B represent objects, the excitations in the network, and the

mapping f, has to be embodied in the wiring diagram of the network. Now consider the
functional component ɸ: b ↦ f. In this functional component, b, is again, a state of the
network, and the mapping ɸ represents the dynamics or control that governs the state
transition from b to f. But now f is playing the role of an object, a pattern of activation in the

network, in addition to the role of system dynamics, a mapping, embodied in the wiring
diagram of the network. In other words, f must be a material structure that is capable of being
both in a state, and something responsible for state transitions. As we have seen, especially,
in Section 6.3, from a purely relational point of view, independent of any consideration of
states, the various roles that f plays in an (M, R) – network, or more, in an (M, R) – system,
are well-defined and pose no problems. However, what Rosen is pointing out is that
functional entailment is not adequately modeled by dynamical systems for reasons we will
now discuss.
Recall from Section 2.3 that the second basic dualism in science, according to Rosen,
is that between a natural system and its environment. We forewarned, that again, according
to Rosen, this partitioning between a natural system and its environment (imputed by the
mind) is a fateful step for science and where fundamental trouble begins to creep in. Also
recall our brief discussion on Newtonian mechanics and dynamical system theory in Section
3.6 in which we pointed out that the distinction between a natural system and its
environment creates an additional dualism between the states of a natural system and the
equations of motion (dynamical laws) that govern its state transitions. We said that the
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equations of motion represent a force in the system’s environment that is responsible for its
change of states. The fundamental trouble that Rosen is alluding to is that while in dynamical
system theory, a natural system is described in terms of states and state transitions, the
environment, and a force, acting on a natural system are not, and cannot be assigned any
states or state transitions. Moreover, what this means is that in dynamical system theory, an
environment and a force are not and cannot be entailed. Now, in Section 3.4, we pointed out
that in a mathematical machine, the distinction between hardware and software, is absolute
and that mathematical machines cannot admit functional entailment. What Rosen realizes is
that this situation in mathematical machines and traditional dynamical system theory is
analogous: in the same way that the distinction between hardware and software in a
mathematical machine is absolute, so too is the distinction between a force and the states of
a dynamical system; hardware cannot be entailed within a machine, and a force cannot be
entailed within a dynamical system. This is because neither machines nor dynamical systems
can entail their own efficient causes. The only kinds of entailments that both mathematical
machines and dynamical systems admit are material entailments in the form of recursively
defined state transitions. We should note that at the time of writing his essay in Theoretical

Biology and Complexity, passages of which we have quoted from above, Rosen’s distinction
between a simple system or mechanism and a machine was not yet made clear. Furthermore,
formally, discrete dynamical systems form a subclass of mathematical machines. And it is for
this reason that neither can serve as models for (M, R) – networks, much less (M, R) –
systems since they cannot admit functional entailments.
Now, to be clearer, recall that the (M, R) – network that we have been considering is
a simple formal system; all of its models are simulable; while it is a mechanism, it is not a
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machine and so cannot be modeled by dynamical system theory. In part, the reason for this
is that in dynamical system theory f cannot both be a state and a force, or formally, f cannot
be both an object and a mapping. And this raises the question: what kinds of material
structures can physically realize something that could be both a state and a force? The
situation for an (M, R) – system, an organism, gets drastically worse: if we interpret our
mappings as forces, in the simple (M, R) – network only one force, f, is internalized or
entailed within the system. However, in an (M, R) – system every force is internalized or
entailed within the system; this is just another way of saying that a material system is closed
to efficient causation. Also, if one tries to interpret the mappings in (M, R) – systems as the
states of a dynamical system, there must be an initial state, but there cannot be one since
closure to efficient causation means that the existence of every mapping within the system
is codependent on every other, and this codependency, as we saw in Section 6.3, forms an
infinite loop. Even during the period of these early investigations, in 1972, regarding the
realization problem, Rosen writes:
To relate the (M, R) systems to actual individual physical cells, however,
requires an identification of the components which comprise the (M, R)
systems in terms of the structural characteristics of the cells themselves. This
problem can be approached in a number of ways, all them leading to the
conclusion that there is no simple relationship between the functional notion
of a component and the structure which our methods of observation discern
in cells; the functional organization seems to cut across physical structures
and landmarks in a complicated way, while the same physical structure seems
to be simultaneously and inextricably involved in a variety of functional
activities.9
Many years later in Life Itself, Rosen writes:

9
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Organization in its turn inherently involves functions and their interrelations;
the abandonment of fractionability, however means that there is no kind of 1
to 1 relationship between such relational, functional organizations and the
structures which realize them. These are the basic differences between
organisms and mechanisms or machines10
And as Louie points out:
This lack of one-to-one correspondence between functions and structures is
inherent in the nature of these two classes of alternate descriptions. A
functional organization cuts across physical structures, and physical structure
is simultaneously involved in a variety of functional activities. So an (M, R) –
system is not realized by identifying its components and maps in a “concrete”
biological example. To tackle the biological realization problem of (M, R) –
systems, one ought not to be seeking physicochemical implementations of
what the relations are, but ought to instead to be seeking interpretations of
what the relations do.11
In large part, what we have presented in this section, are the kinds of problems that
forced Rosen into his studies of scientific epistemology and the reasons why it was necessary
for a fundamental rethinking how to go about realizing any kind of abstract relational
description.
7.2 Complex Systems, Again
It seems to have taken Rosen quite some time to realize the profound implications of
(M, R) – systems and the development of his theory of complexity, that we have presented
thus far.
Rosen’s initial conception of the difference between a simple and a complex natural
system is based on the number of ways in which it is possible to interact with the natural
system in question:

10
11
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A [natural] system is simple to the extent that a single description suffices to
account for our interactions with the [natural] system; a [natural] system is
complex to the extent that this fails to be true.12
In Anticipatory Systems, Rosen refines this initial conception:

We are going to define a system to be complex to the extent that we can
observe it in non-equivalent ways.13
It would appear that the difference between the latter and the former is that now, one

and the same natural system may be considered to be simple or complex depending on how
we can interact with the system; thus, complexity and simplicity are relative concepts:
A [natural] system appears complex when it is possible to generate many
apparently independent descriptions of its behaviors. Each independent
description must arise out of a different process for observing the system and
hence out of a distinct available mechanism that enables us to interact with
the system. For example, a stone usually appears simpler than an organism,
because we only have a few ways to interact with the stone, and many ways to
interact with the organism. As we increase our interaction with the stone, its
complexity grows; as we narrow our capabilities to interact with an organism,
its complexity diminishes.14
Unlike his final concept of complexity which we presented in Section 4.5, at this point
Rosen sees complexity as a contingent rather than an intrinsic property of a natural system.
In Life Itself, Rosen tell us that its Praeludium was written some weeks after the
manuscript for Life Itself was finished. The Praeludium is based on a talk he gave in Japan in
1989. Recalling our discussion of Gödel’s theorem in Section 4.4, in the Praeludium,
regarding complexity, Rosen writes:

Rosen, Fundamentals of Measurement, 112.
Rosen, Anticipatory Systems, 298. Note that Rosen wrote the manuscript for Anticipatory Systems in the
1970s and was not published until 1985. This quotation comes from an appendix which Rosen wrote in 1984.
14 Rosen, “Bifurcations and Biological Observables,” 289.
12
13
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In this light Gödel’s theorem says that Number Theory is more complex than
any of its formalizations, or equivalently, that formalizations, governed by
syntactic inference alone, are simpler than Number Theory. […]
The relation between Number Theory and a formalization of it can be iterated.
That is: in the discussion so far, I have treated Number Theory as a “system,”
and formalizations as “models” of it. As we have seen, formalizations, being
purely syntactic, have too little entailment to capture all of the qualities of
Number Theory itself. But as I have said, Number Theory is in itself a system
of entailments, not only in itself a perfectly good mathematical system, but in
many ways the very center of mathematics. Let us suppose we treat it as a
model (i.e., as we treated formalizations before) and ask what it can model.
The question immediately arises: are there other mathematical formalisms
too rich in entailment to be captured by Number Theory, and hence more
complex than it? The answer is of course, yes; in fact we can iterate this
process, obtaining more and more complex formalisms indefinitely.15
There are several things to take note of in these passages. The first is that unlike his
earlier conceptions, Rosen is thinking metaphorically about what he sees as an indication of
complexity in mathematical systems that is applicable to natural ones; the reason that
number theory is non-formalizable is that it is complex, as we said, inherently semantic and
non-reducible to syntax; and as such, number theory can have no largest model, recalling
that simple systems must have a largest model. The second is that, like his final conception
of complexity we presented in Section 4.5, complexity is now an intrinsic property of number
theory or systems in general, and not a contingent one. However, lastly, there appears to be
an important difference in the notion of complexity in this passage and the way we presented
Rosen’s final conception of complexity in Section 4.5. We said that there is an absolute
distinction between complex and simple systems; unlike a simple system, a complex system
has a closed path of efficient causation, a hierarchical cycle with two or more efficient causes
entailing one another. This, of course, implies that any system meeting this criterion is

15
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complex. In the above passage though, Rosen is claiming that within the realm of complex
mathematical systems, there is a potentially infinite hierarchy of degrees of complexity; and
each system in the hierarchy is more complex than the preceding one.
Also, later on in Life Itself, in Section 5k, Rosen presents his first representation of
diagram [3.6.3] of the simplest (M, R) – network, although not yet in relational form. He
refers to its cycle, which has only one efficient cause functionally entailed, as a “loop that is
closed.” But this is confusing since, later on, a loop that is closed means an impredicative
cycle containing two more functionally entailing efficient causes, again, his final definition of
complexity.16 As a matter of fact, the term impredicativity and its association with
complexity, only appears once in Life Itself, near the very end of the book. When discussing
the problem of protein folding:
This in turn may be regarded as creating an imprecicativity, the hallmark of
complex systems, and precisely the sort of thing which syntax alone cannot
handle.17
This is interesting since, obviously, impredicativity is at the heart of Gödel’s
incompleteness theorem, but he does not make the connection explicit between
impredicativity and complexity in his Praeludium, which again, was written after Life Itself.

Essays on Life Itself was published two years after Rosen’s passing. It is only in the
essays therein, written after the publication of Life Itself, that Rosen presents an outline of
his final theory of complexity and makes explicit that it is based on impredicativity. More, as
Louie tells us in More Than Life Itself, one of the things Rosen was working on before he

16
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passed was a book tentatively titled Complexity. Unfortunately, Rosen only had only
completed a very small portion of the book.
We should note that although Rosen changes his notion of complexity throughout his
work, his earlier notions, even though they no longer serve as a definition of complexity, still
provide vital insights into the modeling of natural systems and their behaviors.
7.3 Realization, Fabrication, and The Origin of Life
Returning to the realization problem, not only is the fabrication of life a realization
problem, but so too is the origin of life. In the structuralist approach to system theory, neither
of these two problems have any clearly defined solutions. As Rashevsky points out in Section
3.1, there is no criterion in physics or chemistry to determine whether a system is animate
or inanimate but more, what this means is that insofar as the origin of life is concerned, is
that there is nothing at the level of the laws of physics or chemistry that entails the existence
of organisms; it is easy for us to imagine a universe in which the same physical and chemical
laws hold but in which there is no life. Additionally, the origin-of-life problem is exacerbated
by the facts that (a) we can also imagine there having been a time in which there were only
inorganic systems; it must then be the case that under some conditions the inorganic became
organic, and (b) the only organisms that we know of are those that have been generated from
preexisting ones. Actually, Rosen points out that there are two origin-of-life problems: what
he calls the general problem of the origin of life and the restricted problem of the origin of
life. The general problem is the determination of conditions under which inorganic matter
can become organic. The restricted problem is the determination of the specific conditions
under which inorganic matter became organic here on earth. The general problem is entirely
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scientific, while the restricted problem is both a scientific and an historical one. The
restricted problem is more difficult in that crucial historical information has been lost.
Nonetheless, Rosen argues that relational biology represents an important addition to a
solution to the origin-of-life problem, since it must be the case that whatever a cell is
structurally, in terms of its physiochemical constitution, it is the realization of an (M, R) –
system.
Now, as we alluded to in Section 7.1, Rosen’s failed attempts to realize an (M, R) –
system as a dynamical system and also the development of his theory of complexity
necessitated an entirely new approach to the realization problem.
Let us look at the realization problem a bit more in terms of the modeling relation. In
both traditional science and relational system theory as we have presented thus far, the

existence of a natural system is taken for granted. As we showed in Chapter 2, the purpose
of the modeling relation is to capture a system’s epistemology. With the realization problem,
however, one starts with a model and a realization of that model is the creation of a material
system, a manifestation of an epistemology; in particular, the creation of a material system
that manifests the epistemology of an (M, R) – system. The creation of a material system is
not just an epistemological problem but also an ontological one. As such, the realization
problem, involves an entirely new category of causation: immanent causation, for which
Rosen means the entailment of the existence of something.
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In Rosen’s later investigations for a solution to the realization problem, he finds what
he believes to be crucial insights from pre-Newtonian science. The general scheme for preNewtonian science, is, for Rosen:18
CONCRETE SYSTEM = EXISTENCE + ESSENCE
The existence of a concrete system is its ontology; its creation, its origins, its
development. The essence of a concrete system is its epistemology; its behaviors, its
operations, its physiology. In pre-Newtonian science, the essence of a system can be further
analyzed into:
ESSENCE = GENERAL + PARTICULARS
The general is what allows for concrete systems to be compared and classified in
terms of the essential properties they share in common. The particular is what allows for
concrete systems to be compared and classified in terms of the essential properties that
distinguishes concrete systems from one another. In terms of entailments, there are two
important features of pre-Newtonian science: first, existence and essence are categorically
independent; the existence of a system, how it came to be, need not entail anything about its
essence, its physiology, and conversely. Second, the general and the particular are also
categorically independent; the general, the essences that concrete systems have in common,
need not entail anything about their particular essences, their distinguishing properties, and
conversely.

18

Note that this is not the same sense in which the term pre-Newtonian is used in Section 3.1.
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What Rosen argues is that Newtonian-based science is a simplification of the above
scheme which is predicated on the denial of the independence of these pre-Newtonian
categories and its modes of analysis and synthesis. This denial results in two Newtonianbased hypotheses. The first is:
EPISTEMOLOGY ENTAILS ONTOLOGY
With this hypothesis it is presumed that knowing a concrete system’s essence, its
behaviors, its operations, its physiology, allows one to know its ontology, its creation, its
origins, its development. In other words, the knowledge of a concrete system’s essence
guarantees knowledge of a concrete system’s ontology and the latter is reduced to the
former, thus:
CONCRETE SYSTEM = ESSENCE
The second hypothesis is:
PARTICULARS ENTAIL GENERALITIES
With this hypothesis it is presumed that the only way to learn about the general
properties that concrete systems may have is through the study of the particular properties
of concrete systems. For example, the only way to learn about life, a general property, is
through the study of particular organisms, and not the other way around; one cannot study
life, the general, to know anything about individual organisms, the particular. Again, in other
words, the knowledge of particular concrete systems guarantees knowledge of their general
properties and latter are reduced to the former, thus:
ESSENCE = PARTICULARS
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Putting these two hypotheses together, the Newtonian simplification asserts that:
PARTICULARS ENTAIL EVERYTHING
And this, Rosen argues, is a hallmark of Newtonian-based science which means that:
Seen in this light, the Newtonian simplification amounts to the imposition of
constraints on the natural philosophy that came before. By the term constraint
I mean the assertion of dependence between things that were initially
independent. The effect of any such constraint is to single out, from the original
universe of discourse, that special class of things that happen to satisfy the
constraints. But the principal hypothesis, the one on which contemporary
physics ultimately rests, and which does all the damage, is this: The special

class that we have singled out by imposing the above constraints is, in fact, the
whole class. […] We can begin to see how much metaphysics is actually
involved in the Newtonian simplification. So much for his “Hypothesis non
Fingo.”19
This special class will be whatever structural, analytic, reductionist units that satisfy
the imposed constraints, elementary particles, molecules, neurons, etc.20
Most importantly, Rosen argues that
Organisms take us outside this special world, into a realm where particulars
do not necessarily entail generalities and where knowledge of a how a system
works does not entail how it is created. Since our problem is with fabrication
(i.e., with ontology), we simply cannot solve it by epistemological means alone
in a world where ontology and epistemology are different.21
In other words, the first step in resolving the realization problem requires a preNewtonian approach in which ontology and immanent causation must first be treated as
categorically distinct from epistemology and also the understanding that particulars do not
necessarily entail generalities.

Rosen, Essays on Life Itself, 258.
Recall Section 3.3.
21 Rosen, Essays on Life Itself, 258 – 259.
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It should be noted, that particulars do not entail generalities is one of the fundamental
underlying assumptions of relational system theory and is involved in our entire
presentation of it thus far; organization, simplicity, complexity, and life are developed as
generalities and objects of scientific study in their own right, again, independent of any
particular systems that may manifest these generalities. This is just another way of
expressing the fact in relational system theory, organization is treated as a thing in itself .22
Now, as we stated above, the realization problem is an ontological problem, involving
immanent causation, the entailment of the existence of something. Formally, as Rosen and
Louie show, immanent causation can be expressed as follows:
If an object b is entailed, then there exists a mapping f such that f entails b, f ˫ b. This
implicitly implies the existence of an object A, an element a in A, and the hom-set H(A, B)
which gives f: a ↦ b. What this means is that entailment itself entails the existence of an

efficient cause, in our case, the mapping f. More, if a mapping f in the hom-set H(A, B) is
functionally entailed, then there exist a mapping g such that g entails f, g ˫ f. This implicitly
implies the existence of an object X, an element x in X, and the home-set H(X, H(A, B)) which
gives g: x ↦ f:
(˫ f) ˫ (Ǝg : g ˫ f)
Succinctly, the entailment of the mapping f entails the existence of the mapping g and
this, formally, is immanent causation.

22

Recall Section 3.3.
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And of course, we have seen the mapping g: X → H(A, B) before, in Section 1.2. And
also recall from Chapter 6, that for the hom-set H(X, H(A, B)), we can let X equal B and we
get the hom-set for ɸ, H(B, H(A, B)) and when we compose it with f: A → B, we get the (M, R)
– network, ɸ ∘ f: A → B → H(A, B), diagram [3.6.3]:

So now we have
(˫ f) ˫ (Ǝɸ : ɸ ˫ f)
Which reads: the entailment of the mapping f entails the existence of the mapping ɸ,
such that the mapping ɸ entails the mapping f.
Thus, Rosen discovers that the (M, R) – network is not only a model for metabolism
and repair but also a model the fabrication of systems in general; the solution to any
realization problem automatically generates an (M, R) – network.
In the (M, R) – [networks] 23 we have just described, the component ɸ, which
embodies the function we call repair, is the fabricator of f. The physiology of ɸ
is precisely the fabrication of f, and the (M, R) – [network] itself describes the

23 Confusingly, sometimes Rosen uses (M, R) – system to mean both an (M, R) –

network and an (M, R) – system.
Sometimes he calls what we have been calling an (M, R) – system a replicating (M, R) – system. We have
replaced (M, R) – system with (M, R) – network to avoid this confusion.
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situation in which the fabrication process itself has been pulled inside the very
system in which what is fabricated is operating.
Every (M, R) – [network] is thus, in itself, a little factory of fabrication. To
realize an (M, R) – [network] is to produce a kind of factory, within which
another kind of factory is itself entailed. Conversely, whenever we pull a
fabricator inside a system by putting it together with what it fabricates, the
result is essentially an (M, R) – network.24
Another way of saying this is that formally, immanent causation has the “same”
structure (isomorphic) that the entailment of metabolism by repair has in an (M, R) network. The fabrication of a system involves an efficient cause that takes a material cause
and generates another efficient cause for another process; immanent cause, the entailment
of the existence of something, by its very nature, involves the existence of other components,
other functions.
Rosen’s proposed solution to the realization problem in Life Itself and Essays on Life

Itself is presented in a rather cryptical way, but appears to be as follows: the major difficulty
in realizing an (M, R) – system is the physical fabrication of the mapping b which gives the
system its closure to efficient cause by entailing ɸ. As we have shown in Section 6.2, Rosen
demonstrates formally that there is already enough entailment in the (M, R) – network,
ɸ ∘ f: A → B → H(A, B), to entail the mapping ɸ, by constructing the inverse evaluation
mapping b̂ -1: H(A, B) → H(B, H(A, B)), and that this is not the only way. This however, does
not mean that an (M, R) – network, physically, has enough entailment to close itself to
efficient causation; in particular it is a simple system and since simple and complex systems
are different in kind, means that its own self-closure is impossible. Now the replicator b is
not part of the (M, R) – network, but suppose that it belongs to some larger system. If it is

24
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possible to embed the (M, R) – network into this larger system it will provide the (M, R) –
network the replicator b to functionally entail ɸ and fabricate the original system. If this can
be done then it is the means by which a new autonomous life form can be created, an
organism. But, as Rosen remarks: “What does it take to build an organism? It takes a lot more
than we presently have. That is why the problem is so hard, but also why it is so
instructive.”25
It is interesting to note that Part II of Essays of Life Itself consists of five essays Rosen
devoted to the mind-body problem. Rosen was not so much interested in the mind-body
problem, a problem over which so many scientists and philosophers obsess. Rosen saw any
solution to the mind-body problem as a corollary of the solution to the “What is life?”
problem and the realization problem, since, he argues, systems would first have to be living
in order for them to become sentient.
As we said above, we can imagine a time in which there was only inorganic matter
and that under certain conditions inorganic matter had to somehow become organic.
Similarly, Rosen would argue, against panpsychism, there must had been a time in which the
non-sentient had to somehow become sentient; i.e., that the “objective” world had to
somehow generate the subjective. Approaches to both the origin-of-life and the origin-ofmind problem involve running these two processes backwards, from the organic to the
inorganic, from the sentient to the non-sentient.
In one of the essays in Part II of Essays on Life Itself, “Mind as Phenotype”, Rosen asks
us to consider an analogy of his between the history of mathematics and the origins and

25
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evolution of life and mind. Historically, mathematics did not begin with the simplest,
formalizable, “objective” systems from which more complex and nonformalizable systems
developed. The history of mathematics runs the other way; the attempts to formalize and
simplify mathematics is only a very recent development. In particular, Hilbert’s program
which we discussed in Section 4.1. Rosen reminds us that Gödel’s incompleteness theorem
demonstrates that formalizable, simple systems in mathematics are non-generic. As such,
formalizable and simple systems are not useful means for understanding the development
or the nature of mathematics as a whole. He ends his essay with these remarks and we would
like to end our study with them as well:
My suggestion is to take this mathematical metaphor seriously in the material
world as well—namely, that diachronic evolutionary processes do not
necessarily go from simple to complex in matter, any more than they do in
mathematics.26

26
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